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Abstract
Very little research has focussed on inexperienced pilots and there is a notion in 
literature and popular texts that such pilots are one of the safest groups. Despite this, 
‘early-solo’ UK glider pilots were found to have a higher accident rate than any other 
group. Research was conducted in order to investigate the issues surrounding this. It 
was identified that accidents sustained by these pilots tended to be initiated by events in 
the approach and landing phases of fight, and caused by misjudgement of the approach 
path and landing flare. Most accidents to more experienced pilots were found to be 
different in all respects. It was subsequently found that instructors believed the highest 
accident likelihood to be associated with more experience pilots, in line with literature. 
It was also found that instructors wrongly believed that the ‘approach’ phase was the 
least likely in-flight phase to be associated with accident causes for low-hours pilots. 
Critical Incident Technique was used to investigate instructor decisions with regard to 
sending pilots solo. An initial model of the decision process was put forward. It was 
found that, with one critical exception, when events occurred on assessment flights that 
were similar to causal accident factors (from the accident analysis), instructors 
disallowed solo flight. An absence of potential accident factors was apparently 
insufficient to allow solo flight by itself; instructors required further evidence in order to 
confirm that students were ready to fly alone. Exceptionally, pilot performance in terms 
of the approach path did not appear to be a critical factor when instructors considered 
disallowing solo flight, highlighting a possible gap in the instructor decision process.  It 
was recommended that further research be conducted to validate and extend the decision 
model, and that the approach phase be focussed upon more in both training and 
assessment.
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1Chapter 1 - Introduction
Gliding is a popular form of recreational and sport flying. In 2005 there were 9,000 
active pilots in the UK and 20,000 licensed pilots in the USA (Jarvis & Harris 2007a). 
Evidence shows that accidents continue to occur annually; in a single five year period 
there were 117 non-fatal and 26 fatal gliding accidents in the USA alone (van Doorn & 
de Voogt 2007). It has been shown that 80% of these accidents were attributable to 
‘pilot error’, including the majority of fatal accidents (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). 
There is some suggestion in the statistics that certain flight phases contribute to more 
accidents than others, although this evidence is very limited. The ‘cruise’ phase has 
been shown to be associated with high numbers of accidents (van Doorn & Zijlstra 
2006), although it is not clear what is meant by the ‘cruise’ phase for a glider, and the 
only other in-flight phases in this research were ‘landing’ and ‘take-off’. With the 
exception of the research already cited, there is no published research that looks at
gliding accidents or safety.
Much research has focussed on other forms of recreational and light aviation, and 
particularly general aviation (GA). However it would be a mistake to simply generalise 
the results of these analyses across to gliding in order to inform safety programmes. 
Powered aircraft operate quite differently to gliders in every part of flight. Gliders 
launch in a very different manner to the way in which powered aircraft take off, they 
cannot sustain flight for long periods without the correct environmental conditions and 
they require different techniques and different controls in order to land. Accident 
statistics show that major causes of accidents in general aviation include ‘fuel 
management’, ‘poor selection of terrain for take-off’, and ‘go-around decisions’ 
(Wiegmann et al 2005). None of these are applicable to gliders. Glider pilots are 
arguably more vulnerable in other ways. They lack a number of general options when 
flying due to having no power available, for example they cannot ‘hold’ in order to wait 
for conditions to improve or for a runway to become available, and they cannot reject a 
poor circuit or approach by performing a ‘go-around’. It is therefore likely that there are 
accident themes in gliding that would not appear in powered aviation. For these reasons 
2it is important that research takes place specifically for gliding, in order that remedial 
action can be taken to reduce accidents.
It has been found that only 5% of ‘pilot-error’ related gliding accidents are due to 
inexperience (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). However the definition of inexperience is 
not given, and it is not explained how pilot inexperience was the ‘cause’ of these 
accidents. Popular literature from many forms of aviation asserts there is a band of 
moderate pilot experience which accounts for the highest accident rates (see Pratt 2000, 
Telfer 1993, Jenson 1995) and this band does not include highly inexperienced pilots. In 
gliding it has been proposed that early solo pilots are ‘statistically’ safer than other 
pilots (Piggott 1997).
Prior to any research being conducted, all UK accident data from 1997 to 2006 (British 
Gliding Association 2007b) were used to produce a number of simple frequency 
distributions of accident totals grouped by pilot experience. The experience level was 
expressed as the total number of hours gliding that the pilot had accumulated as pilot-in-
command at the time of the accident. This is how pilot experience is expressed in the 
British Gliding Association accident database as well as many previous studies (see 
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association - AOPA 2006, Booze 1977, Hasselquist 1999, 
O’Hare and Chalmers 1999, van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). Statistical analysis was not 
performed due to the fact that, in common with the flying totals, the accident database 
represented the entire population of accidents for the period, and therefore statistical 
tests would have been inappropriate (Ludwig 2005).
Two frequency distribution charts are shown. Figure 1.1 shows pilot experience 
grouped by brackets of 10 hours (up to 189.9 hours) and Figure 1.2 shows brackets of 
one hour (up to 9.9 hours). Each chart shows the accident counts for the ten year period 
1997 – 2006 (inclusive) as well as the count for the most recent three year period (2004 
-6).
3Figure 1.1.  Frequency distribution of all UK gliding accidents grouped by pilot 
experience (10 hour brackets). Each block of ten hours experience is shown on the 
horizontal axis, and the number of accidents is on the vertical axis: 1997 – 2006 
(left), 2004 – 2006 inclusive (right). 
Figure 1.1 shows that the highest accident count belongs to the least experienced pilot 
group. Indeed when taken over a ten year period, the ‘under-10’ bracket has over twice 
the number of accidents of any other bracket. The most recent three year period (2004 –
2006) has the same general pattern as the ten-year period (1997 – 2006) and there is 
therefore reason to believe that the recent three-year period is representative of long-
term accident trends in UK gliding.
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4Figure 1.2. Frequency distribution of all UK gliding accidents grouped by pilot 
experience (1 hour brackets). Each block of one hour is shown on the horizontal 
axis, the number of accidents is on the vertical axis; 1997 – 2006 (left), 2004 – 2006 
inclusive (right). 
Figure 1.2 shows that proportionally more accidents occurred to pilots in their very first 
hour of flying. It can be seen that a recent three-year period (2004 – 2006) is broadly 
similar to the most recent ten-year period (1997 – 2006).
These simple charts suggest that there is a concerning trend. Raw UK gliding accident 
totals show consistently decreasing numbers of accidents with pilot experience, even 
when looked at in terms of single hours of flight experience, or when numbers are 
relatively small (2004 - 2006 only). This appears to be out of line with popular notions 
and indicates that, as a group, inexperienced UK glider pilots may require attention. 
Research is required into what factors cause these high accident totals in order that 
remedial action can be taken. 
However to proceed with such research on the basis of this evidence alone would be 
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5likely to have accidents than experienced ones would involve the unsupported 
assumption that there is a constant exposure for all pilots (Li 1994). It cannot be known 
from accident counts alone whether this observed trend is simply a reflection of the 
amount of hours and launches flown by inexperienced pilots, compared to more 
experienced pilots. Inevitably the total number of flights taken across the glider 
population also decreases with experience. It is self-evident that more glider pilots get 
exposed to their tenth solo hour than their hundredth, since like any activity there will 
be an inevitable amount of participation attrition. Therefore the trend displayed in 
figures 1.1 and 1.2 could simply reflect this attrition rate, or even be opposed to it.
Instead of accepting the trend from the simplistic data analysis and proposing research 
aimed at investigating it, there is first a need to review literature around this area and to 
obtain and analyse appropriate data to confirm or discount the notion that inexperienced 
glider pilots are a particularly vulnerable group.
6
7Chapter 2 - Analysis of accident totals against exposure measures for low hours 
glider pilots
This study was published as:
Jarvis, S. Harris, D. (2007b), Accident Rates for Novice glider pilots Vs pilots with 
experience. Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine Vol 78: p.1155-1158
Introduction
A best selling UK gliding textbook claims that “Statistically, your first solo flights are 
safer than most other flights because the pilot has recently revised all the critical 
situations and is in good flying practice” (Piggott 1997). No reference is given for this
statistic.
The quote corresponds to the popular assertion referred to in the previous chapter that 
pilots with a moderate amount of flying experience, rather than the least experienced 
pilots, have the highest accident rates, whereas low-hours pilots have a low risk of being 
involved in an accident. In powered aircraft flying, where most research has been 
conducted, there are many claims to this effect. Jenson (1995) relates that there is a 
“universally well-known high accident rate for pilots with between 100 and 300 total 
flying hours”, while Olsen and Rasmussen (1989) state that the greatest risk to pilots 
occurs at “around the 100 hour mark”. However the source of these figures is not given. 
Telfer (1993) claims that low-hours pilots are less represented than more experienced 
pilots in accident statistics, and are therefore a relatively safe group. 
No studies of glider statistics are available to support claims regarding the relative 
safety of inexperienced glider pilots, but other forms of recreational aviation, 
particularly general aviation, have been studied. 
In U.S. general aviation it has been found that cumulative flight time experience 
increases the rate of accident involvement, peaking between 1001 and 2000 hours, when 
the rate begins to reduce (Booze 1977). Pilots with 10 hours or less have been shown to 
8have the lowest accident rate of any experience group; over ten times less than the 1001 
– 2000 hour group (Booze 1977). This particular study has been cited by many authors 
(e.g. O’Hare et al 2001, Telfer 1993).
Many general aviation textbooks report accident figures in a way that supports the trend 
of these claims. Wells (1992) states that the highest proportion of accidents take place to 
pilots with between 100 and 499 hours.  Pratt (2000), using a simple count of accidents, 
observed that out of 300 UK fatal accidents: “Less than 5% of the fatalities were student 
pilots; far more instructors and professional pilots were involved in fatal accidents” 
(Pratt 2000). 
The notion that highly inexperienced pilots are relatively safe has attracted theoretical 
explanations based on psychological mechanisms such as increased risk-taking 
behaviour, overconfidence and an increased perception of ‘invulnerability’. Booze 
claims that “Overconfidence and lack of vigilance by high time pilots have been cited as 
possible contributors to the situation” (Booze 1977) although no references are given. 
Some more recent studies support the existence of such mechanisms.
Telfer (1989) describes the findings of such a study, often referred to as ‘The Australian 
Study’ (Telfer & Ashman 1986);
At the beginning of their training, student pilots recognised that their judgement 
could be a source of danger to themselves and others. After accumulating flying 
hours over half a year they were less prepared to concede that their judgement 
could be defective. Such a perceptual shift might correspond to the high accident 
rate of pilots who have total flying hours in the range of 100 – 300 hours. They 
may have a similarly optimistic view of their invulnerability (Telfer 1989).
In a simulated decision making test of mixed pilots, O’Hare (1990) found that 
experienced pilots were more likely to choose to accept a marginal VFR flight than less 
experienced ones, although the results only tended towards significance. The data 
suggested that greater experience led to a higher risk utility and a greater sense of 
9‘invulnerability’ (O’Hare 1990). Wichman and Ball (1983) found evidence that 
“aviators with more experience and exposure develop stronger self-serving biases” 
(from O’Hare 1990).
There is a growing body of evidence that appears to refute these claims, and suggest 
relatively high accident rates exist among inexperienced pilots. In a study of homebuilt 
aircraft accidents for the single year of 1993, Hasselquist and Baker (1999) found that 
student pilots were involved in 18% of the 52 fatal accidents recorded, although no 
exposure measure was collected. Considering that the mean total flight time of 
homebuilt aircraft pilots (from the accident data) was 3088 hours, it would be very 
surprising if student pilots accounted for 18% of the total ‘non-accident’ flying hours. 
Hence this suggests a high accident rate among student pilots. A high incidence of fatal 
accidents among ultralight pilots with less than 40 hours experience on the specific 
aircraft type (make/model) has been found (Pagan, De Voogt & Van Doorn 2007). 
Although this effect disappeared when overall experience was factored in, there was no 
hint that relatively more experienced pilots were at greater risk than low-hours pilots. A 
recent study by The Flight Safety Foundation pointed out that “Pilots with fewer than 
200 hours total time are the most vulnerable and those with fewer than 10 hours in make 
and model are more vulnerable still” (AOPA 2006). These studies hint at the possibility 
that low-hours pilots may in fact have a higher relative accident rate, or at least have a 
rate no lower than the average for the pilot population. 
Unfortunately, all of these studies are based simply on counts of accident data. Without 
properly accounting for the amount of flying that pilots of different experience groups 
are exposed to, accident studies cannot fully support or revoke claims made regarding 
accident involvement and experience. This can only be done by properly factoring in an 
appropriate measure of the amount of flying that each group undertakes (an exposure 
measure). A failure to do so leads to the unsupportable assumption that the amount of 
flying is constant for different groups (Li 1994). 
The difficulty of gathering appropriate exposure data to revoke or support such claims 
remains a problem with the research literature. Accident data are relatively easy to get 
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access to and often contain considerable detail including pilot experience information. 
However accident counts alone cannot show the likelihood of accidents occurring.
Neither Wells (1992) nor Pratt (2000) gave any indication of overall numbers of pilots 
in any categories, nor the amount of flying they had done. Therefore even if their
figures are correct, they may represent an inaccurate picture of the situation.  For 
example in the year 2000 a UK student pilot only needed to log a minimum of nine
hours solo flying for the qualification of a PPL (A), meaning student pilots (as pilot in 
command) had very few solo hours of exposure. This total may be very low compared 
to other pilots, and it is possible that Pratt’s claim that fewer than 5% of fatalities were 
student pilots could in fact equate to a very high accident rate in comparison to other 
pilot experience groups. 
Hence these sorts of studies cannot provide objective comparisons of accident rates 
between particular groups (e.g. inexperienced against experienced pilots). This can only 
be done by factoring in a measure of the amount of flying that each group is exposed to 
(an exposure measure), meaning a figure representing the amount of flying done by 
each pilot group, recorded either as numbers of hours flown or number of flights. Such 
data is not easily available. In recreational aviation the only records of hours flown by 
pilots in particular experience groups are contained within an individual pilot’s logbook 
(O’Hare & Chalmers 1999).  This makes it very difficult to produce appropriate 
measures of exposure, and helps to explain why few studies use them.
It is important to select an appropriate measure of exposure. According to Li (1994) 
studies often incorrectly use ‘crashes per pilot per year’ as an exposure measure, which 
would fail to give accurate information about flight time. An effective exposure 
measure should include a factor equating to the amount of accident-free flying done by 
groups of interest, in order to calculate the relative frequency of accident occurrence for 
true comparisons between the groups. Booze (1977) factored in the numbers of pilots in 
each group of interest, as obtained from medical records, and rates were constructed by 
comparing the number of ‘accident’ pilots in each group by the number of ‘non-
accident’ pilots. Li (1994) has effectively demonstrated that the effect shown by Booze 
11
(1977) was reversed when controlled for by pilot-flight-hours per group, rather than 
simply the theoretical number of active pilots.
This is supported by other studies using measures of exposure that have shown that 
inexperienced pilots are more vulnerable to pilot error accidents. Borowsky (1981) used 
comprehensive records kept by the US Navy in order to collect accurate figures for pilot 
exposure and accident involvement. It was found that for US Navy pilots there was a 
significant decrease in accidents involving ‘pilot error’ (as defined within the database) 
as total flight hours increased. The only recent study of recreational aviation to use a 
sophisticated measure of flight time exposure was carried out by O’Hare and Chalmers 
(1999), who produced the exposure measures from a large study of pilot logbooks in 
New Zealand. It was found that when controlled by measures of flying hours per year, 
the proportion of accidents in the 100 to 200 and the 100 to 300 hour brackets were in 
fact slightly lower than the general trend across all accidents.
No study investigating the accident rates among glider pilots has been undertaken.  The 
only study so far to look at gliding found that of 114 accidents judged to have been 
caused by ‘pilot error’, only six were attributed to inexperience (van Doorn & De Voogt 
2007). However no comparable accident rates were produced for the inexperienced 
group. Apart from this study, no recent accident statistics exist for gliders (van Doorn & 
De Voogt 2007).
Research aims and objectives
Most research in recreational aviation has been shown to be limited in terms of its 
ability to objectively inform of accident rates between pilot groups, and no study that 
makes appropriate use of exposure data has focussed on very early solo pilots. The main 
reason for this may be the difficulties involved in producing exposure measures in this 
field. 
However the small amount of valid research of aviation accident databases does not 
support the popular assumptions about the existence of a zone of moderate pilot 
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experience that is particularly high risk, nor is there any good evidence to support 
notions that early solo pilots are relatively safe.  On the contrary, the studies tend to 
point towards the possibility that inexperienced pilots are relatively more vulnerable 
than others, which would mean that the popular notion could be dangerously 
misleading. Despite this, no accident studies have specifically looked at investigating 
accident risks among very early solo pilots in recreational aviation or gliding, by 
factoring in measures of flight exposure.
More such work does need to be done in order to properly inform pilots and instructors 
of the risks involved in early hours flying and establish the effectiveness of training and 
instructor judgement of student pilot suitability for solo flying.
Claims such as that by Piggott (1997) cannot be justified from the literature, and the 
small amount of valid research points in the opposite direction. This study aims to 
produce a valid estimate of the accident rate for very inexperienced UK glider pilots 





The amount of annual UK gliding was collected from ‘annual statistics’ published by 
the British Gliding Association (British Gliding Association 2004, 2005, 2006a). A 
sample of daily UK gliding log sheets (flying logs) were then collected from gliding 
clubs in order to estimate the proportion of annual flying attributable to very 
inexperienced pilots. In gliding, as in general aviation, the only individual pilot records 
are kept in pilot logbooks. However due to the particular operation required to launch 
gliders, many UK clubs keep daily log sheets of all launches, and most keep a log of 
hours flown by each glider, including the name of the pilot. Such log sheets vary in 
quality between clubs; but all give a list of daily launches and most contain individual 
flight times. These could therefore be used in order to sample the amounts of accident-
free flying done, i.e. a measure of exposure.
Three UK gliding clubs took part, all of which had active training programs, used both 
aero-tow and winch launching methods, and kept daily records with an adequate amount 
of detail from the previous three years.
Accident counts were taken from the UK database of all gliding accidents and incidents 
from 1997 to 2006 (British Gliding Association 2007b).  This contained details 
including age and experience (in hours) of the pilot in command, aircraft type, severity 
of injuries, damage to the glider and a description of what happened. All accidents 
where damage or injury were categorised as minor or above were included in the 
analysis. Incidents were not included. Additionally, ground-handling accidents (such as 
towing out winch cables, or pulling gliders out of hangers) were not included. These 
types of accidents made up 15.1% of the total in the database from 2004 to 2006. A 
small number of glider accidents did not include any data about pilot experience. This 
group made up 6.3% of the accidents from 2004 - 2006. There was no reason to suggest 
this small group of accidents was biased towards any particular experience group. Some 
were clearly experienced pilots due to the nature of the flight description, e.g. a 
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competition or long cross-country flight, whereas others were less experienced pilots, 
e.g. containing descriptive comments such as “with the aim of completing a five hour 
badge flight” or “second flight on type”. Since there was no reason to assume a 
systematic variation in terms of pilot experience, this small group of accidents was 
dropped from the analysis. Two accidents were subject to AAIB investigation and no 
information was available at the time of analysis, hence these were also dropped.
Flying hours were used as the measure of pilot experience, in line with many previous 
studies (AOPA 2006, Booze 1977, Hasselquist 1999, O’Hare & Chalmers 1999, van 
Doorn & de Voogt 2007). Two experience brackets were decided upon for this 
investigation:
1. Solo pilots with only one hour or less of experience as pilot-in-command (PIC). 
Therefore this only included those taking their first few solo flights. This will be 
referred to as Group G-1.
2. Solo pilots with 10 hours or fewer PIC experience (includes those in group 1). 
This will be referred to as Group G-10.
These groups both represent very inexperienced pilots who would have recently been 
involved in training and instruction. There were a number of firm reasons behind these 
specific groups being selected. 
Firstly, the frequency distributions of accident totals for the ten year period 1997 - 2006 
showed that twice as many accidents occurred to pilots with ten hours or fewer 
experience (G-10) as any other ten hour experience bracket (Chapter One, Figure 1.1). 
The pattern for 2004 - 2006 showed a similar general trend, with the 0 – 10 hour bracket 
having the highest accident total. The finer distribution within the ten hour bracket
showed more accidents in the very first hour than any subsequent hour (Chapter 1, 
Figure 1.2).  As previously discussed, these figures were determined from accident 
totals only, and so could not be used to draw conclusions as to the likelihood or 
proportions of these accidents occurring, since the accident distribution may simply be a 
reflection of the distribution of the amount of flying done in each bracket. However, the 
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distributions gave a clear justification to collect exposure data to clarify the meaning of 
these findings for groups G-1 and G-10.
Secondly, the first major UK gliding qualification (the BGA Bronze Badge) includes a 
requirement of ten hours of flying time or 50 launches, and begins the process of 
restrictions being lifted on pilots flying out of gliding range of their base airfield. It was 
therefore determined that ten hours was a significant experience level in UK gliding. 
However it is possible that despite having fewer than ten hours, such pilots may have 
accrued many flight cycles. Although not used in this research due to lack of complete 
records, flight cycles could be argued to be an important measure of experience in 
gliding where many flights are short, and the majority of accidents occur on landing 
(van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). This supports the need to investigate a group such as the 
G-1 group which would be certain to have a low number of flight cycles.
Thirdly, gliding clubs do not record or update information about individual pilot 
experience (apart for instructors, for regulatory reasons). Therefore although daily 
gliding log sheets do identify pilots, they do not indicate the experience of those pilots. 
To do this, pilot information would have to be constantly updated and in some cases 
sought from years for which no records existed, or sought from other clubs. Many pilots 
fly at more than one club, but not normally as pilot-in-command unless they have some 
solo experience, normally at least a BGA ‘Bronze’ badge (meaning they had flown 10 
hours solo, or had at least 50 solo flights). For these reasons pilot experience could only 
be accurately assessed from log sheets if the pilot in command had less than about ten 
hours solo. Such pilots could be identified on the log sheets (usually by club members 
or office staff) and their total flying experience traced back through archive log sheets




The proportion of annual flying exposure was estimated from a sample of daily gliding 
log sheets. Three lists of 45 random annual dates were generated, labelled List A, List B 
and List C and checked for a reasonably representative monthly distribution. In order to 
guard against systematic sampling error, a counter-balanced sampling strategy was 
used. For a given club, list A was applied to the year 2004, B to 2005 and C to 2006. At 
the next club this order was rotated one place, meaning that List C was applied to 2004, 
A to 2005 and B to 2006. This rotation continued for the third club. No cluster or 
stratified sampling was used from this point, because although the summer season sees 
the greatest number of hours and launches, there is no reliable information about the 
distribution of various types of flying that occur across the year. For example it is likely 
that the distribution of serious cross-country flying and racing is heavily clustered 
around July and August, whereas the distribution of training and local flying could be 
flatter since it does not require thermal conditions. On the other hand, glider aerobatic 
flying often decreases in the summer months due to the thermal activity and increased 
local glider traffic. Since these distributions are not known, the best sampling strategy 
was a purely random one, with enough cases to adequately represent each month of the 
year.
A high degree of confidence was required for the sample, and so a calculation was made 
to ensure that its mean was highly likely to be within 0.1 of a standard deviation from 
the population mean (to a 95% level of confidence). A sample of at least 385 days of 
data was required to provide an estimate with a 95% level of confidence that the 
measures for the flight exposure data would be within 0.1 standard deviations of the 
population mean, prior to calculating further confidence intervals (Hays 1994). In order 
to achieve this, 45 days from each of the three years were sampled from each club, 
making a sample total of 405 days (20 days above the minimum calculated). The total 
number of hours and launches flown by the G-10 and G-1 groups was summed for each 
daily log sheet, along with the total number of hours.
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Further triangulation of exposure measure:
The only UK gliding qualification with a requirement to attain a specified number of 
gliding hours is the BGA Bronze Badge, requiring 10 hours of solo flying experience 
and twenty flights, or just fifty flights (British Gliding Association 2001). Figures were 
published by the BGA from 2006 onwards giving the number of Bronze badges attained 
in the UK during 2005 and 2006 (British Gliding Association 2006a, 2007a). These 
figures were used to triangulate the exposure estimate by multiplying the number of 
Bronze badge qualifications per year by 10 and comparing to the annual hours of the 
‘G-10’ group estimate. 
A further requirement of the Bronze badge is two solo flights of at least 30 minutes
duration. Therefore it would be possible to complete 50 flights with only five hours 
experience (2 x 30mins and 48 x 5mins). Equally it would be possible to achieve 10 
hours flying without amassing 20 flights. However this would require a very 
inexperienced pilot to exploit good soaring conditions, since even from a high 3000ft 
aero-tow a glider with a normal sink rate of 200ft/min would be on the ground in 15 
minutes without the use of lift. Therefore whereas not all pilots qualifying for a Bronze 
badge will have exactly 10 hours, the variation either side will be relatively small for the 
majority of claimants. The expectation therefore is that if the G-10 group exposure 
calculation were accurate (in terms of the number of hours flown), it should not be too 
far from the number of annual Bronze badges multiplied by 10 (for hours). Naturally 
some pilots drop out of the sport without reaching the Bronze badge, and therefore the 
direction of any expected difference should show as a slightly higher number of hours 
in the exposure measure than this bronze badge calculation.
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Treatment of data
The mean number of launches and hours flown per day (for 2004 - 2006) was calculated 
for groups G-1 and G-10 from the exposure data collected. The mean number of hours 
and launches for all flying done (also as a daily figure) from 2004 to 2006 at the three
clubs involved was taken from the BGA annual statistics (British Gliding Association 
2004, 2005, 2006a). This meant that an accurate figure could be known for this 
measure, rather than a sample estimate. Having estimated figures of flying hours and 
launches for the low-hours pilot groups and derived the same figures for all pilots, the 
flight exposure measure for G-1 and G-10 pilots could be produced for the three year 
period. This was required in order to enable comparison with accident totals derived 
from the same three year period. Three estimates of flying exposure for inexperienced 
pilots (related to the period 2004 - 2006) were produced; an upper and lower estimate 
based on the 95% level of confidence, and a mid-point between the two (a mean 
estimate).
Accident rates were derived by dividing the total number of accidents for each group 
(from the BGA accident database: British Gliding Association 2007b) by the estimated 
number of hours and launches flown by that group over the same period. The overall 
accident rate (for all pilots) was obtained from known accident numbers and known 
totals for the amount of flying undertaken, from the data provided by the BGA.
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Results
The results for this study are in two sections. Firstly the statistics for the exposure 
measures are displayed and secondly the accident rates are shown.
Section 1 - Exposure measure
The mean number of launches per day per club from BGA population parameters was 
29.5 launches. Because these were necessarily calculated from annual totals, rather than 
daily totals, standard deviations could not be produced. Although not used, the same 
figures estimated from the sample data of 405 days flying were 28.7 launches/day (sd = 
32.5) and 13.6 h/day (sd = 22.3).  This suggested that the sample data were a good 
representation of daily UK gliding movements for that three-year period.
Table 2.1 shows the number of launches and hours collected from each group from the 
sample (405 days) along with the mean daily total and the standard deviation.
Table 2.1. Statistics for the 405 days of data collection.










G-1 Launches (n) 54 0.13 0.5 0.025 0.18 0.08
G-1 Hours (h) 8.62 0.02 0.09 0.004 0.03 0.01
G-10 Launches (n) 209 0.52 1.2 0.06 0.64 0.4
G-10 Hours (h) 84.53 0.21 0.62 0.031 0.27 0.15
Using the mean totals for all pilots (calculated from BGA parameters) along with the 
statistics (Table 2.1) the proportion of exposure was calculated for the two groups, in 
terms of launches and hours, as a percentage of UK gliding activity. These proportions 
were used to estimate the amount of flying done across the UK for the period 2004 to 
2006 inclusive (table 2.2).
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Table 2.2. Estimated number of hours and launches taken by low-hours glider 
pilots in both groups and the associated percentages of flying done in the UK 







Estimated number of launches taken 5852 4276 2700
Estimated total hours flown 896.16 633.52 370.88
Group
G-10
Estimated number of launches taken 20372 16550 12727
Estimated total hours flown 8050.23 6212.14 4374.04
Group
G-1
Percentage of launches taken (%) 0.6 0.5 0.3
Percentage of hours flown (%) 0.2 0.15 0.09
Group
G-10
Percentage of launches taken (%) 2.2 1.8 1.4
Percentage of hours flown (%) 1.9 1.5 1
Triangulation of the exposure measure estimate. 
The number of UK Bronze badges attained in 2005 was 200 and in 2006 it was 196 
(British Gliding Association 2006a, 2007a). Based on these data, it was expected that 
the number of hours flown by the Group G-10 was close to 1,980 per year (5940 for the 
three year period), and probably higher to account for the pilots dropping out prior to 
completing the Bronze badge. The exposure figure obtained from sample data (table 
2.2) for the three year period 2004-2006 was 6212.4 hours (2071 hours per year). Thus 
the exposure estimate and the estimate from the Bronze badge figures are very 
comparable, verifying the exposure measure.
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Section 2 – Accident Rates
In total there were 268 glider accidents causing damage or injury (2004 – 2006) of 
which 16 were accidents that involved solo pilots with 10 solo hrs or fewer and six 
involved solo pilots with one hour or less. Table 2.3 shows the estimated numbers of 
accidents per launch (and launches per accident) for the two inexperienced pilot groups, 
as well as the overall accident rate for glider pilots. Table 2.4 shows the same 
information, but for hours flown rather than launch numbers.
Table 2.3. Estimated UK glider accident rates per launch for 2004 – 2006 inclusive. 
Bracketed figures give the number of launches flown per accident. The overall 
accident rate per launch is included for comparison, calculated from BGA annual 
flight safety statistics. Groups G-1 = pilots with one hour or less experience, G-10 = 
pilots with ten hours or less
Accident rates Upper 95% 
confidence 
interval







   0.0014







    0.001








Table 2.4. Estimated UK glider accident rates per hour flown for 2004 – 2006 
inclusive.  Bracketed figures give the number of hours flown per accident.  The 
Overall accident rate per hour is included for comparison, calculated from BGA 
annual flight safety statistics. 
Accident rates Upper 95% 
confidence 
interval
Mid-Point Lower 95% 
confidence 
interval




















It can be seen that the accident rates for both groups are higher than the overall accident 
rates, whether looked at in terms of flight time or flight cycles.
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Discussion
Simple frequency distributions based on raw accident counts showed consistently 
decreasing accidents with increasing experience (see Chapter 1, figures 1.1 and 1.2). 
However without knowing whether this trend was simply a reflection of the numbers of 
flights or hours flown by pilots of those experience levels, conclusions could not be 
drawn regarding the rates of accidents.  This study used two measures of flight exposure 
to estimate the true accident rates of pilots with one hour or less, and 10 hours or fewer. 
Taking the lowest estimate among inexperienced pilots (using the upper 95% 
confidence interval) it can be seen that these pilots sustained much higher accident rates 
than the overall UK rate for all glider pilots (tables 2.3 and 2.4).  By this lowest 
estimate, the G-1 group were involved in over three and a half times the number of 
accidents per launch than average and over ten times the number of accidents per hour 
flown. For the G-10 group the figures were slightly better at just under three times the 
number of accidents per launch than the overall UK rate for all glider pilots, and just 
over three times the number per hour flown. Since this is the lowest estimate, it is 
probable that the real situation is even worse. Using the most likely estimate (the mid-
point between the upper and lower confidence intervals, tables 2.3 and 2.4) gives 4.96 
times the number of accidents per launch and 15.1 times the number per hour for the G-
1 group, and 3.42 times the number of accidents per launch and 4.1 times the number 
per hour for the G-10 group.  
Despite being in a different area of recreational aviation, the results support the 
observation by AOPA that pilots with fewer than ten hours are vulnerable (AOPA 
2006). Findings of O’Hare and Chalmers (1999) are also partially supported, in that 
after the early stages of solo flying the accident rate falls as experience is acquired. 
However since the current study only used exposure data for pilots with a few hours, it 
cannot provide information with regards to the 100 - 300 hour experience bracket.
The high hourly accident rate for the G-1 group could be partly accounted for by those 
pilots flying relatively short flights.  It is likely that exposure to flight cycles presents a 
24
greater risk to pilots than exposure to hours flown, because of the increased risk 
presented by the takeoff and landing phases of each flight cycle.  Analysis of 143 glider 
accidents in the USA observed that 59.5% of the accidents occurred in the landing 
phase (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). 
The reason for early-hours pilots doing short flights is that during their early solo flying, 
pilots are restricted to flying circuits in benign, often unsoarable conditions.  Against 
this background the high accident rate should be of great concern because inexperienced 
pilots are the most closely supervised and restricted of all glider pilots. This period 
involves being checked for solo competence by an instructor before flight, particular for 
very early solo pilots. In addition restrictions are put on the pilots’ activities. These 
would generally include only being allowed to fly within gliding range of the airfield, 
not flying if there is a marked change in conditions, only using a specified launch 
method, and being restricted to flying basic glider types. Furthermore early solo pilots 
are only allowed to fly in conditions that are deemed safe, including weather, times of 
day, direction of the sun on landing, visibility, traffic density and landing directions
(runs). Given all of these precautions and the fact that these pilots fly the most basic 
flights in the easiest conditions, it is of concern that their accident rate remains so high. 
This may indicate that some pilots are being allowed to fly solo before they are ready.
Whereas powered aircraft pilots have the option of escaping from, and postponing many 
situations by applying power, glider pilots are forced to confront situations directly, 
even when beyond their experience. For example they do not have the option to ‘go 
round’ from a poor approach, divert due to poor weather, hold for other traffic or climb 
to avoid obstacles. Therefore glider pilots require the ability to quickly resolve these 
problems, without the possibility of making more time available. It may be that many 
pilot weaknesses are not exposed during the controlled training environment, possibly 
because some situations cannot be easily engineered by instructors.  It is therefore 
possible that these abilities are not practiced or tested enough before pilots are sent solo.
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Conclusion
No previous study has uncovered such a strong effect on low-hours pilots. This may be 
due to the type of study; direct focus on low-hours pilots has not previously been done 
using a suitable measure of exposure. It may also be due to the difference in the 
operation of gliders, as opposed to other forms of aviation.
The findings of this study should be used to inform the gliding community that contrary 
to some popular assumptions, early solo pilots have a relatively high risk of being 
involved in an accident. Further research is now required in order to ascertain what the 
specific problems are that cause low-hours pilots to have such a disproportionate 
accident rate. Until more is known about the specific types and causes of accidents 
occurring to these pilots and whether they are different to the overall accident trend, 
remedial action cannot be properly focussed.
This study suggests that important safety-critical learning takes place after pilots are 
sent solo (progressively decreasing the risk of an accident). It is not possible to know 
whether such learning could be achieved while still under instruction and so there is a 
question of whether some pilots are being sent solo too early.
The findings from this study contradict claims made about the relative safety of low-
hours glider pilots.  Flight exposure estimates show that inexperienced UK glider pilots 
are more likely to have an accident than other more experienced pilots whether the 
figure is looked at by flight cycles (per launch) or by hours flown. The findings show 
that claims such as “statistically, your first solo flights are safer than most other flights” 
(Piggott 1997) are wrong.
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Chapter 3 - UK Gliding Qualifications
It has been robustly established that there is a safety issue surrounding highly-
inexperienced UK glider pilots. Before looking further into this issue, it is necessary to 
outline the basic UK gliding qualifications applicable to the subsequent studies.
Gliding in the UK
The governing body for gliding in the UK is the British Gliding Association (BGA). 
The BGA not only provides leadership and representation in UK gliding but also acts as 
a self-regulator, supplemented where appropriate with delegations from the Civil 
Aviation Authority. Therefore the BGA has a large role to play in the safety of gliding 
in the UK, and to this end has committees dedicated to safety and instruction. BGA 
responsibilities include the setting of standards and progress levels for pilots, instructor 
training and standards, and the investigation and documentation of accidents.
Solo qualification
UK glider pilot trainees follow a training syllabus laid down by the British Gliding 
Association (BGA). There is no set minimum number of flights or hours required before 
a pilot can go solo, but there is a minimum of 20 launches that is required before a ‘test’ 
can be taken to obtain a certificate or badge. The accrediting document issued to British 
glider pilots is the Gliding Certificate, which is issued on completion of their first solo. 
This certificate is endorsed with the A and B badges shortly after the first solo. The tests 
for these are as follows (source: ‘The BGA Laws and Rules’ (British Gliding 
Association 2008a).
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 ‘A’ BADGE: One solo circuit in a glider or motor glider in unpowered 
flight after the launch, followed by a satisfactory landing. An appropriate 
level of knowledge of rules of the air and local airspace restrictions must be 
demonstrated to the supervising instructor at the time of the first solo flight
 ‘B’ BADGE: A soaring flight of at least five minutes, at or above the 
previous lowest point after launch, followed by a satisfactory landing.
Post solo qualifications
Once a glider pilot has gone solo and achieved the A and B badges, he or she can work 
towards their Bronze ‘C’ badge (commonly known simply as ‘The Bronze Badge’) 
which is the first major gliding qualification in the UK. In order to obtain this the pilot 
must achieve two observed soaring flights, 50 total flights (or 10 hours and 20 flights), 
pass a flying test with a senior instructor and successfully take an exam covering 
subjects such as air law, principles of flight and navigation. The Bronze Badge is 
therefore similar to the Private Pilot License, in that it is the major qualification 
obtained following solo experience, tests and exams. Although a UK gliding license 
does exist, it is voluntary and not commonly applied for apart from by pilots looking to 
fly abroad, indeed this was one of the main reasons for its implementation (British 
Gliding Association 2006b). The license requires the holder to have a Bronze Badge 
and an endorsement that they are capable of cross-country flying. The syllabus for 
trainee glider pilots and for the Bronze badge is not as thoroughly defined as that of the 
Private Pilots License (PPL). Unlike the PPL, there is no minimum number of dual 
flying hours required and although many exercises are specified in the glider pilot 
trainee syllabus, no evidence needs to be provided that all these have been performed in 
order to obtain a Bronze Badge.
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Chapter 4 - Fundamental Accident Analysis
The research from chapters four and five was published as: 
Jarvis, S. Harris, D. (2008), Investigation into Accident Initiation Events by Flight 
Phase, for Highly Inexperienced Glider Pilots. International Journal of Applied 
Aviation Studies Vol 8, Number 2. FAA Academy.
Introduction
Jarvis and Harris (2007b) used flight exposure estimates based on sample data from a 
three year period along with BGA statistics and simple accident counts, to show that 
very inexperienced solo glider pilots (defined as those with fewer than 10 hours 
experience as pilot in command) had twice the number of accidents per launch and three 
times the number per hour flown than their more experienced counterparts (see chapter 
2). Important questions were generated about what lies behind this. Pilot inexperience 
alone is not adequate as an explanation for such a phenomenon. With such a small 
amount of research in the field of gliding, deeper explanations are required about how 
and why inexperienced pilots sustain these high accident rates if action is to be taken to 
address them. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate fundamental accident causation in UK 
gliding, in order to establish the proportions of accidents that were pilot related. 
Particular focus was placed upon inexperienced pilots (those with up to 10 solo hours). 
This was done for two reasons. Firstly to test the hypothesis that pilot related accident 
causes were driving the high accident rate, and secondly to lay the groundwork for 
subsequent studies to look deeper into the exact nature of the reasons behind the earlier 
findings (chapter 2). Accidents identified as ‘pilot related’ were used subsequently as 
the primary source of data.
There is wide acceptance that human factors are the most significant source of failure in 
aviation as well as in other safety critical industries (O’Hare 2000) and the estimated 
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proportion of accidents caused by pilot factors remains high for all types of aviation. 
The figures reported from aviation related research over the last quarter of a century 
have remained consistent. Feggetter (1982) reported that the figure was approximately 
70%.  More recent studies have reported figures of the same magnitude, for example 
71% (O’Hare et al 1994); 70% (The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation – BASI 1996); 
and 78.6% (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association - AOPA 2006). Similar findings 
were reported after examining 143 glider accidents in the US over a single five year 
period. The majority of accident causes (79.7%) were designated as pilot related, 14% 
were designated as weather related, 4.9% malfunction (mechanical) and 1.4% were 
undetermined (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). No research has split these figures by pilot 
experience level, nor analysed them specifically for low-hours pilots. 
On initial consideration, there would appear to be no reason why the proportion of 
mechanical and external factors would change among pilots of different experience 
levels. However, this should not be assumed. The aims of this study were therefore:
 To identify all UK gliding accidents from 2002 - 2006 that were ‘pilot related’ 
in order for these to be further analysed in later studies.
 To investigate the proportion of UK gliding accidents that were pilot related, and 
then to investigate whether the inexperienced group of pilots, defined as those 
with 10 or fewer hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) had a higher proportion of 
such accidents.
 To investigate the categories of damage and injury, in order to assess whether or 
not inexperienced pilots suffered a different level of severity in accidents to 
more experienced pilots.
 To investigate whether there is evidence that weather conditions (specifically 
wind strength) could have been a factor in the high proportion of accidents by 
low-hours pilots.
 To identify the specific set of ‘pilot-related’ accidents occurring to student pilots 
under instruction. This was done in order that later comparisons could be made 




Guidelines were constructed by a group of subject matter experts based on the work of 
Hollnagel (1998). These were used to identify all UK gliding accidents from 2002 -
2006 deemed to have pilot-related causes. A second rater was also used to ensure 
reliability of the ratings. Analysis was performed according to two levels of pilot 
experience (10 hours or fewer experience as pilot in command (PIC) and more than 10 
hours PIC), in line with the research findings by AOPA (2006) and those of Jarvis and 
Harris (2007b), showing that 10 hours PIC or fewer is a particularly vulnerable 
experience bracket. Factors such as injury level, damage, pilot age and wind strength 
were also analyzed to see if systematic effects were evident between the two experience 
groups.
Data
Prior to the present study it was anticipated that the relatively limited pool of UK 
gliding accidents involving low-hours pilots would be broken down further. Therefore 
in order to enhance the reliability and validity of the analysis two further years of 
accident data were added to that used in the previous study (Jarvis & Harris 2007b), 
meaning that a five year period was used (2002 - 2006). 
The British Gliding Association (BGA) database of all UK gliding accidents and 
incidents over five years from 2002 to 2006 was used (source: British Gliding 
Association 2007b).  This database contained details including pilot age (years); total 
experience in command (hours); aircraft type; severity of injuries; damage to the glider; 
and a narrative description of what happened.  In line with the previous study (see 
Chapter 2) accidents resulting in no injury or damage were dropped from the analysis 
along with ground-handling accidents (such as towing out winch cables or pulling 
gliders out of hangers), and those without necessary information about the pilot’s 
experience. Where possible the short accident descriptions contained within the BGA 
database were supplemented with segments from AAIB or BGA reports, as well as 
additional information from other fields in the database (with the strict exception of 
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pilot experience for the purposes of coding). Hence for each accident a narrative was 
produced that, in a number of cases, contained more information than the original BGA 
database text description.
Three categories containing numerical or ordinal data in the BGA accident database 
were used during statistical analysis. These were:
Nature of Injury:  The British Gliding Association categorises accidents into injury 
categories: ‘none’, ‘minor’, ‘serious’, ‘fatal’ (British Gliding Association 2007). All 
accidents contain an entry in this field.
Damage: All accidents in the database contain an entry of either ‘none’, ‘minor’, 
‘substantial’ or ‘write-off’.
Wind strength: Just over 80% of accidents contained numerical detail on wind strength 
(in knots) while several more contained text. The rest were dropped from the analysis 
relating to wind strength. Many of those containing numerical data were in the form of a 
range (e.g.15 – 20 knots). In these cases the median was used as the value for the 
purpose of analysis (e.g. 17.5 knots). Where a sign was used (i.e. 10 + knots) only the 
numerical value given was counted (e.g. 10 knots).
Identification of pilot-related accidents
All accidents from the BGA database (2002 – 2006) were categorized into either 
primarily ‘Pilot-Related’ or ‘Other’ cause (‘Technical’, ‘External’ or ‘Unknown’) using 
guidelines drawn up and agreed by a group consisting of three subject matter experts 
and an aviation human factors professional. All members of this group were 
experienced instructors on gliders and general aviation aircraft. The guidelines are 
shown in Appendix A. It was pointed out to the raters that ‘pilot-related’ did not 
necessarily mean pilot culpability, responsibility or blame, but simply that the accident 
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could be reasonably attributed to the actions taken by the pilot without an overwhelming 
and unavoidable influence of external or technical factors. 
The definition of ‘Pilot-Related’ cause was based upon Hollnagels’ definition of human 
error (Hollnagel 1998).  To be defined as a ‘Pilot-Related’ cause there had to be an 
identifiable performance shortfall in terms of the actions (or inactions) on the part of the 
pilot in command together with a reasonable opportunity for the pilot to act in such a 
way that could have avoided the accident.  If a ‘Technical’ or ‘External’ factor was 
identified as being the seminal accident event then the accident was considered as non-
pilot related (i.e. placed in the ‘Other’ category). 
The guidelines for coding an accident as being the result of a ‘Technical Factor’ were 
that the aircraft would have been deemed unserviceable had the failure been apparent 
before flight.  If a ‘Technical Factor’ was induced by the abnormal operation of the 
glider (outside its operating limitations) this was deemed to be pilot induced.  An 
‘External Factor’ was regarded as any reasonably unforeseeable and/or unavoidable 
factor external to the glider that made the flight difficult beyond the skills that could 
reasonably be expected of a competent pilot. Where ‘External Factors’ were deemed to 
have been reasonably avoidable or foreseeable then they were again deemed to be 
‘Pilot-Related’.  Furthermore, difficult flying conditions were only counted as ‘External 
Factors’ where there were no reasonable signs or expectation of such conditions 
occurring.  A lack of rising air (thermal, wave or ridge lift) was not regarded as an 
‘External Factor’ since such ‘lift’ is not reliable and it is also not required for safe glider 
operation.  If it was not possible to identify positively any ‘Pilot-Related’, ‘Technical’ 
or ‘External Factor’ (i.e. where no causal events could be determined by the rater) the 
accident cause was categorized as being ‘Unknown’.
The pilot-induced category was further broken down into accidents which involved solo 
glider pilots and those that involved gliders with more than one person aboard (whether 
the second person was a passenger or a crew member). Within the latter group, a further 
designation was made for accidents occurring during training flights (where a pre-solo, 
or inexperienced pilot was, or had been, handling the glider under the supervision of an 
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instructor pilot). In such flights the instructor is designated as P1 (the pilot in charge) 
and the student as P2 (the second pilot), even though the student would normally be 
doing most of the handling. Only those instructional flights where the P2 actions could 
have influenced the flight in any way were included (and termed ‘genuine instructional 
flights’). This meant that trial gliding flights, gift flights, or flights where the student 
pilot had no input were not included in the category. Legally, accidents occurring on a 
training flight would always be the responsibility of the instructor, even though some 
causality could be due to the actions of the second pilot or trainee (P2). Accident data 
reflect this by attributing these accidents to P1, meaning they will always be categorised 
in the ‘experienced pilots’ group, regardless of the circumstances. 
Reliability of the ratings
Since the variable of interest was pilot experience, this was deleted from all reports 
prior to any categorisation so that all ratings were performed ‘blind’ thereby avoiding 
any associated bias on the part of the raters. 
In accordance with previous research using large samples of accident data (e.g. Gaur 
2005), to establish reliability a random sample of accidents was independently 
categorized by the primary investigator and an independent rater at each stage of the 
rating process. Two tests were performed at each stage. In order to check observer 
consistency a sub-sample of accidents was re-categorized by the primary investigator 
two weeks after initial rating to establish the intra-rater reliability (a factor omitted in 
many studies). Such an intra-rater reliability (observer consistency) test is used to check 
that the researcher’s method of coding had been consistent across the database. After 
this, an inter-rater reliability test was performed by an independent rater to be sure that 
the researcher had not coded in an idiosyncratic way (Robson 2002). The independent 
rater was an experienced pilot of gliders and commercial aircraft as well as a crew 
resource management (CRM) instructor with training in human factors. A random 
sample of 139 accidents was used (over 25%) to check the reliability of the ‘pilot 
related’ designation. A sample of only 100 accidents were used to check the solo/dual 
and ‘genuine instructional flight’ designations, but this still represented over 25% 
35
because these designations were only performed  on the pool of accidents already 
designated as pilot-related. Comparisons between the ratings were performed using 
cross-tabulations and a value of Cohen’s Kappa was produced for each test. Robson 
(2002) cites a commonly used rule for assessing the observer agreement from a 
calculated Cohen’s Kappa co-efficient, as first proposed by Fliess (1981). 
Kappa of 0.40 – 0.60: ‘Fair’
Kappa of 0.60 – 0.75: ‘Good’
Kappa of above 0.75: ‘Excellent’
The results for all measures of inter-rater and intra-rater reliability were ‘good’ or 
‘excellent’ (Table 4.1). 
























































Pilot related / Other? 139 95% 0.87 96% 0.88
Solo / Dual 100 100% 1 100% 1
Genuine training flight? 100 95% 0.64 98% 0.85
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Data analysis
Initially, Fisher’s exact tests were used to establish whether significant differences 
existed between the inexperienced pilots (10 hours or fewer PIC) and experienced pilots 
(over 10 hours) in terms of pilot related accidents, as well as other factors from the 
accident database such as injury severity and aircraft damage.
Wind strength data were compared between the two experience groups. The mean 
strength of wind for accidents occurring to pilots with 10 hours and under was 8.25 
knots (sd = 4.1, SE = 1.097), and to over 10 hours pilots it was 10.3 knots (sd = 5.51, 
SE = 0.428). An independent measures t test on this data showed that the difference 
between the two means was non-significant (t = -1.36, df = 178, p = 0.174, two tailed). 
This indicated that the difference in mean wind strength could have occurred by chance, 
and that wind strength was less likely to be a confounding variable in the differences 
between the two groups in terms of accident rates. 
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Results
Of 469 accidents, no causal factors could be determined for 19 (4%), hence these were 
eliminated from the analysis.  Of the remaining 450 accidents, 418 occurred to ‘over 10 
hours’ pilots, of which 331 were deemed to have been ‘pilot-related’ (79%). For pilots 
with 10 hours PIC or fewer there were 32 accidents, 28 of which were designated ‘pilot 
related’ (88%). A Fisher’s exact test on these data (shown in tabulated form in Table 
4.2) was non-significant (p=0.36, two-tailed) suggesting that the distribution of causes 
(‘Pilot-Related’ or ‘Technical or External’) was randomly distributed between pilots 
across the two levels of experience.
Table 4.2. Numbers of pilot-related accidents split by experience group.
The mean age of pilots in the 10 hours and under group was 47.2 yrs (sd = 15.76). For 
the over 10 group it was 51.72 years (sd = 14.2). Pilots with 10 hours or fewer would be 
expected to be slightly younger than those with more than 10 hours on average (since 
age must necessarily increase with experience!). Because of this a one-tailed t-test was 
run on this data and showed that the difference was in fact not significant (t = -1.537, df 
= 329, p = 1.125).
Table 4.3 shows the number of pilot-related accidents leading to injury and damage for 
the two pilot experience groups. Fisher’s exact tests on these data show no significant 
association between the degree of injury and the experience group over the five years 
being studied (p=0.701). The same is true of aircraft damage analyzed by experience 
group (p=0.272). There is therefore no evidence to suggest that the accidents suffered 
by inexperienced pilots were different in terms of their consequences to those suffered 





10 hrs or fewer 28 4 32
Over 10 hrs 331 87 418
Total 359 91 450
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Table 4.3. Total pilot-related accident numbers for the two experience groups 
broken down by injury severity and damage classification.




Fatal 0 9 9
Serious 0 18 18
Minor 3 40 43





Write off 0 36 36
Substantial 11 107 118
Minor 17 186 203
None 0 2 2
It was found that 70 pilot-related accidents involved gliders with two people on board 
(coded as ‘dual’). Of these, 34 were coded as ‘genuine instructional flights’ (where the 
‘P2’ had some input under instruction). It was important to identify this small subset of 
pilot-related accidents at this stage so that it could be analysed further in subsequent 
studies, alongside the low-hours group. If differences were then found between 
instructional accidents and accidents occurring to low-hours pilots then this would 
indicate important issues in terms of what occurs when pilots fly solo. No analysis could 
be done on these accidents at this stage because they all fell into the ‘over 10 hours’ 
pilot bracket (by definition, due to having an instructor on board the glider). 
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Discussion 
The finding that 80% of accidents overall were ‘pilot related’ is only slightly higher 
than previous findings across the whole aviation domain (O’Hare 1994, BASI 1996, 
AOPA 2006), and is almost identical to the figure from US gliding activity reported by 
van Doorn and de Voogt (2007). Although the low-hours group had a higher percentage 
of pilot related accidents as predicted (88%) it was not statistically significant in 
comparison to other pilots. However this does show that the high accident rate among 
low-hours pilots is due to pilot-related causes rather than other systematic variables. 
This is further supported by results showing that no statistically significant difference 
existed between the two experience groups in terms of wind conditions and pilot age.
Analysis of the primary causal categories demonstrates that accidents involving pilots 
with 10 hours flight experience or fewer were not statistically different in their 
distribution of injury and aircraft damage to those of more experienced pilots. This 
means that statistically, low-hours pilots were just as likely to damage a glider or injure 
themselves in an accident as other pilots. Figure 4.3 shows that no serious injuries 
occurred to low-hours pilots in the period 2002 and 2006. However the statistics 
indicate that this was likely to be due to the relatively low number of flights accrued by 
this group, as opposed to a systematic cause. Low hours pilots had a marginally higher 
percentage of accidents leading to substantially damaged aircraft (39% of all accidents, 
as opposed to 32% for other pilots), and it has been shown that there is a high 
correlation between damage and injury in gliding (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007).
This study identified that out of 469 UK gliding accidents occurring during the period 
2002 - 2006, three-hundred and fifty nine (359) were caused primarily by the pilot (see 
Table 4.2). Thirty-two of these occurred to pilots with 10 hours or fewer as pilot-in-
command, and 34 occurred to student pilots under instruction. 
The findings of the present study, along with the previous study (Jarvis & Harris 2007b)
provide robust evidence from which to conclude that low hours solo glider pilots in the 
UK are relatively vulnerable to accidents, and that those accidents are somehow linked 
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to their piloting of the glider, as opposed to external or technical influences. Clearly, 
more research is needed to look into pilot-related accidents in order to investigate the 
accident causes, particularly between low hours and more experienced pilots. To this 
end the 359 accidents identified in this study, along with their narrative descriptions and 
some supplementary material, were prepared for use in subsequent studies aimed at 
identifying deeper causal accident factors.
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Chapter 5 - Flight Phase Accident Analysis
This research was published (along with chapter four) as: 
Jarvis, S. Harris, D. (2008), Investigation into Accident Initiation Events by Flight 
Phase, for Highly Inexperienced Glider Pilots. International Journal of Applied 
Aviation Studies Vol 8, Number 2. FAA Academy.
Introduction
It has been shown that low-hours UK glider pilots (defined as under 10 hours total time 
as pilot-in-command) have a much higher accident rate than their more experienced 
counterparts (Jarvis and Harris 2007b). It has also been established that the vast 
majority of UK gliding accidents, including those occurring to low hours pilots, are 
pilot-related (See Chapter 4) as opposed to being caused by other factors (mechanical, 
external, etc). The majority of accidents contributing to the disproportionate accident 
rate for low-hours pilots were therefore caused by pilot-factors. It was shown that no-
statistical difference exists in the categories of injury suffered by low-hours pilots and 
hence it is clear that low hours UK glider pilots are less safe than more experienced 
pilots, and that the reason is somehow related to the pilots’ general levels of skill.
In order to begin to investigate the reasons behind this it was necessary to analyse where 
accident events were most likely to occur during flights. It was possible that some parts 
of the flights were causing more problems than others, particular for low-hours pilots, or 
that some specific tasks in the flight were more likely to trigger mistakes or errors 
caused by pilot inexperience. Such an analysis could be useful in directing training 
interventions for pre-solo pilots, and interventions for low-hours post solo pilots. 
Additionally any subsequent overall human factors analysis on the accidents would be 
of greater use if it could be determined at which points in the flights human factors 
problems emerged.
A study of 143 US gliding accidents by van Doorn and de Voogt (2007) found that 
based simply on a frequency analysis, over half of all accidents (52.4%) occurred on 
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landing, while 30% occurred during the ‘cruise’. Most fatal accidents in gliders took 
place during the cruise (van Doorn & Zijlstra 2006); 36% of these accidents were found 
to end in fatality, whereas only 10% of landing accidents did so (van Doorn & de Voogt 
2007).  These studies did not, however, break down the accident statistics by pilot 
experience, nor did they take into account flight exposure. Furthermore they could be 
criticized as lacking explanatory power as a result of the nature and extent of the phases 
used.  Van Doorn and de Voogt (2007) used only four phases to describe all accidents; 
assembly, tow, cruise and landing.  Although problems can occur during ‘assembly’, it 
is problematic to compare this numerically with other phases of flight since many 
gliders are kept in hangers or flown many times per assembly, hence many glider flights 
do not include this phase at all.  This leaves only three in-flight phases, all of which 
include numerous flight components (see British Gliding Association 2003, Stewart 
1994, Piggott 1997) meaning that categorization using such a taxonomy would be 
questionable in terms of its utility in identifying specific problem areas.  For example, 
an accident deemed to have occurred in the ‘cruise’ phase could have taken place in 
midair (e.g. a collision or overstress leading to break-up), in the circuit or approach to a 
field landing, during an attempted out-field landing or as a result of unintentional 
ground impact. There is no current evidence to suggest differences may exist between 
experienced and inexperienced glider pilots in terms of accident flight phase, and no 
such research has been carried out.
Studies of powered aeroplane accidents tend to use a greater number of flight phases. 
Many studies report accidents by the same flight phase descriptions as used by the 
NTSB. Seventeen NTSB flight phase categories exist; ‘standing’, ‘taxi’, ‘takeoff’, 
‘climb’, ‘cruise’, ‘hover’, ‘descent’, ‘descent - emergency’, ‘descent - uncontrolled’, 
‘approach’, ‘landing’, ‘emergency landing’, ‘go around’, ‘missed approach’, 
‘manoeuvring’, ‘other’ and ‘unknown’ (FAA 2008). Unfortunately most of these are not 
applicable to gliders which have much less clearly defined phases of flight. Phases such 
as ‘taxi’, ‘go around’ and ‘missed approach’ would clearly not apply to gliders and the 
‘cruise’ phase would not easily fit into the operation of a glider in the way it does a 
powered aeroplane, since an engine is required to sustain cruise flight. ‘Manoeuvring’ is 
an example of a flight phase that could be very applicable to gliding accidents; it is 
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known that serious and often fatal accidents do occur from low turns (Jarvis 2004, 
Jarvis and Harris 2007a). The ‘descent’ and ‘climb’ phases could apply to almost all of 
a glider’s flight, since all the time that the glider is not climbing in lift it is descending 
in a glide, but the glider pilot does not have the same degree of control over such phases 
as does a pilot of a powered aircraft. An analysis with a more detailed breakdown of 
flight phases allowing more explanatory power and hence better-targeted remedial 
interventions is required to encompass the unique operation of a glider.
In general aviation, manoeuvring and landing are consistently cited as being the most 
common accident flight phases.  Again, based solely on frequency counts, it has been 
shown that 39% of accidents occur during the landing phase (O’Hare 1994).  AOPA 
(2006) reported that 38.9% of non-fatal accidents happened during ‘landing’, more than 
any other flight phase, while observing that ‘manoeuvring’ was the most common flight 
phase for fatal accidents (22.8%).  In a study of insurance claims, Lenné and Ashby 
(2006) reported that the landing and taxiing phases accounted for 55% of all non-fatal 
general aviation accidents in Australia. 
The only study to specifically analyse accidents for highly inexperienced general 
aviation pilots used NTSB flight phase descriptors to show that US solo student pilots 
(i.e. very low hours solo) had 146 (45%) accidents during landing over a two year 
period (Baker et al 1996). Very few of these however led to injuries. Touch-and-goes (a 
manoeuvre including a landing and take-off) accounted for 78 (24%) accidents. Some 
phases were notably under represented; only four (1%) occurred during turns, seven 
(2%) occurred in the circuit (downwind or base-leg) and eight accidents (2%) occurred 
during the final approach to land. This suggests that a considerable section of the flight 
(from entering the circuit until landing) appears to be a relatively safe phase of flight for 
very inexperienced general aviation pilots, accounting for only 4% of accidents to early 
solo pilots.
The use of flight phase categorisation in accident descriptions is far from 
straightforward. While the accident reports of many national investigation organisations 
contain flight phase categorisations, many, such as the UK’s Air Accident Investigation 
44
Branch, do not. It is often unclear how a flight phase descriptor relates to the accident, 
or how it has been defined. Several definitions are often possible, leading to a different 
selection of phase. For example the ‘accident flight phase’ may be defined as the stage 
causing the damage/injury, the phase containing the initial error, the emergency phase 
(AOPA 2006) the phase containing the most obvious departure from safety, etc. 
Furthermore, accidents are often the result of a chain of events rather than a single event 
or error (Wiegmann et al 2005). Therefore taxonomies and classifications (including 
databases such as the NTSB) that categorise by a single flight phase may risk over-
simplification, as a series of causal events may have accumulated during the flight. In 
particular there is a danger that the flight phase in which the initiating event took place 
is not categorised. This scenario is particularly likely in gliding as a result of the 
difficulty in regaining lost energy in terms of height and/or speed.  For example: 
misjudgment of height when entering the circuit may lead to poor positioning of the 
base leg with little energy to reach the airfield, subsequently resulting in a slow 
approach and heavy landing. In such a case the accident ‘flight phase’ might be 
categorized as the stage in which the damage/injury was sustained (landing) thereby 
failing to identify that the initiating event occurred much earlier in the flight. 
Recognizing the issue of multiple events Wiegmann et al (2005) categorized accidents 
using any number of flight phases but labeled only one of these to be the ‘seminal’ 
phase, in which the initiating event was deemed to have taken place. This same 
approach was initially used in the study of North Sea Helicopter Safety (Ingstad et al 
1990).  Lenne & Ashby (2006) also used a similar method by identifying the first crash 
occurrence noted in the accident narrative. Baker et al (1996) used a similar method. It 
was pointed out that the flight phase allocated did not always coincide with the NTSB 
phase for the same accident because it was based upon “the period when the problem 
arose” (Baker et al 1996).
Although research dedicated to accident flight phase has been conducted for general 
aviation (and a small amount for gliding), it has been shown that there has been little 
attention to the relationship between pilot experience and the flight phases of initiating 
accident events. Furthermore while some research has used frequency data and accident 
totals (BASI 1996, AOPA 2006, van Doorn & Zijlstra 2006; van Doorn & de Voogt 
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2007) no research has provided comparable accidents rates, possibly due to the 
difficulties of obtaining exposure data for pilots of differing experience levels. 
This study produces a detailed flight phase template applicable to glider operations, and 
using UK gliding accident data, compares the flight phases in which the initiating event 
preceding an accident occurred with respect to highly inexperienced pilots (10 hours or 
fewer experience as pilot in command) and more experienced pilots (over 10 hours).  
Furthermore, the data obtained are used to provide estimates of accident rates (both in 




All accidents from 2002 - 2006 deemed to be ‘pilot-related’ from the previous analysis 
(see Chapter 4) were used in this study. The same categorization and narrative 
descriptions from the UK accident database were used (source: British Gliding 
Association 2007b). The analysis of accident data progressed in two stages.  Firstly, the 
numbers of pilot-related events were identified within each accident report with the 
‘seminal event’ being categorized as the first to occur.  Secondly, a detailed flight phase 
template was constructed using subject matter experts and task analysis techniques in 
order to conduct a flight phase analysis on the seminal events.  All accidents were 
analyzed according to two levels of pilot experience (10 hours or fewer experience as 
pilot in command (PIC) and more than 10 hours PIC), in line with the previous research 
findings. Since pilot experience level was a key variable of concern in the research, this 
information was removed from the accident descriptions during categorization to avoid 
influencing the process, in common with the previous study.
Stage 1: Identification of pilot-related contributory events
Within the BGA accident database, it was clear from performing the analysis during the 
previous study (Chapter 4) that there were many cases where a number of events 
occurred, usually in different flight phases, in order to cause the accident. The 
individual major ‘pilot contributory’ events in each accident were identified from the 
accident narratives using guidelines in order to increase consistency (see Appendix B). 
The guidelines were drawn up by the investigator and agreed by the same three subject 
matter experts used previously. Some of the guidelines written previously (shown in 
Appendix A) were relevant and therefore included. Each accident report was 
categorised by any number of events, in the order that they occurred. Events occurring 
within the same flight phase were designated as separate events. Following this, the 
seminal event was identified; this being defined as the first event in the sequence (cf. 
Ingstad et al 1990, Wiegmann et al 2005). Reliability tests were performed in the same 
way as for the other stages.
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Stage 2: Flight phase analysis
It has been shown that many of the NTSB flight phase descriptions are not fully 
applicable to gliding, and that no adequate flight phase designators have been used to 
research gliding accidents. Therefore a framework for glider flight phases was prepared 
that supplemented that used by van Doorn and de Voogt (2007) that categorised flights 
into three phases; tow, cruise and landing.
A high-level mission analysis utilizing concepts drawn from process charting methods 
(see Kirwan & Ainsworth 1992) was undertaken to breakdown the operation of a glider 
into meaningful, quasi-independent flight phases.  Resources such as the BGA 
instructors’ manual (2nd ed, British Gliding Association 2003), Piggott (1997) and 
Stewart (1994) were used in this process along with a number of subject matter experts 
(experienced gliding instructors). This analysis was performed to produce a two-level 
flight phase template. The resulting template consisted of 25 flight phases in total, 
grouped within six higher-order phases (pre-flight; launch; in-flight phase; circuit; 
approach and landing).  Agreement was reached between the subject matter experts that 
the final template was representative of all aspects of UK gliding operations. This 
coding template is shown in Figure 5.1.
The flight phase analysis highlighted the requirement to separate accidents occurring 
during attempts to land at an airfield from accidents occurring while attempting to land 
in an unfamiliar field, which can often occur when insufficient lift is found to continue 
the flight.  Off-airfield landings (also known as field landings) are common in gliding 
but involve unique tasks such as assessing field size and suitability, and positioning a 
circuit to an unfamiliar site with no primary height information.  This is accepted as 
common practice in gliding (rather than an emergency) particularly when a pilot is 
attempting a cross-country soaring flight.  It was therefore necessary to be able to 
identify such accidents during analysis in case they had a substantial effect on the 
findings.  Therefore prior to attaching the flight phase descriptors, each accident was 
classified by its location (‘airfield’ or ‘off airfield’). Accidents in the circuit or approach 
phase of the base airfield (or intended landing airfield) were labeled as ‘airfield’ 
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accidents, whereas those occurring outside the circuit pattern of the airfield were treated 
as ‘off-airfield’ accidents. Additionally, accidents occurring during intentional cross-
country flights were noted.
Accidents following launch failures required identification for similar reasons. Launch 
failures can require unique maneuvers such as regaining flying speed at low altitude and
flying low abbreviated circuits.  Therefore it was essential to have the ability to separate 
these from normally launched glider flights for the purpose of analysis.  A failed launch 
recovery was deemed to be any accident flight where the launch failure was the seminal 
event and from which the glider was unable to join the normal circuit from the high key 
position, without encountering lift. This included: breaks (weak link/ cable break/ rope 
break/ unexpected release) as well as power failures (winch power failure, tug wave off 
/ power loss). Where the main causal factor led to an aborted or failed launch (e.g. 
ground loop, over rotation) then this was not coded as a failed launch recovery, since in 
such a case the launch failure was not the seminal event in the accident chain, but a 
consequence of another event.
All accident events were categorized using the flight phase template (figure 5.1).  In 
addition, each accident was further categorized as being normal launch/launch failure; 
airfield/off-airfield.
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Figure 5.1. Flight phase categorization template
1. Pre-flight, after boarding
2. Launch
a. Ground run [Only if attached to cable]
b. Pre-rotation initial climb (Winch)/ Airborne, pre-climb (Aerotow)/PIOs
c. Rotation and establishing main climb (Winch)/Initial Climb (Aerotow)
d. Established Climb
e. Aerotow cruise (cross-country towing etc)
f. Release
g. Recovery to normal flying speed, period prior to manoeuvre/approach
h. Non normal aerotow: Low tow, ‘Boxing the tug’
3. Flight phase
a. General flying (practicing manoeuvring, local soaring/flying etc)
b. Serious soaring (circling, dolphin, eights, street flying, cloud climb, leaving, 
joining etc)
c. Search/descent (Usually during cross-country/ extended soaring. 




f. Final glide (incl. comp finish/ return to airfield/ ‘stretching the glide’)
g. Aerobatics/ intentional unusual manoeuvring (stall/spin/steep turns)
h. Immediate evasive airborne manoeuvre to avoid imminent collision 
4. Circuit
a. Circuit join. [Phase between 3 & circuit to land] (including prep, wheel 
down, decisions on circuit/landing direction). NOT choice of field 
itself, that is 3c (search/cruise)
b. Circuit (from high key to final turn, joined from anywhere) Include as 
seminal where accident descriptions begin from a poorly positioned 
final turn or final approach from turn (too high, low, far, close)
c. Abbreviated circuit or non-standard manoeuvring to land 
d. Final turn (from normal or abbreviated circuit only)
5. Approach
a. Approach after circuit or flying (approach other than 4b)
b. Approach as straight ahead recovery from launch failure
6. Landing/Ground
a. Flare/ Hold off. Includes ballooning and PIOs
b. Ground run [post landing or after ground cable release]
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Reliability of the ratings
In common with previous studies, information about pilot experience was deleted from 
all accident reports prior to any categorisation. The techniques used for reliability 
testing were exactly the same as used in chapter four. Inter-rater and intra-rater tests 
were performed on a random sample of just over 25% of the data (100 cases). Statistical 
comparisons were performed using cross-tabulations.
For stage 1, accident events were identified, and ‘number of events per accident’ was 
used as the variable to be compared between raters. In stage two the seminal events for 
each of the 100 accidents in the reliability sample were highlighted and coded using the 
flight phase template. The category chosen for each seminal event was compared 
between raters.
The results for all measures of inter-rater and intra-rater reliability were ‘good’ or 
‘excellent’ at all stages (Table 5.1). The classification matrices for ‘number of events’ 
and ‘high level flight phases’ are also shown (Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5).























































Launch Failure or not? 100 99% 0.95 98% 0.91
Airfield / Off airfield 100 98% 0.95 99% 0.98
Intentional cross country flight? 100 98% 0.95 99% 0.97
Number of Events per accident 100 87% 0.61 89% 0.67
High Level Flight Phase categorization 100 87% 0.84 96% 0.95
Low level  Flight Phase categorization 100 81% 0.79 91% 0.90
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Table 5.2. Intra-rater classification matrix for establishing reliability 
In terms of the number of events designated to each accident. 
Table 5.3. Intra-rater classification matrix for establishing reliability 
In terms of the number of events designated to each accident. 
INTRA RATER Original Rater








1 event 58 3 0 61
2 events 5 21 2 28
3 events 0 3 8 11
total: 63 27 10 100
INTER RATER Original Rater








1 event 59 2 0 61
2 events 2 23 4 29
3 events 0 3 7 10
total: 61 28 11 100
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Results
Results - Treatment of Data
The 359 accidents identified as being pilot-related were subjected to the main flight 
phase analysis. Since accident causation was of primary concern in the research, each 
accident was classified according to its seminal event (as identified in stage 1). For 
example, an accident designated as occurring in the launch was one in which the 
seminal event took place whilst the glider was launching. After classification of events, 
those other than the seminal events were dropped from the analysis.
The distribution of seminal events occurring during the various flight phases with 
respect to pilot experience groups were initially analyzed using Fisher’s exact tests. 
Odds ratios with associated confidence intervals were then calculated between the two 
experience groups for all six top level flight phases.
Although such analyses can be used to compare the frequency of accidents in one group 
with that of the other and identify where accident features were disproportionately 
distributed between groups, they cannot account for differences in flying exposure 
between the groups (including flying that did not result in an accident). For this, a 
measure of exposure was required in order to produce accident rates for comparison.
The exposure estimate from Jarvis & Harris (2007b) required re-calculation due to the 
additional two years of accident data needed to cover the five-year period 2002 - 2006. 
The exposure estimates were recalculated using the original method from Jarvis and 
Harris (2007b) but including two additional years of data collected from 2002 and 2003 
in order to cover the whole period 2002 to 2006 inclusive. The 10 hours (and fewer) 
exposure estimate was subtracted from BGA annual totals to provide data for the two 
groups; pilots with 10 hours or fewer and those with more than 10 hours as pilot in 
command.  On this basis the estimated total number of launches taken from 2002 –
2006 by pilots with 10 hours PIC or fewer was 29,924 with an upper 95% confidence 
boundary of 35,301 launches and a lower 95% confidence boundary of 24,548 launches. 
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The estimated total number of hours flown was 11,553 hours (upper 95% confidence 
boundary of 14,017 hours and a lower 95% confidence boundary of 9,089 hours. The 
mean calculation of flying exposure by pilots with over 10 hours PIC during the same 
period was 1,609,810 launches and 696,041 hours.
Table  5.4. Classification matrix for intra rater reliability ratings of the six high 
level flight phases (FP1 - FP6).







FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6
FP1 - Pre-flight 6 1 7
FP2 - Launch 9 1 10
FP3 - General Flying 28 28
FP4 - Circuit 1 21 22
FP5 - Approach 1 14 15
FP6 - Landing 18 18
7 9 30 22 14 18 100
Table 5.5. Classification matrix for inter-rater reliability ratings of the six high 
level flight phases (FP1 - FP6).







FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6
FP1 - Pre-flight 5 5
FP2 - Launch 2 8 1 1 12
FP3 - General Flying 27 27
FP4 - Circuit 3 19 2 24
FP5 - Approach 1 2 12 1 16
FP6 - Landing 16 16
7 9 30 22 14 18 100
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Results - Stage 1: Accident events.
Within the 359 ‘pilot-related’ accidents classified in the previous study (Chapter 4), 545 
causal events were identified in total.  Only three accidents were categorized as 
containing four events, and so these were combined with the three-event accident group, 
to make up a group labeled ‘three or more events’ (see Table 5.6). The resulting 
analysis using a Fisher’s exact test showed a significant association between pilot 
experience group and the number of events in the accident sequence (p=0.016).  Further 
analysis of standardized residuals indicated that the ‘10 hours and under’ group had a 
significantly higher proportion of accidents where three or more events were identified 
in the analysis (standardized residual of 2.3, p=0.016). 
Table 5.6. Numbers of events identified in the accident narratives, split 






ts Under 10 Over 10 Total
1 event 11 203 214
2 events 10 97 107
3 or more events 7 31 38
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Results - Stage 2: Flight phase analysis
Launch failures
Twenty-four pilot-related accidents happened after launch failures. Of these 23 occurred 
to pilots with over 10 hours of experience and one to a pilot in the 10 hours of fewer 
group.  A Fisher’s exact test on this data gave a two-tailed result of p=0.707, showing 
that a systematic effect was statistically improbable.
However, subsequent analysis found that nine out of 23 of these accidents occurring to 
the experienced pilots were associated with training flights (where the experienced pilot 
was the instructor pilot, but the handling pilot was a trainee). Indeed, from the accident 
narratives it can be established that all of these accidents were ‘simulated’ launch 
failures (where the instructor deliberately releases the launch cable from the glider 
prematurely as if the cable or weak-link had broken, in order to test whether the student 
can deal effectively with the ‘emergency’). All of these occurred during winch 
launching. None of the other launch failure accidents were of the simulated type 
(understandably, since they were mostly solo pilots). No data exist to show how many 
simulated exercises are performed compared to the number of real launch failures, and 
no such records are kept. Without such exposure measures, it is impossible to draw 
conclusions about how likely accidents are to occur after simulated launch failures as 
opposed to real ones. However the data do show that simulated launch failures in 
training cause nearly as many accidents as real launch failures.
Fine grained flight-phase analysis showed that of the nine simulated launch failures 
leading to accidents, five of them had seminal events occurring in the recovery to flying 
speed after the failure had occurred (phase ‘2g’ in the template, Figure 5.1). Three 
caused serious injuries to one or more of the occupants, and two had no injuries 
associated with them. No other fine-grained phase was associated with more than one 
launch failure accident. 
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Off airfield accidents
Table 5.7 shows that of the 359 pilot-related accidents, 113 were identified as occurring 
off the airfield (meaning outside the circuit). All but one of these involved pilots with 
over 10 hours flying experience. The result of the Fisher’s exact analysis suggested that 
accidents occurring away from the base airfield were not randomly distributed across 
the experienced and inexperienced groups (p<0.000, two tailed).  In terms of simple 
frequency of occurrence, experienced pilots were much more likely to have an accident 
away from their home airfield. The odds ratio was 13.807, suggesting far greater odds 
of experienced pilots sustaining this type of accident, although the 95% confidence 
interval was extremely wide (1.85 – 102.9). 
Table 5.7. Total accident numbers for the two experience groups 
broken down by accident location









n Airfield / within circuit 27 219 246
Off-airfield 1 112 113
Flight phases overall (all pilots)
For this main flight phase analysis each accident was classified only by its seminal 
event. From this point, all other accident events were dropped from the analysis.
Table 5.8 shows the total number of accidents in each high level flight phase category. 
Table 5.9 shows the same information broken down by the lower level (fine grained) 
flight phases.
Table 5.8 shows that of the six high-level phases ‘general flying’ included most 
accidents overall (i.e. where the seminal event leading to accident occurred in the 
general flying phase). The distribution of injuries (Table 5.11) shows that seminal 
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events in the ‘launch’ phase and the ‘general flying’ phase led to the most severe 
accidents. From finer-grained analysis using the sub-phases (Table 5.9) it can be seen 
that the ground run phase caused most accidents (although relatively few injuries). 
Recovery to speed after release from launch was associated with ten accidents (causing
four serious injuries).  Initial events occurring in the rotation into the climb (on launch) 
were associated with most fatalities (3 in total). For the general flying phase most 
injuries occurred during ridge soaring (one fatality, two serious and five minor injuries).  
The search/descent and final glide stages also had high numbers of injuries (three 
serious and four minor).
Table 5.8. Seminal accident event totals for each high-level flight 
phase descriptor, as well as a breakdown between the two
experience groups.  ‘Instructional flight’ totals are the subset of 
those seminal accident events occurring during training flights.














































































1. Pre-flight 15 3 12 1
2. Launch 41 2 39 9
3. General Flying 94 1 93 2
4. Circuit 71 3 68 3
5. Approach 72 11 61 6
6. Landing 66 8 58 13
Totals 359 28 331 34
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Table 5.9. Seminal accident event totals for each low-level flight phase 
descriptor, as well as a breakdown between the two experience groups.  
‘Instructional flight’ totals are the subset of those seminal accident events 
occurring during training flights.









































































1. Pre-flight 15 12 3 1
2a. Ground run 20 19 1 2
2b. Pre-rotation climb 4 4 0 0
2c. Rotation 4 4 0 1
2d. Established climb 1 0 1 0
2e. Aero-tow cruise 1 1 0 0
2f. Release 0 0 0 0
2g. Recovery to speed 10 10 0 5
2h. Non normal aero-tow 1 1 0 1
3a. General flying 12 11 1 1
3b. Serious soaring 10 10 0 0
3c. Search/descent 40 40 0 0
3d. Ridge soaring 15 15 0 1
3e. Wave flying 0 0 0 0
3f. Final glide 16 16 0 0
3g. Unusual manoeuvring 1 1 0 0
3h. Evasive manoeuvre 0 0 0 0
4a. Circuit join. 39 39 0 1
4b. Circuit 23 21 2 1
4c. Abbreviated circuit 6 5 1 1
4d. Final turn 3 3 0 0
5a. Approach (circuit etc) 68 57 11 5
5b. Approach (lnch failure) 4 4 0 1
6a. Flare/ Hold off. 52 45 7 11
6b. Ground run 14 13 1 2











1      2           3    4         5   6
Figure 5.2. 
Accident totals for 
pilots with over 10
hours PIC, split by 
flight phase seminal 
events (flight 
phases 1 - 6)
1      2           3    4         5   6
Figure 5.3. Totals 
for instructional 
accidents (subset of 
over 10 hours 
pilots) split by 
flight phase seminal 
events
(flight phases 1 - 6)
Figure 5.4. 
Accident totals for 
pilots with 10 hours 
or fewer PIC, split 
by flight phase 
seminal events
60
1. Pre-flight  (8.3%
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Instructional Accidents (Training accidents)
Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show flight phase totals displayed for ease of comparison of 
accident trends across flight phases, for the two groups as well as for the sub-group of 
training accidents (identified as genuine instructional accidents). Figure 5.3 clearly 
shows that the distribution of training accidents is closer to the distribution for pilots 
with 10 hours or fewer than it is to pilots with over 10 hours, despite training accidents 
being a sub-set of the latter. 
In total, there were 34 accidents coded as ‘genuinely instructional’, meaning that 
10.27% of accidents occurring to the over-ten pilots happened while they were 
instructing students (34 out of 331). Figure 5.5 shows how this figure splits between 
flight phases; in other words the percentage of accidents in each flight phase that 
happened while instructing. For example, 23% of launch accidents occurring to pilots 
with over ten hours were accounted for by instructional flying.
Figure 5.5. The 
percentage of 
accidents to pilots 
with 10 hours or 
over, attributable to 
instructional flights, 
split by flight phase. 
These flights are a 
subset of the over-10 
hours accidents.
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A Pearson’s Chi-square test was used to compare the differences between flight phases 
in terms of instructional and non-instructional flying (within the over 10 pilot group). 
Table 5.10 shows the data, including the expected cell counts. The result was significant 
(two-tailed) to a 99.9% level of confidence (χ2 = 25.2, df = 5, P<0.001), confirming that 
(in terms of flight phase) the pattern of accidents was different for instructional 
accidents than for non-instructional ones. It can be seen that two cells had expected 
frequencies of less than 5, which is generally understood to lower the statistical power 
of the test (Field 2005, Robson 2002). However, most sources point out that while this 
rule applies to small contingency tables (e.g. 2 x 2) larger tables can sustain a number of 
such cases, usually deemed to be up to 20% of cells (Field 2005, Coolican 1994). Since 
in this case less than 20% of cells fall into this category and any associated error would 
be type two (i.e. finding no effect when one exists), this was deemed acceptable.
Table 5.10. Cross-tabulation used for Pearson’s Chi-square test. The 
population is all accidents occurring to pilots with over 10 hours of 
experience. This is split by the flight phase in which the seminal event 
occurred, and whether or not the flight was instructional (as coded).  
Bracketed numbers are the expected cell counts.
Non instructional accidents 
(over 10 group)
Instructional accidents              Total
Pre-flight 11 (10.8) 1    (1.23) 12
Launch 30 (35) 9    (4.01) 39
General Flying 91 (83.4) 2    (9.55) 93
Circuit 65 (61) 3    (6.98) 68
Approach 55 (54.7) 6    (6.27) 61
Landing 45 (52) 13    (5.96) 58
297 34 331
Twenty-three percent of all accidents coded as occurring during launch (for the ‘over 10 
hours’ group) happened on instructional training flights (9 out of 39).  For landing the 
figure was 22.4% (13 out of 58). Launch and landing therefore stand out as being the 
phases that were disproportionately high for instructional flying accidents. Fine grained 
analysis (Table 5.9) indicates that most instructional training accidents initiated during 
the launch phase had the seminal event in the ‘recovery’ to speed after the release (flight 
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phase 2g). Unsurprisingly, all of these were simulated launch failures, including three 
accidents resulting in serious injuries. Interestingly no such accidents (recovery to 
speed, ‘2g’) occurred to pilots in the ’10 hours or fewer’ group, so despite causing 
serious accidents during training, the recovery phase caused few accidents once pilots 
were solo. It was also notable that few accidents during the launch ‘ground run’ 
happened on instructional flights, despite these accidents being the largest group of 
accidents in the launch phase overall. The ‘general flying’ phase and ‘circuit’ phase 
were associated with very few accidents during instructional flying.
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Flight phases split by pilot experience
From figures 5.2 and 5.4, it can be clearly seen that the pattern of accidents across flight 
phases was quite different between the two pilot experience groups. 
Table 5.11. Totals, frequencies and injuries categorized by where the seminal 
event was deemed to have taken place, in terms of the six higher level flight 
phases. Launches per accident are calculated from exposure data.  The exposure 
data for pilots with 10 hours or fewer pilot-in-command was derived from the 
data published in Jarvis & Harris (2007b).
High level Flight 
Phase
Injuries totals 10 hours or fewer 
experience




























































1. Pre-flight 1 1 2 3 9,975 ± 1,792 12 134,151
2. Launch 4 2 9 2 14,962 ± 2,688 39 41,277
3. General flying 2 9 12 1 29,924 ± 5,377 93 17,310
4. Circuit 1 0 5 3 9,194 ± 1,792 68 23,674
5. Approach 0 3 12 11 2,720 ± 489 61 26,390
6. Landing 0 1 4 8 3,741 ± 672 58 27,755
For initial statistical comparison of the two pilot experience groups, odds ratios were 
calculated for accident involvement across the six flight phases. An example of the 
tabulated data for a single test would be the total number of ‘landing’ accidents against 
the total number of all other accidents, then all split by the two pilot groups (Example: 
Table 5.12)
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Table 5.12. Example of the tabulated data for the odds ratio calculation (this is for 
accidents initiated in the landing phase)





Accident initiated in the landing phase 8 58 66
Accidents not initiated during the landing phase 20 273 293
Total 28 331 359
This was done six times; once for each of the flight phases. Only two phases out of the 
six resulted in significantly different odds between the two experience groups (i.e.
where the 95% confidence interval did not include 1). These were the approach phase 
(Odds ratio: 2.864, in favour of inexperienced pilots having such accidents, with a 95% 
confidence interval from 1.28 to 6.42) and the ‘general flying’ phase (Odds ratio: 10.55, 
in favour of experienced pilots having such accidents, with a 95% confidence interval 
from 1.41 to 78.765).
However these results only show the odds of one type of accident occurring in relation 
to other types. They do not show the actual likelihood of these accidents occurring on a 
given flight. For such analysis, accident rates were required, for both pilot groups, and 
all flight phases.
Accident rates were calculated for comparison by flight phase between the two pilot 
groups.  In the phases of flight where high numbers of accidents were observed more 
detailed analysis was performed. The rates across the six high-level flight phases 
(broken down by pilot experience) are shown in Table 5.11.
Whereas approach and landing were associated with the highest accident rates within 
the 10 hours or fewer group, the ‘general flying’ and ‘circuit’ phases had the highest 
accident rates within the experienced pilots’ group. The ‘general flying’ phase was the 
only phase where the accident rate for the over 10 hours group was higher than the 10 
hours or fewer group (estimated at one launch in 17,310 against one in 29,924 for the 10 
hours and fewer experience group). Fine-grained analysis of the over 10 hours group 
showed that element 3c (search/descent) accounted for 40 accidents in the ‘general 
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flying’ phase (43% of that category) by far the largest element. No accidents were 
caused during this phase for the 10 hours or fewer experience group, and further 
analyses were not undertaken owing to the limited number of accidents involved.
The highest accident rate overall was associated with the inexperienced pilots and 
having an accident caused during the approach phase (1 in 2,720 launches by the mean 
estimate and one accident in every 3,209 launches by the lowest estimate). Even the 
lowest estimate is over eight times that of the more experienced group. The next highest 
was the landing phase with the lowest estimate of the accident rate at one in 4,413 
launches, over six times higher than that for the over 10 hours experience group. 
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Discussion 
Stage one found that 44% of accidents were designated as having more than one ‘pilot 
induced’ causal event, however the narrative descriptions of accidents involving 
inexperienced pilots were more likely to describe multiple contributory causes. 
Therefore it is possible that inexperienced pilots are less able to successfully deal with 
the consequences of an initial error, and so make further errors (i.e. compound the 
problem). Equally however this could be due to the quality of the reports and witness 
statements. It has been shown that inexperienced pilots regularly crash at or close to the 
airfields (much more so than the experienced group) and this means that the accidents 
are more likely to be witnessed by other glider pilots. This effect could add detail to the 
accident narratives, meaning more events were identified.
Direct comparisons of flight phase findings from stage two with previous research are 
problematic because the definitions of phases used in this research are more detailed 
than in most previous studies, particularly in gliding. Also this analysis uses seminal 
events (the first contributory factor leading to an accident – (see Ingstad et al 1990, 
Wiegmann et al 2005) rather than categorizing on the basis of the phase of flight in 
which the crash occurred. The ‘General Flying’ phase in this study (phase three – see 
Figure 5.1) most closely corresponds to the ‘cruise phase’ used in previous research, 
although it is unclear in previous research whether ‘cruise’ includes the circuit and 
approach phases of flight. The finding that most fatal accidents occurred during the 
cruise phase (van Doorn & Zijlstra 2006) is not reproduced in this study since UK data 
shows that most fatal accidents occurred on ‘Launch’ (see Table 5.11) despite this being 
the least frequent accident phase after ‘Pre-Flight’.  The discrepancy in these figures 
could be a result of the predominant use of aero-tow launching in the US and the 
popular use of winch launching methods in the UK.  However the ‘General Flying’ 
phase in this study did contain more accidents than other categories and led to the 
largest number of injuries. This phase was particularly associated with the more 
experienced group of pilots (see Table 5.11).  Previous findings that ‘Landing’ was the 
most frequent accident phase (e.g. van Doorn & de Voogt 2007, O’Hare 1994, AOPA 
2006) were supported by the current research only if seminal events taking place in the 
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proceeding ‘approach’ phase were included with those in the ‘landing’ phase (which 
may have occurred in the aforementioned study given the lack of fidelity, i.e. only three 
flight phases).
The significant difference in numbers of ‘out-landing’ accidents between the two 
experience groups was to be expected considering that pilots with 10 hours or fewer 
solo experience would rarely fly out of range of the base airfield in the UK and 
therefore hardly ever need to make an out-landing. This explains the finding that the 
rate of accidents occurring to pilots with 10 hours experience or fewer was higher than 
for more experienced pilots, except when the seminal event occurred during the 
‘General Flying’ phase (Table 5.11). In any cross-country, competition or soaring flight 
this phase makes up the majority of the duration of the flight and therefore experienced 
pilots carrying out such flights are exposed to this phase for much longer.  Accidents 
initiated in flight phase 3c (‘Search/Descent’) were exclusive to the more experienced 
group, accounting for 12% of all accidents. This was partly because most of the seminal 
events involved an inappropriate choice of landing area made during the ‘descent and
searching’ phase. Landings in unplanned locations such as farm pastures, crop fields or 
scrubland bring dangers not associated with airfields, such as an uneven surface, 
obstacles and slopes, and usually a smaller area in which to land. It has previously been 
found that ‘collisions with objects took place predominantly in terrain unsuitable for 
landing’ (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). These dangers are faced almost exclusively by 
pilots with over 10 hours experience who are more likely to undertake longer (distance) 
flights than are novice pilots. 
All major flight phases except ‘General Flying’ were found to have a much higher rate 
of accidents for the 10 hours or fewer (inexperienced) group compared with the group 
of pilots with more than 10 hours as pilot in command. The highest accident rate overall 
was associated with inexperienced pilots and the ‘Approach’ phase (1 in every 2,507 
launches using the mid-point estimate – see Table 5.11). This finding is not in line with 
general aviation, where the approach phase has been found to be one of the least likely 
to cause accidents to low-hours pilots (Baker et al 1996). This stark difference could be 
explained by the very different nature of approach control in gliders and powered 
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aircraft. General aviation pilots use power to manage the energy on approach (speed and 
height). Glider pilots must set up an approach with plenty of reserve energy to reach the 
airfield, and then use airbrakes to “spoil the lift over a portion the wing and increase 
drag” (Piggott 1997), and in this way descend properly on the glide slope. In the event 
of an undershoot developing the airbrakes can be shut because there should be energy in 
reserve. However should this be mismanaged or misjudged then there is a real 
possibility that the glider may end up unable to reach the airfield, with no other options 
available. In powered aircraft this cannot happen unless there is an engine problem, so 
any mishandling of energy on approach can be simply rectified by the application of 
power or performing a go-around, a maneouvre not possible in a glider for obvious 
reasons. Without the ultimate option to abandon the approach (go-around) glider pilots 
must always correct errors occurring in this late stage of flight with little time and little 
height remaining. This may challenge the ability of inexperienced pilots. The causes of 
accidents on approach require further study.
Due in the large part to the number of accidents caused on approach, the segment of 
flight from joining the circuit through to the end of the approach was associated with 
exactly half of all accidents occurring to low hours solo glider pilots, unlike general 
aviation where the same section of flight was found to account for only 4% of accident 
initiation Baker et al (1996). The ‘Landing’ phase provided the second highest rate 
(after the approach) of accidents for very inexperienced pilots (1 in 3,448 launches). 
This supports previous findings for both gliders and aeroplanes regarding the frequency 
of landing accidents (O’Hare 1994, van Doorn & de Voogt 2007), as well as being in 
line with research findings from Baker et al (1996).
Like the approach, the landing is a discrete phase of relatively short duration, occurring 
late in the flight and therefore allowing little opportunity for recovery from serious 
errors. Landings were associated with fewer injuries than approaches which supports the 
finding that only 10% of landing accidents are fatal (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007).
The ‘Pre-Flight’ phase had a lower accident rate than both the ‘Approach’ and 
‘Landing’ phases (one accident per 9,194 launches for the less experienced group – see 
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Table 5.11).  This phase, however, showed the biggest discrepancy between the 
inexperienced and experienced pilot groups. Using the mid-point exposure estimates the 
less experienced pilots were over 13.5 times more likely to have an accident when the 
seminal event occurred during the ‘Pre-Flight’ phase. Pre-flight involves critical actions 
prior to take-off (particularly shutting the canopy and locking the airbrakes). It is 
possible that inexperienced pilots were actually making more of these errors, but 
equally possible that the difference was caused by inexperienced pilots failing to 
recover from errors made at this stage, since a recovery from such an error would not 
feature in the accident statistics.
It has been shown that accidents occurring to very inexperienced pilots (10 hours and 
fewer) had a very different pattern to those of more experienced pilots (over 10 hours), 
in terms of flight phase seminal events. Perhaps unsurprisingly, accidents occurring 
during training (‘genuine instructional flights’) followed a pattern closer to the 
inexperienced group than the experienced one, despite being a subset of the latter (due 
to the pilot in command being the instructor, and hence always with over 10 hours of 
experience). Instructors must allow student pilots to fly imperfectly, in order for them to 
practice and learn. An example of this philosophy is given in the BGA instructors’
manual, which gives the following advice to instructors: 
“Unless things are going badly wrong, start with the indirect prompt. It is an 
invitation to the trainee to assess the situation and make a suitable decision. 
The prompt doesn’t tell him exactly what to do” (British Gliding Association 
2003)
Therefore the instructor will usually allow a situation to develop beyond what he or she 
would have done had they been flying solo.  Hence, it is probable that had the instructor 
pilot been flying solo then the situation preceding the seminal events, and in many cases 
the seminal events themselves, would not have happened. Because it was the input from 
the trainee pilot that brought about these accidents, it follows that the trend would 
appear similar to the trend for accidents occurring when those same trainees have gone 
solo, and indeed this effect is apparent in the results (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4).
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However this is not the full story. Within the similar patterns of accidents occurring to 
trainees and inexperienced solo pilots, there were some notable differences. It is evident 
that the approach phase led to proportionally fewer accidents during instruction (as 
opposed to flights by inexperienced solo pilots), and the landing and launch phases 
proportionally more.  A probable explanation is suggested by the overall distribution of 
instructional accidents across the flight phases. Instructional accidents were
disproportionately caused during the launch and landing stages of instructional flights 
compared to the other pilot group breakdowns (i.e. all pilots, 10 hours or fewer and 10
hours and over). These two phases are at the very start and end of each flight and are the 
only phases which include interaction with the ground. This means that, compared to 
the other phases, there is much less height or time for effects of seminal errors made by 
trainees to be corrected by instructors. Notably the approach phase was the only phase 
where accident initiation increased substantially for student pilots once the instructor 
was no longer in the aircraft (Figures 5.3, 5.4). The ‘pre-flight’ phase also shows this 
effect, but the numbers are extremely small, and hence cannot be used to suggest trends. 
Landing and Launch accidents declined markedly (in proportion to other types) after 
solo while general flying and circuit accidents remained generally similar. The unique 
nature of gliding undoubtedly plays some part in these effects. The instructor does not 
have the option to increase power in order to recover a situation such as aborting the 
landing attempt, or to help recover speed after release (landing and speed recovery were 
the two most obvious seminal event ‘spikes’ of instructor accidents). However the 
instructor would have proportionally more time to mitigate the consequences of errors 
made on the approach. 
The high proportion of instructing accidents occurring after simulated launch failures 
(as a result of events during recovery after release) could be a reflection of the high 
number of simulated cable breaks being practiced. It could be that it is a difficult phase 
for instructors to recover from, once a mistake is made. It is equally possible that real 
launch failures are rare and so accidents caused by them are also rare. There is therefore 
no easy solution to this problem. It would be a possible over-simplification to use this 
evidence to argue for a reduction in launch failure training, in order to prevent training 
accidents. It could be that the amount of training itself is what leads to the low numbers 
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of launch failure accidents when solo, and hence to take away that training would lead 
to a rise in solo accidents of this type. The figures could be explained by the hypothesis 
that because trainees are subjected to these situations many times during training the 
standard of solo pilots is high in this maneuver. 
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Conclusions
The distribution of seminal accident events among the various elements of glider flight 
is quite different for inexperienced glider pilots than for pilots with more experience, or 
for general aviation pilots.  In contrast to the accidents occurring to low hours general 
aviation pilots, low hours glider pilots were most likely to have accidents initiated in the 
‘approach’ phase. This may reflect a major difference between operating gliders and 
powered aircraft. ‘Landing’ also had a high accident rate for inexperienced glider pilots, 
in line with previous findings across many types of aviation. Approach and landing 
made up 68% of seminal events leading to accidents for inexperienced pilots. The group 
of pilots with more than 10 hours of experience also had accidents originating in these 
phases but at a much lower rate. In general, the approach phase accounted for far more 
injuries than the landing phase.  All flight phases other than ‘General Flying’ showed 
higher accident rates for the pilots with fewer than 10 hours experience as pilot in 
command compared to more experienced pilots. Experienced pilots had a high rate of 
accidents originating during the ‘General Flying’ phase, mostly in the ‘Descent/Search’ 
sub-phase. 
The pattern of accidents occurring during training is more reflective of the pattern of 
accidents occurring to low-hours pilots than experienced ones, with launch and landing 
showing up as key areas where seminal events led disproportionately to accidents, even 
more so than for the low-hours solo group. The approach phase however was not as 
prominent in instructional accidents as it was for the low-hours solo group. Therefore it 
seems that accidents caused by seminal events in the approach were more likely to 
happen once the pilot was solo and prior to them gaining experience.
This research demonstrates the benefit of examining the flight phases in which seminal 
accident events occur, rather than classifying accidents by the flight phase in which the 
crash happens. This approach allows for better targeting of appropriate remedial actions.  
It also shows the benefits of analyzing accidents with respect to rates rather than 
frequency counts or odds ratios based on accident populations.
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Chapter 6 - Causal Factor Accident Analysis 
Introduction
So far, it has been shown that very inexperienced glider pilots (defined as those 
having10 hours PIC or fewer) have the greatest risk of accident involvement (Jarvis & 
Harris 2007b) and that these pilots were eight times more likely than more experienced 
pilots to initiate accidents during the approach phase, and six times more in the landing 
phase (Jarvis & Harris 2008). Accidents in the approach phase were far more likely to 
have injuries associated with them than the landing phase. Experienced pilots were 
much more likely to have accidents initiated during ‘general flying’ activity such as 
ridge soaring and cross country flying, and were more likely to have accidents 
associated with off-airfield landings (Jarvis & Harris 2008). Eighty percent of UK 
gliding accidents have ‘pilot related’ causes (Jarvis & Harris 2008) which is line with 
previous studies from the US (van Doorn & de Voogt 2007). 
Little research has been done on the nature of these pilot related causes in gliding
accidents. Previous research carried out on aircraft accident databases containing reports 
for powered aircraft has used either a categorical or an analytical methodology to 
discover causal factors. Categorical approaches develop taxonomies where accidents are 
broken down into groups deemed to have circumstantial similarities. Analytical research 
uses taxonomies describing the underlying causal factors. Various taxonomies have 
been produced and utilised using both methods. 
Categorical methods benefit from not imposing a pre-determined structure onto accident 
data, hence the methodology is predominantly data-driven. Using a categorical method 
the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) developed ten categories of accidents including 
‘Controlled Flight into Terrain’ (CFIT), ‘Loss of Control in Visual Meteorological 
Conditions’ and ‘Low level Manoeuvring/Aerobatics’, (UK Civil Aviation Authority -
CAA 1997). These categories were formed from groupings of similar accidents after 
reviewing reports in a database.  Such categories describe the general circumstances of 
the accidents but do not attempt to explain the human factor root causes. 
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These data-driven processes have spawned well-known categories which have been 
considered useful enough to be re-used by many organisations. An example is 
‘controlled-flight-into-terrain’ (CFIT) which is often used when an aircraft is deemed to 
have been flying under control but hit terrain or water. But although these methods are 
popular, particularly within aviation safety organisations, their explanatory weakness is 
demonstrated by the fact that there is no agreement upon categories or definitions, even 
of regularly used terms; “Getting investigators and researchers to agree on what is, and 
more importantly, what is not CFIT, is difficult at best” (Shappell & Weigmann  
2003a). Moreover, because these categorisations often give little indication about the 
human factor causes surrounding the accident, remedial work can be difficult.
Simple categorisation also does little to explain the human factor causes of accidents.  
At best, it is merely descriptive of the consequences, for example by definition CFIT is 
an outcome rather than a cause.  In 1996, ‘The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation’ used 
a similar method but with more focus on human factor causes. ‘Pilot factors’ were 
broken down into ‘medical’ (3%), ‘improper operation of primary flight controls’ (5%), 
‘inadequate pre-flight preparation or planning’ (11%), ‘perceptual misjudgement’ 
(12%), ‘operation beyond experience or ability’ (13%), ‘in-flight decisions or planning’ 
(15%), ‘did not obtain or maintain flying speed’ (15%), ‘diverted attention’ (16%) and 
‘poor judgement’ (17%), (Bureau of Air Safety Investigation 1996). BASI attempted to 
base its investigation efforts around error frameworks such as Reason’s theory of latent 
failures (O’Hare 2000) and it is clearly more representative of the human factor causes 
than the previously described system. However it could be argued that while some of 
the categories chosen represent the root of human mistakes and errors (i.e. perception, 
decision making and judgement errors) some represent the consequences of these (e.g. 
‘did not maintain flying speed’ and ‘inadequate preparation’). The latter could be 
caused by the former, meaning that the categorisation is questionable in terms of pilot 
causation, since it is used as if the categories are mutually exclusive. For example, 
‘diverted attention’ could cause ‘failure to maintain flying speed’. 
Recently taxonomies of accident causation based specifically on human error theory 
have become more popular. As early as 1982, Feggetter designed a comprehensive 
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human factors checklist for accident investigation including cognitive, social and 
situational factors (Feggetter 1982). The foundation of the cognitive component was a 
general model of human information processing, including attention, perception, 
memory, decision making and response. However the checklist was very involved and 
intended for use by an ‘appropriately trained human factor specialist’ (Feggetter 1982). 
It was aimed at single accident investigations where in depth information was available, 
rather than multiple accident analysis based on shorter written reports, summaries or 
database entries. 
A number of systems and taxonomies for human factor analysis of accident report 
databases have been developed in the last fifteen years. Gerbert and Kemmler (1986) 
used 1448 critical incidents reports of ‘near-accidents’ from pilots in the German Air 
Force to produce a taxonomy of 61 error types, fitting a four dimensional error structure 
of vigilance errors, perception errors, information processing errors and sensorimotor 
errors.
O’Hare et al (1994) coded 284 aviation accident reports deemed to have been caused by 
pilot error into one of three error stages based on fundamental cognitive theory; 
information, decision and action. It was found that 62.5% of serious and fatal accidents 
were characterised by decision errors. The same accident reports were coded for the 
existence of the 61 error types identified by Gerbert and Kemmler. A ‘principle 
components analysis’ found that the majority of the accidents were accounted for by 
seven components; ‘Mishandling controls’, ‘decisions and judgement of go-arounds’, 
‘failure to check/monitor’, ‘stall/spin delayed recovery’, ‘failure to follow procedures in 
go-arounds’, ‘misjudgement of weather conditions’ and ‘misjudgement of altitude and 
clearance’.
In a second study, O’Hare et al (1994) looked at aviation accidents from 1983 until 
1991, using a six step taxonomic algorithm (Figure 6.1). Of the seven human error 
categories formed by working through the steps, the first was ‘non-cognitive’, i.e. where 
the pilot had no realistic chance to intervene, such as a problem caused by a technical 
defect. The remaining six were information, diagnostic, goal, strategy, procedure and 
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action error. Such a model is an expansion of the three step model previously mentioned 
(information, decision, action) but with the ‘decision’ category broken down into a 
further four categories. Again, the accidents with the most serious outcomes were 
characterised by decisions, and of the four decision categories ‘goal errors’ (i.e. choice 
of option/goal) was by far the highest (O’Hare et al 1994).
Development of a taxonomy capable of identifying deeper root causes culminated in
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) developed by 
Weigmann and Shappell (2001). HFACS is perhaps the most widely used human factors 
accident analysis framework, being extensively used in civil and military accident 
analysis in recent years (Li & Harris 2005). HFACS was developed from Reason’s 
organizationally based model of human error (Reason 1990).  The HFACS taxonomy 
contains four levels describing different layers of failure in the system; Unsafe Acts, 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervision, and Organizational Influences 
(Shappell & Weigmann 2000). Using this analytical taxonomy derived from an 
underlying theory, the active failures (errors) of pilots combine with latent conditions 
lying dormant in the system to breach its defences.  These latent conditions are spawned 
in the upper levels of the organization and are related to management and regulatory 
structures.
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HFACS has not been applied to gliding accidents. It has however been applied to 
general aviation accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann 2003a; Shappell & Wiegmann 
2003b; Shappell & Wiegmann 2004). Although 19 causal categories across four levels 
of human failure are contained within the HFACS framework, only one of those four 
Did the pilot detect cues arising 
from the change in system state? Information error (1.1)
No
Yes
Did the pilot execute procedures 
consistent with the strategy selected? Procedure Error (2.4)
No
Yes
Was there an opportunity for pilot 




Was the problem executed as 
intended? Action Error (3.0)
No
On the basis of the information 
available, did the pilot diagnose 




Did the pilot choose a strategy which 
would achieve the goal intended? Strategy Error (2.3)
No
Yes
Did the pilot choose a goal which 





Figure 6.1. Taxonomic algorithm for classifying information processing failures 
(from O’Hare et al 1994)
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levels (unsafe acts of aircrew) was used to examine general aviation accident data. This 
level consists of four causal categories; skill-based errors, decision errors, perceptual 
errors and violations. Eighty-two percent of 3,200 fatal accidents were found to be 
attributed (at least partially) to skill-based errors; 12% included perceptual errors and 
32% decision errors (Shappell & Wiegmann 2003b). Decision errors represented only 
about half the figure reported by O’Hare et al (1994) and the percentages of decision 
errors were similar for fatal and non-fatal accidents (Wiegmann et al 2005). Fine-
grained analysis found that ‘maintaining direction control’, ‘airspeed’, and ‘stall/spin’ 
made up most skill-based errors (Wiegmann et al 2005) which partially supports the 
CAA’s (1997) finding that high numbers of accidents involved loss of control.  The 
majority of decision errors involved ‘in-flight planning’; ‘pre-flight planning’; ‘fuel 
management’; ‘poor selection of terrain for take-off/landing/taxi’ and ‘go-around 
decisions’ (Wiegmann et al 2005).
It is arguable that none of the lower-level decision sub-categories apply to gliders in the 
way that they do to powered aircraft. ‘Pre-flight planning’ cannot be carried out in 
gliders to the extent to which it can be in powered aircraft simply because flights are not 
entirely predictable in terms of height, track and speed. Goals are often set (waypoints 
for example in competition flying with ‘legs’ drawn between them) but these are targets 
which the pilot hopes to achieve while accepting that s/he may not be able to, and may 
need to land-out (i.e. in an unknown field). However, to maximise air currents glider 
pilots do perform dynamic in-flight planning, described as “whole chains of logic that 
can play important roles in cross-country flight” (Reichmann 1992). Additionally, the 
circuit and landing phases require considerable dynamic planning since the vertical 
profile is more or less fixed, meaning the pilot must extrapolate this in order to plan to 
arrive at the right height, in the right place for a landing to be made. This area represents 
a large difference between powered aircraft and gliders because gliders cannot be flown 
around standard circuits with the expectation of losing a predictable amount of height 
all the way round (Piggott 1991). It is clear therefore that the planning issues are quite 
different in gliders, and therefore a read across from the HFACS categories should be 
treated with caution. The categories of ‘fuel management’ and ‘go-around’ are clearly 
not applicable to gliding operations at all. Finally, the category of poor terrain selection 
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can only really apply to landing (rather than take off or taxiing, as in the aforementioned 
study). Clearly therefore the five decision categories cannot simply be mapped across 
and used for gliding accidents because as well as significant operational differences, the 
nature of decision making and judgement are very different than for pilots of powered 
aircraft. This supports the argument that gliders need a separate form of accident 
classification, and that in particular the nature of decision making and judgement need 
careful thought. 
In addition to differences in categorisation, the upper levels of the HFACS framework 
are arguably unsuited to UK gliding, because it is not clear what the organisational, 
management or supervisory factors are for pilots operating gliders in the UK. Pilots 
generally fly for their own pleasure, and with very few exceptions instructors are 
volunteers. Recreational flights are not affected by organisational or management 
pressure in the way that commercial flights are. This is probably the reason that only the 
four lower level causal categories of HFACS (the unsafe acts of the pilots ) have been 
applied to recreational general aviation accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann 2003a, 
Shappell & Wiegmann 2003b, Shappell & Wiegmann 2004). The lower level of the 
HFACS taxonomy relates only to the unsafe acts of the pilots, and would therefore be 
the only part of HFACS possibly appropriate for recreation gliding. 
Despite the extent of analysis done on recreational aviation accidents, only a small 
amount of research has looked at very inexperienced pilots, or the differences between 
pilots of varying experience levels. Although no such research has been done for 
gliding, some has focussed on general aviation. A study of US general aviation 
accidents found that of 327 accidents occurring to student pilots flying solo (i.e. early 
solo pilots), 146 (45%) involved loss of control on landing (Baker et al 1996). The 
majority of these involved running off the side or the end of the runway, nosing over or 
hard landings. Very few led to injuries. Other prominent issues found to initiate 
accidents were fuel starvation (13%) and stall (13%). Stalling accidents accounted for 
46% of fatal accidents identified in the study, and occurred mainly on takeoff and final 
approach.
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The UK Civil Aviation Authority reported that accidents involving loss of control were 
associated with inexperience (CAA 1997). These accidents were defined as “where the 
pilot lost control of the aircraft while operating in accordance with normal aviation 
procedure, under visual flight rules (VFR), and not engaging in low level aerobatics” 
(CAA 1997). The mean total experience of pilots involved in LOC-VMC accidents was 
927 hours, whereas the mean figure overall for all other accident types was 2115. Only 
21% of pilots involved in LOC-VMC accidents had more than 1000 total hours whereas 
all other accident types combined had a figure of 55%. A pilot’s previous amount of 
experience on the aircraft type involved in the accident appeared to make little 
difference, it was the total flying experience overall that was notable (CAA 1997). The 
explanation offered for this in the UK CAA publication CAP 667, states that such 
accidents are caused by a lack of basic handling skills often associated with an 
unfamiliar situation and possibly caused by initial training or inadequate refresher 
training (CAA 1997). It is claimed that this also brings the standard of instruction into 
question.
Research by O’Hare et al (1994) using the six step taxonomic algorithm (figure 6.1) 
found that less experienced pilots were more likely to be involved in accidents classified 
by the six cognitive categories (i.e. they were more likely to make human errors). This 
finding has not been replicated for gliding where no significant difference was found 
between highly inexperienced pilots and their more experienced counterparts, in terms 
of pilot-related causes as a proportion of all accidents (Jarvis & Harris 2008). In general 
aviation, the sub-category of ‘procedure errors’ was found to be associated with 
accidents involving pilots with low total hours (fewer than 100) as well as low hours on 
type. Procedure errors were ones where an appropriate goal and strategy had been 
selected by the pilot, but the procedures selected and executed were not consistent with 
that strategy (O’Hare et al 1994). Action errors (those where the procedures were not 
carried out as intended) were also more predominant in pilots with fewer than 500 total
hours, and less than 100 hours on type. This is consistent with the CAA findings 
regarding lack of handling skills. More experienced pilots (greater than 1000 hours) 
suffered a greater number of information errors proportionally (O’Hare et al 1994).
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In terms of human factors, a small amount of previous analysis of recreational powered 
aircraft accidents suggests that low hours pilots are often involved in accidents which 
involve general handling (skill-based) errors. There is some suggestion that instructional 
techniques may be to blame. 
This study aims to investigate the nature of causal events in UK gliding accidents, and 
specifically whether any differences exist in the pattern of causal factors where those 
accidents involved highly inexperienced pilots. It has been argued that the human 
factors taxonomies developed for powered aircraft accident analysis are not completely 
suitable for analysing gliding accidents because of the unique nature of glider 
operations. In particular, pilot decisions are of a very different nature to those made by 
powered aircraft pilots. Therefore the analysis will be approached from a fresh angle.
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Method
Before any causal analysis could be done on the accident database, a taxonomy had to 
be produced with which to do so. Therefore the first objective was to create a taxonomy 
specifically for categorising pilot related causal accident events in gliding. This was 
done using qualitative means to analyse the meaning of all accident events identified in 
Jarvis and Harris (2008), see chapter five. The second objective was to code all seminal 
events by the taxonomy and apply quantitative analysis in order to discover where the 
particular dangers are for glider pilots, and look specifically at the problems being faced 
by very inexperienced pilots. These objectives will be termed stage one and stage two. 
Stage 1 - Creation of the taxonomy
As argued, gliding accidents may be quite different in nature to those of other aircraft 
and so a categorical data driven approach was chosen for the analysis of accident 
narratives, rather than relying on any predetermined taxonomies. This was in order to 
avoid the risk of overlooking elements unique to gliding. The analysis borrowed from 
principles of grounded theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss 1967) but also had to be 
capable of categorising accident events in a mutually exclusive manner in order to 
facilitate quantitative analysis.
Grounded theory was developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967 and is a 
method of deriving theory inductively from systematic analysis (Strauss & Corbin
1990). The method allows meaning to emerge from data, by constant comparison 
between individual sentences or phrases within the data in order to assess their meaning 
within the context, before grouping (coding) those phrases on several levels. Hence it is 
a technique that attempts not to impose any pre-conceptions onto the data. Using the 
principles of grounded theory allowed a structured approach to be taken to the 
qualitative data analysis.
The approach taken followed three stages; Data gathering, open coding and axial 
coding, as shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2. Initial grounded theory application steps (From Huddlestone 
and Harris 2006)
Data Gathering
Only UK gliding accident reports from a five year period (2002 to 2006) identified by 
Jarvis and Harris (2008) as having a pilot-related cause were used in the analysis 
(source: British Gliding Association 2007b). Each accident report contained details such 
as glider type, pilot age and experience; injury, damage caused, and a narrative 
description of what happened. Within the 359 reports, 545 contributing events had 
previously been identified Jarvis and Harris (2008).
Where possible the narrative accident descriptions contained within the BGA database 
were supplemented with segments from AAIB or BGA reports, as well as additional 
information from other fields in the database (with the strict exception of pilot 
experience for the purposes of coding). In a very few cases witnesses or pilots also 
contributed information about specific accidents. Hence for each accident a ‘descriptor’ 
was created that, in a number of cases, contained more information than the original 
BGA database text description.
Open coding
Strauss and Corbin (1990) describe open coding as “The process of breaking down, 
examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorizing data”. In terms of ‘concepts’, 
these are defined as “conceptual labels placed on discrete happenings, events and other 
instances of phenomenon” (Strauss & Corbin 1990). Since any individual accident is 
naturally a ‘discrete happening’, there was no need for the data to be broken down in 
this way, as occurs commonly in grounded theory analysis. The only breakdown was 
splitting accidents into events which were also discrete happenings. This was done in 
Data Gathering Open Coding Axial Coding
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Chapter five; accident reports were broken into discrete events deemed to be pilot-
related. With the data already reduced (‘broken down’), a modified version of open 
coding was performed on all accident events used using pair-comparisons, as described 
by Partington (2002). Each data item (event) was compared with preceding data items to 
see if it described the same phenomenon.  Where this was deemed to be the case they 
were coded as belonging to the same category.  
For example, the first event to be looked at was a description of an accident where a 
pilot forgot to lock the canopy and it came off during the launch. The next was an event 
where the pilot misjudged the approach path and allowed a serious undershoot to 
develop. Comparing the two, it was decided that they were dissimilar in terms of their 
underlying causes and hence two coding categories were started but no definitions or 
labels were applied at this point. The third event was a pilot not doing their straps up 
prior to launch. This was compared with both the previous events and declared to be 
similar to the first one, and so put into that pile. A new category was started whenever 
an event was deemed to be dissimilar to all preceding events up to that point. The 
process was repeated for all 359 accidents and the categories were continually revised 
and re-worked. Only after the process was complete was each category given a working 
title (code). 
The objective of the research was to compare accident events with each other, and so 
each accident event necessarily remained separate as a phenomenon. In other words 
rather than pulling out as many themes as possible from every accident and then 
categorising these themes, the categorisation process was performed on individual 
accident events, each given a single overall theme. Importantly, by rigidly applying only 
a single code to each accident event, quantitative analysis of events/accidents remained 
a valid procedure, and so comparison of accidents was possible after the qualitative 
analysis was complete. This was because every accident event had the same number of 
associated themes (one), and therefore there was no numerical bias caused by the 
applying the qualitative methodology.
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Open coding was performed on accident events using constant comparisons between all 
545 event descriptors (treated as ‘concepts’ in terms of grounded theory principles). As 
previously stated the descriptors were compared very strictly on a single criteria: the 
basis of the pilot contribution to the accident. Other criterion could have been applied, 
for example: outcome, consequence, ‘type’ of accident, damage caused etc, and in many 
cases these criterion would have been a more obvious choice. In other words each 
descriptor was compared only in terms of what the pilot did or did not do. In this way, 
confusion about cause and consequence was avoided. Furthermore the categories were 
constantly and systematically compared to make sure each was mutually exclusive, in 
order to reaffirm that a single criteria was being applied. Where there was found to be 
overlap between categories, they were re-worked with particular care given to the 
criterion being applied.
After all 545 events had been grouped using this open coding process, each of the 
groups (categories) were labelled on the basis of its descriptions represented in terms of 
pilot actions/inactions/activities. This process involved a second subject matter expert, 
in an attempt to reduce any potential researcher bias. Additionally some events were re-
categorised at this point, after further discussion. Sixty-five categories emerged from 
this open coding process. 
Axial-coding
Axial coding is defined as “A set of procedures whereby data are put back together in 
new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories”, Strauss & 
Corbin (1990, p.96). In pure grounded theory analysis a process called paradigm linking 
is used, which links categories by causes, actions and consequences. However since all 
events had already been carefully coded on the basis of cause, this was inappropriate. 
Comparison of categories was used however, in order to link together those categories 
that had similar human factor root causes. For example many categories had attentional 
issues as the root cause of the events (e.g. action omitted; not lowering gear or flap, 
action slip or not noticing another aircraft, etc). These categories were then linked to 
form a major human factors category. Additionally some categories were split further to 
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reflect different root causes of a similar issue. For example, one of the initial categories 
was called ‘flew glider into poor weather/ gliding conditions’. It was clear from scrutiny 
of the reports that in some cases this had been an attentional issue, for example where a 
pilot had not noticed a change in wind direction, while with some it had been a strategic 
decision, for example where the pilot flew into rain and low visibility in an effort to find 
lift. Therefore these were separated into two categories to reflect the difference in cause. 
Using these methods, a hierarchical template was arrived at that described all gliding 
accidents within the database. 
In this way the categories from the open coding process were systematically compared 
and formed into larger groups, based on pilot action/inaction. Some of these groups 
were then joined to form larger units, and finally six higher level categories emerged 
describing the root human factor causes. Hence the taxonomy ended up with  a 
hierarchical structure. After all the further coding and grouping, the number of 
categories decreased to 62, and these became the lower level categories.
Selective coding, sometimes used as a final process in grounded theory analysis in order 
to describe the central themes of the ‘story’ was unnecessary, since when the categories 
and sub-categories were arrived at, numerical and statistical analysis was to be applied. 
This numerical analysis was valid because of the rigorous application of single codes to 
single events. Since total numbers of events were known for each category and sub-
category, and each event was only coded once, quantitative analysis could be performed 
on the accident database using the hierarchical template.  
Because total numbers of events were known for each category and sub-category, and 
each event was only coded once, quantitative analysis could be performed on the 
accident causes. 
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Reliability and blind rating
A number of measures were put in place to insure the reliability and objectivity of the 
rating process and provide triangulation of the categorisation, in common with the 
previous study (see chapter 5).
 First, pilot experience information was removed before rating the reports to 
avoid any possible bias during the grounded theory analysis. 
 Second, the complete categorisation along with exemplar narrative statements 
were given to a number of subject matter experts for feedback as to whether or 
not they appeared valid and reflective of the activity, and some adjustments 
made in light of this exercise.  
 Third, after coding was complete one hundred complete accident narratives were 
randomly selected to be used as the reliability sample (representing over 25% of 
the narratives and containing 150 events in total). Each event was highlighted 
within the report in order to ensure that the second rater was making a 
judgement based on the correct event. Human factors training was provided to 
the second rater, who was a subject matter expert in gliding, a former airline 
training captain and a qualified instructor in crew resource management. The 
template was explained thoroughly and practices were performed. The 
independent rater then proceeded to categorise all 150 events using the template. 
The complete inter-rater grid is shown in Appendix C part 1, with the two sets of 
150 codes (for rater A and rater B) in Appendix C part 2.
 Fourth, an intra- rater reliability test was conducted in the same way on the same 
sample (as the inter-rater test) two weeks after initial rating was completed. 
Intra-rater reliability (observer consistency) is used to establish that the 
researcher’s method of coding is consistent, and inter- rater tests are used to 
make sure that the researcher had not coded in an idiosyncratic way (Robson 
2002). The complete intra-rater grid is shown in Appendix D part 1, with the 
two sets of 150 codes (for 1st and 2nd rating) in Appendix D part 2.
 The lower level categories were matched to the four top level categories by the 
independent rater, and the vertical structure of the template was discussed in 
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light of this exercise. Some modifications were made to terminology of several 
lower level categories as a result.
Statistical analysis
Chi square and Fishers exact tests was used to compare accident features between 
groups. These test the assumption that certain properties of groups are randomly 
distributed between those groups. In the case of accident analysis (particularly analysis 
of cause rather than outcome), accidents can be treated as a random sample of all flights 
undertaken, until evidence becomes available to indicate that certain features of accident 
flights were different to other flights. In other words, the population is all flights 
undertaken, the sample is all accidents. Fisher’s exact tests can provide evidence of 
imbalance between accident features belonging to the different pilot groups. Thus if a p 
value is significant it would suggest that the variables under consideration are 
systematically associated with accident causation, within the population of all flights. 
Rates for particular accident factors were calculated in the same way as used by Jarvis 




The proportion of agreement for the intra-rater test on the low level categories was 
0.913, giving a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.909. The inter-rater test gave a proportion of 
agreement of 0.773, with a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.764. These reliability coefficients can 
be regarded as ‘excellent’ (>0.75) according to Robson (2002). When this same test 
result is analysed between just the six high level categories, the figures increase only 
slightly, to Kappa = 0.94 (intra-rater test) and Kappa  = 0.78 (inter-rater test). The 
similar coefficients show that there is only a small amount of inconsistency in selection 
of the finer-grained elements (lowest level categories) within the larger six categories 
(i.e. that most of the inconsistency is between the higher level categories). 
The coding of the template can therefore be considered as reliable and consistent. 
However the relation of specific lower level categories to top level (general) categories 
required verification. All 62 lower level category descriptions, along with an event 
example were matched to the four main general categories by an independent rater. No 
intra-rater test was conducted because the investigator was familiar with the template. 
The results were a Kappa of .64 for the inter-rater test (Good). It was of interest to note 
that the majority of disagreement was between perceptual judgement (J) and handling 
(H). This could have been due to the descriptions given to the second rater.
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Results Stage 1 - The causal template (taxonomy)
Table 6.1 (across two pages). The final template with accident numbers for both 
groups, and injuries. Each accident is represented by its seminal event only. The 
table is presented in four sections, representing the four top-level groups. Where a 
number of categories from open coding were brought together into intermediate 
categories, those are shown on the left in grey.




Misjudged intended separation with obstruction 0 2 1
Allowed wing tip to touch the ground in a turn 0 2 0
Landing Flare too high/ too early 4 8 0
Landing Flare too low/ too late 3 28 2




Flew too close in / (too high / too much energy) 1 11 2
Flew too far out/ (too low / little energy) 1 10 1




Opened airbrakes at inadvisable point in approach 0 2 0
Left airbrakes out too long 1 3 0
Insufficient reduction of airbrakes below glide path 3 2 1
Applied landing flap too early 0 0 0




Used too little airbrake 0 0 0
Put airbrake away (any number of times) 0 1 0
Continued until too late to safely execute alternative 0 1 0
Cue misinterpreted 1 1 0
H - Handling =< 10h >10h Injuries
Mishandled in 
Pitch
Mishandled elevator causing ‘longitudinal oscillation’ 0 4 1
Overuse of up-elevator causing accelerated stall 0 3 2
Overuse of up-elevator causing overly steep climb 0 2 1
Overuse of up elevator causing tail strike in flare 0 3 0
Overuse of down elevator 0 7 2
Mishandled in 
roll
Not correcting/allowing for drift 2 1 1
Mishandled sideslip 0 2 0
Mishandled airbrakes 1 3 2
Mishandled flaps 0 2 0
Mishandled during an established aerotow 0 3 1
Ground run after 
landing
Allowed/ failed to prevent wing going down 0 16 5




Causing a re-light after landing by mishandling controls 0 1 1
Causing a premature/exaggerated take-off on launch 0 2 0
Causing an extended ground run on take off 1 2 0
Overuse of wheel brake 0 0 0
Mishandled 
speed
Failed to maintain (or increase to) speed required 3 25 10
Allowed unintentional increase of speed 1 3 0





Continuing with a 
plan / strategy
Continued into poor conditions 0 4 1
Accepted launch into unfavourable conditions 0 3 1
Continued with a marginal attempt to reach airfield 0 7 2
Continued operating (e.g. thermal soaring) while too low 0 8 2
Flew over an area with no safe landable options 0 7 1
Continued with compromised launch 0 3 0
Flew out of reach
Flew out of reach of airfield during intended local flight 0 20 7
Flew out of reach of chosen field while x-country/ soaring 0 6 1
Compromised sighting of intended flight path 0 2 1
Landed in an unsuitable field 0 12 1
Chose unsuitable initial field leading to late rejection 0 6 1
Chose to land on unusual/unfamiliar area of airfield 0 5 0
Rejected straight ahead landing from launch failure 0 1 1
Deliberately left wheel up 0 1 0




Did not notice 
stimulus
Did not notice obstruction/ditch/undulation/slope 0 8 0
Did not notice another aircraft, or launch in progress 0 8 4
Did not notice change in conditions 1 5 1
Aircraft issue/setting overlooked 1 3 1
Secondary 
control actions
Secondary control action omitted (unintentionally) 0 29 1
Action initiated but not completed. E.g. u/c, canopy lock 0 2 1
Secondary control action slip 0 16 2
Failed to correctly set/lock control/straps/seat 2 9 3
Four accidents were dropped from the analysis because either the cause could not be 
sufficiently determined, or the accident was caused by a non-handling passenger. These 
represented three open coded categories in their entirety and so these were dropped 
from further analysis, leaving only 59 low level categories in the taxonomy. All 59 are 
listed in Table 6.1 along with the main intermediate subgroups formed subsequently (on 
the left). The template is in four sections, each representing one of the four top-level 
groups that finally emerged from the axial coding process: Perceptual Judgement (J), 
Handling (H), Strategy (S) and Attention (A).
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The four top-level groups were formed as follows.
Perceptual Judgement (J): Categories in this group included those with events driven 
by perceptual judgment that turned out to be in error. For example misjudged separation
(e.g. with object), misjudged position, rate, descent profile or height. Perceptual 
judgement was not categorised alongside decision judgement (e.g. the judgement of 
alternatives). 
Handling (H): Categories forming this group included events deemed to be caused by 
mishandling of the controls (e.g. under-banked turns, over-pitching the launch rotation, 
overuse of wheel brake, etc.). This is where the outcome of control actions was not as 
intended, in contrast to ‘perceptual judgement’ or ‘attention’ events. 
Strategy(S): This included all eventualities where the glider’s overall operation led to 
the accident in a manner fitting the description of ‘pilot-related’ and included any 
deliberate action/inaction (as opposed to outcome) not caused by a perceptual 
misjudgement or handling of controls.
Attention (A): This group was formed of lower level categories where it was clear from 
the accident narrative that the pilot had been unaware of his/her actions (or inactions) 
leading to the accident, for example ‘secondary control action slip’ (such as operating 
the flap lever rather than the undercarriage lever). This category was also used where a 
problem occurred due to attentional issues relating to other information, such as not 
noticing a change in conditions (such as wind direction).
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Results Stage 2 – Quantitative analysis of accidents.
For quantitative analysis, each accident was represented by its seminal event only. 
Being the first event in the accident sequence, the seminal event represented the cause 
of the accident. All analysis in the following section is based on seminal events only.
Injury causes
Table 6.2 shows the distribution of accidents and injuries between the four top-level 
groups. Chi-square analysis on this data (injury verses no injury) resulted in a chi square 
of 11.193 (p< 0.05, df = 3). This indicates that the ‘perceptual judgement’ group (J) 
contained significantly fewer injuries than expected whereas ‘handling’ (H) contained 
more.







Perceptual Judgement (J)  9 83 92
Handling (H) 26 67 93
Strategy (S) 19 67 86
Attention (A) 13 71 84
The two most common low level categories (leaving the landing flare too late / too low, 
and omitting a secondary control action) were unlikely to be associated with injuries 
(Table 6.1). The third most common open code (not maintaining or increasing airspeed) 
was much more likely to be associated with injury (over a third of such accidents). This 
category contained more injuries than any other, including fatal and serious injuries. 
Flying out of reach of the airfield during a local flight was associated with the highest 
number of accidents leading to injuries categorised as serious or fatal. This category was 
applied where it could be deemed that the pilot intended to fly ‘locally’ (within range of 
the home airfield) but got into a position whereby a return was able to be achieved.
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Quantitative analysis of accidents by experience
Seminal accident events in the four top-level groups were compared between the two 
pilot experience levels using chi-square analysis supported by standardised residual 
scores, and rates calculations. Where differences were found, the lower level categories 
were examined in an attempt to identify more detailed explanations.
Table 6.3. Seminal accident event numbers and rates by experience level for the 
four top level groups. The number of accidents is given for each group (n), rates 
are given in the form of launches per event, and the 95% confidence interval for 
the inexperience pilot level (estimate) is also given (+/-).
Seminal event totals and 
rates
10 Hours and under Over 10 Hours
n Launch per event +/- n Launch per event
Perceptual Judgement (J)  15 1995 358 77 20,907
Handling (H) 9 3325 597 84 19,164
Strategy (S) 0 n/a n/a 86 18,719
Attention (A) 4 7481 1344 80 20,123
Rates for particular accident factors were calculated using the revised exposure measure 
from Jarvis and Harris (2008) which was an estimate of the number of launches and 
hours flown by UK glider pilots between 2002 and 2006. The ‘10 hours and under’
group totals were subtracted from the overall UK totals to provide data for two mutually 
exclusive groups; pilots with 10 hours or fewer PIC and those with more than 10 hours 
PIC. The estimated number of launches taken from 2002 – 2006 by pilots with 10 hours 
PIC or fewer was 29,924 (upper 95% confidence interval boundary = 35,301; lower 
95% boundary = 24,548). The estimated number of hours flown was 11,553 (upper 95% 
confidence interval boundary = 14,017; lower 95% boundary = 9,089). The mean 
calculation of flying exposure by pilots with over 10 hours PIC during the same period 
was 1,609,810 launches and 696,041 hours.
Comparison of accident totals (the data in the two columns headed ‘n’, Table 6.3) gave 
a Chi-Square of 17.875 (df = 3, p <0.001). No expected cell value was less than five and 
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so the assumed criteria for Pearson’s chi square test was upheld. Standardised residuals 
showed that for the 10-and-under  pilot group there were significantly more seminal 
events associated with perceptual judgement (z = 2.9) and significantly fewer associated 
with strategy (z = -2.6) than for the over10 group. Accident rates support this general 
picture, but also show the real extent to which inexperienced pilots were much more 
likely to have an accident associated with seminal events in all top-level groups apart
from ‘strategy’. The lowest rate for seminal events associated with perceptual 
judgement in the under10 pilot group (1995 + 358) occurred at 8.9 times the rate per 
launch than for the over10 group, although none of these led to injury. Seminal events 
in the ‘handling’ category occurred at a rate 4.9 times higher for the under10 group 
(lowest estimate) and those associated with ‘attention’ at a rate 2.3 times higher. No 
seminal events involving strategy occurred to any pilots with ten hours of experience or
fewer. 
Out of the fifteen ‘judgement’ related events that occurred to pilots with10 hours or 
fewer, three were associated with using too much airbrake (insufficient reduction of 
airbrake) below the glide-path, four were associated with flaring the glider too early and 
three flaring too late. Hence nearly half of the judgement errors were misjudgements of 
the landing flare. The remainder were spread between a number of low level categories. 
Caution should be used however since the number of accidents is very low. Further 
analysis was undertaken on the low-level categories that accounted for the largest 
numbers of accidents for inexperienced pilots, three of which were from the judgement 
group (J). Cross-tabulations were prepared in order to compare the numbers of accidents 
occurring to inexperienced and experienced pilots in each of these low level categories. 
Fisher’s exact tests were used along with calculations of odds ratios.
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Table 6.4. The four most frequent lower-level categories for inexperienced pilots, 
broken down for comparison with the experienced pilot group. The four 2 x 2 
cross-tabulations are shown by the columns ‘10 and under’ and ‘over 10’. Each 











Landing flare too high / early 4 8
p=.0095 6.73 1.89 - 23.96All other accidents 24 323
Landing flare too late / low 3 28
p=.722 1.3 0.37 - 4.57
All other accidents 25 303
Insufficient reduction of 
airbrake below glide-path
3 2
p=.0038 19.74 3.15 - 123.7
All other accidents 25 329
Too little airspeed 3 25
p=.47 1.47 0.41 - 5.2All other accidents 25 306
Table 6.4 shows a statistically significant difference between experienced and 
inexperienced pilots in terms of the numbers of accidents caused by ‘insufficient 
reduction of airbrake below the glide-path’ and ‘landing flare too high/ too early’. The 
odds of an accident caused by an insufficient reduction of airbrake were nearly 20 times 
greater for pilots with 10 hours or fewer (over three times greater using the lowest 95% 
confidence interval). Although statistically significant, these numbers are small and 
should therefore be treated with some caution. However it is of note that there is only 
one case associated with the insufficient airbrake reduction occurring to a pilot with 
more than 50 hours total experience in the whole accident set. This supports the 
assertion that these types of events were highly associated with pilot inexperience. 
Accidents involving ‘landing flare too high’ were over six times more likely to occur to 
inexperienced pilots. However none of these caused injuries.
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Applying the flight phase codes of Jarvis and Harris (2008) to the present categorisation 
showed that all but one ‘landing’ accident was judgement related. Of the 11 ‘approach’ 
accidents identified as occurring to low-hours pilots by Jarvis and Harris (2008), the 
present categorisation showed that six were caused by handling issues (H), and five by 
judgement problems (J). All these were accounted for by just three intermediate 
categories. These were ‘Failing to maintain (or increase to) speed required’ and 
‘mishandled in pitch’ (within ‘H’), and ‘Approach misjudgement: undershoot’ (within 
‘J’). The latter was used where the approach path was misjudged to the point where the 
glider failed to reach the intended landing area, meaning that the airbrakes were not 
reduced in order to check the rate of descent. Three of these were coded as ‘insufficient 
reduction of airbrake below the glide path (Tables 6.1 & 6.3), one as ‘left airbrakes out 
too long’ and one as ‘reason not known’.
In summary, low-hours pilots were far more likely than more experienced pilots to have 
accidents caused by problems stemming from judgement and handling issues. 
Insufficient reduction of airbrake on approach was highly associated with inexperienced 
pilots, as was misjudgement in the landing flare.
Instructional accidents.
Jarvis and Harris (2008) identified 34 accidents that occurred during instruction. 
Analysis of these using the causal template found that only two fine grained codes 
regularly appeared as seminal events. These were ‘landing flare too late to low’ and 
‘overuse of down elevator’, both of which were found to be seminal events in four 
accidents. Interestingly, no instructional accidents occurred due to landing flare being 
initiated too early, or because of overuse of airbrake on approach. This is noteworthy 





The methodology resulted in a multi-layered taxonomy similar to that of Gerbert and 
Kemmler (1986) with a striking similarity in the number of low level categories as well 
as top-level groups. However the four top-level human factor groups were more in line 
with the basic human information processing model, paralleling the cognitive 
component of Feggetter’s (1982) model and O’Hare et al’s (1994) classification system, 
despite the method used to arrive at the categorisation being quite different. Unlike 
these taxonomies, the main groups were not constructed from cognitive theory, but were 
formed by classifying technical descriptions of pilot related events from accident 
narratives, in a similar way to Gerbert and Kemmler’s (1986) research. For example, 
although the ‘strategy’ category contains mainly decision-related events, it does not 
break down decisions further into diagnostic, goal, strategy and procedure in line with 
O’Hare et al’s (1994) decision error category. Instead it breaks into many smaller 
categories describing events from an operational perspective such as ‘flying out of 
reach/position/sight of intended landing area’ and ‘accepting launch into unfavourable 
conditions’. This is more  in line with Gerbert and Kemmler’s work in which low level 
categories were also characterised by descriptions of pilot actions / inactions such as 
‘inadequate pre-flight preparation’ and ‘poor throttle control’. The fact that the top-level 
groups still aligned with models such as those by O’Hare et al (1994) supports the 
validity of applying taxonomies based on the human information processing system to 
accident narratives.
The categorisation of top level groups also has some parallels with the ‘unsafe acts’
level of the HFACS taxonomy, but there are some notable differences. In HFACS, 
‘perceptual errors’ are those that “occur when sensory input is degraded or unusual, as 
is the case with visual illusions and spatial disorientation or when aircrew simply 
misjudge the aircraft’s altitude, attitude, or airspeed” (Shappell & Weigmann 2000).
Three quarters of general aviation accidents in the HFACS ‘perceptual category’ are 
made up of misjudged distance, flare, misperceiving altitude, misjudged clearance and 
visual / aural perception (Shappel & Weigmann 2004). Such events were classified 
99
under the ‘Perceptual Judgement (J)’ group of the present study. Additionally however, 
group J was made up from a number of lower level categories formed from events 
where pilots had misjudged more complex aspects uniquely related to the gliders. For 
example; a pilot flying a circuit with insufficient energy to recover to the airfield 
(combination of height, distance and possibly speed), or a pilot failing to recognise a 
developing undershoot until too late to recover. These elements of judgement are not 
fully accounted for by the HFACS taxonomy, even in its fine grained form for general 
aviation, validating the need for the bespoke approach to gliding accidents. This could 
also account for the reason why a substantially higher proportion of events were found 
to be related to ‘perceptual judgement’ in the present research, relative to the low 
proportion found in general aviation (Shappell & Wiegmann 2003b).
Decision errors as classified by HFACS are broadly equivalent to ‘strategy’ related 
events in the present study. Decision errors are said to represent intentional behaviour 
that proceeds as planned, yet the plan itself proves inadequate for the situation 
(Weigmann & Shappel 2003). The limitation with the ‘strategy’ category in the present 
study is that it was used for a number of accidents which, although undoubtedly a result 
of the pilot’s intentional strategy, may have had other contributory factors (such as 
attentional and perceptual contributions, and also an element of chance). An example 
would be a glider losing height in an area of poor fields. The term ‘strategy’ was 
therefore applied so as to cover all eventualities where the glider’s overall operation 
initiated the accident in a manner fitting the description of ‘pilot-related’ as previously 
given. This included occasions where it was not possible to know what (if any) 
decisions had been taken by the pilot, but it could be discerned that the glider was flown 
into a dangerous situation, albeit that the risk may have been underestimated the pilot.
The other two categories from the present study (‘attention’ and ‘handling’) have no 
direct parallels in HFACS but do share some characteristics with the ‘skill based error’ 
group. Skill-based behaviour is that which occurs ‘without significant conscious 
thought’ (Shappell & Weigmann 2000) and in pilot related events such errors would 
usually be associated with control inputs (‘stick and rudder skills’, Shappell & 
Weigmann 2000). However such categorisation may not be adequate to describe all 
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events caused by the incorrect use of controls. For example, a glider pilot who 
recognises an undershoot but raises the nose rather than closing the airbrakes (hence 
leading to low airspeed) may have consciously taken that action, i.e. the control input 
was a ‘mistake’ rather than a ‘skill-based’ error. By O’Hare et al’s (1994) algorithm 
such an error would be deemed a ‘strategy’ error, since the change of state was correctly 
identified but the strategy to address it failed. However, one might argue that the pilot’s 
strategy was to extend the glide but the control input did not achieve the strategy 
chosen. It was not always possible to determine exactly what the pilots’ strategies and 
plans were from the accident narratives alone. However, where sufficient detail existed 
it was possible to determine whether or not the problem stemmed from the pilot 
mishandling the control inputs. Many low level codes were applied to events where 
there was evidence that incorrect control inputs initiated the accidents (e.g. ‘overuse of 
up elevator causing tail strike in flare’). Where this was the case, the codes were 
grouped and the resulting top level category of ‘handling’ emerged. Importantly, this 
did not represent an attempt to judge the adequacy of the cognitive process involved but 
simply represented a collection of events where the pilot used incorrect control inputs to 
solve the problem. 
Low level codes involving attentional deficit, distraction or where a skill-based error 
was indisputable, were brought together into the top-level category of ‘attention’. For 
example a pilot who continually retracted and extended the undercarriage on approach 
with no airbrake usage could confidently be deemed to be experiencing a skill-based 
error, since the only reasonable explanation would be that the pilot had mistaken the 
undercarriage lever for the airbrake lever. Also, narratives where pilots forget to lower 
the undercarriage were classified under ‘attention’ since these were deemed to be 
lapses.
No accident events were classified as violations from the qualitative analysis. All were 
found to be better placed in other categories.
It was previously argued that analysis of gliding accidents would benefit from a bespoke 
taxonomy, involving the use of emergent methods, rather than relying on existing 
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categorisations from powered aviation. It has been shown that the four top level ‘human 
factor’ groups that emerged from this process were in fact broadly similar to some 
previous classifications. However many of the underlying categories from which they 
were formed had no parallel in powered aviation or previous research, and some of 
these were very prominent in terms of accident totals and severity. Notable among them
were ‘flying out of reach of the landing area on a local flight’, accounting for the 
highest number of serious and fatal injuries of any single low-level category. ‘Allowing 
the wing to go down’ accounted for a high number of ‘handling’ accidents on both 
landing and launch This issue is almost unique to gliders due to the central single-wheel 
undercarriage design necessitated by the long slender wings. Furthermore six categories 
specifically concerned the pilots’ use of airbrakes. Because gliders do not have their 
own power, a glider pilot uses airbrakes to control the rate of descent on approach 
(Stewart 1994) unlike powered aircraft in which combinations of power and attitude are 
used (Thom 1997). These findings vindicate the lengthy process of forming a new 
taxonomy, specific to gliders.
Analysis of Causal Events Overall
Handling related events were more likely to lead to injury than other types, unlike 
previous research in which ‘decision making’ was found to be the most associated with 
injury causing accidents (O’Hare et al 1994). However it is possible that the origin and 
nature of the ‘handling’ category had some effect on this, since it may well have 
contained some accidents that would have been placed in the decision category of 
‘strategy’ using O’Hare et al’s algorithm (O’Hare et al 1994). In such a case, poor 
handling could be deemed to constitute a reason for not achieving an appropriate goal in 
answer to the question “Did the pilot choose a strategy which would achieve the goal 
intended?” (see Figure 6.1, step five), and hence this would spawn an error labelled 
‘strategy’. In the current study, any error involving mishandling of the controls was 
placed in the ‘handling’ (H) category. Perceptual judgement (J) accounted for a 
significantly lower number of injuries than the other three groups. This is partly 
explained by the fact that over a third of the events were misjudgements of the landing 
flare; events unlikely to be serious, with only two out of 31 such accidents ending in an 
102
injury. However the overall proportion of events related to ‘perceptual judgement’ was 
higher than found in general aviation (Shappell & Wiegmann 2003b). This probably 
relates to the manner in which gliders are flown; with pilots having to rely heavily on 
the judgement of visual references rather than being able to set specific parameters such 
as altitude, power and position.
Accidents caused by handling events involving low airspeed were not only common but 
also relatively likely to cause injury. Indeed 15% of all injury causing accidents had a 
seminal event coded under this single low-level category. This supports findings from 
general aviation where ‘airspeed’ accounts for 19% of fatal accidents (Weigmann et al 
2005).
Analysis of Causal Events by pilot experience
Very inexperienced pilots suffered more accidents in all top level groups apart from 
‘strategy’ (S). The full extent can be seen by the rates calculations. This is probably a 
reflection of the fact that pilots with 10 hours or fewer do not have the experience or 
qualifications to be permitted to fly strategically demanding flights such as cross-
country tasks or competitions, and hence do not have the same opportunity to engage in 
difficult strategic decision making. Most very inexperienced pilots must fly within 
range of their home airfield, and in moderate conditions, until they have qualifications 
such as the British Gliding Association Bronze Badge (Jarvis & Harris 2007b).  By way 
of illustration, the lower level category of ‘chose an unsuitable land-out field’ only 
contained accidents involving experienced pilots, probably because field selection is a 
task usually associated with cross country flying. 
Rates show that inexperienced pilots had nearly nine times as many accidents involving 
judgement in the seminal event than experienced pilots. The high number of landing 
flare misjudgements was a major contributor, but none of these accidents were serious. 
Insufficient reduction of airbrakes on the approach was an initiating accident event 
almost exclusive to inexperienced pilots. This category was assigned to a situation 
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where the pilot failed to appreciate that the glider was undershooting and continued to 
hold the airbrake lever back. This phenomenon in early hours pilots is consistent with 
research by Kasarskis et al (2001) who used a flight simulator (of a powered aircraft) to 
show that novice pilots tended to land short of the optimal landing point compared to 
experienced pilots. It is therefore likely that inexperienced pilots are either slower to 
judge when the aircraft is undershooting the desired path or that experts are better able 
to take appropriate corrective action. Baker et al (1996) found that only a very small 
proportion of accidents occurring to solo student pilots of light aircraft were initiated in 
the approach phase; eight out of 327 accidents (compared with 99 on landing) which is 
not consistent with the findings of the present study. This could be because a poorly 
judged approach in a powered aircraft (e.g. undershooting) can be easily escaped from 
by application of power, or even a go-around, and hence such events are less likely to 
produce accidents. In gliding, seemingly harmless errors of this sort can become very 
serious because they can quickly develop to the point where the landing area cannot be 
reached, leaving the pilot with no other options available. The skill of judging the 
approach path is therefore arguably a more critical task for a student glider pilot than a 
student in a powered aircraft, and may require more training and practice. Indeed 
Piggott claims that the ‘approach is a busy time for the beginner and it is only some 
time after soloing that he learns to organise the thinking and flying so that there is 
enough time for refinements’ (Piggott 1997).
Instructional accidents
Leaving the landing flare too late accounted for a number of accidents during 
instruction. This is unsurprising for two reasons. Firstly because early solo pilots were 
shown to suffer from this particular error and secondly because it is an error of omission 
that gives an instructor very little time to react, since it occurs close to the ground and 
moments prior to impact. It is clear from the analysis that a number of pilots do not 
fully master this skill and suffer these types of accidents while solo, but that as 
experience is gained the rate of accidents caused by flaring too late decreases 
substantially. No instructional accidents occurred due to overuse of airbrakes on 
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approach or flaring too early, despite these being associated with accidents to early solo 
pilots. This could be because these types of errors give instructors time to take over, or 
provide verbal prompts. It is therefore possible that such errors occur as frequently on 
instructional flights as they do on early solo flights, but do not lead to accidents.
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Conclusion
Based on the literature, it was argued that because gliding was a unique aviation 
activity, emergent methods based on grounded theory techniques were required to create 
a new taxonomy, rather rely on existing ones for powered aviation. This approach was 
validated by the large number of codes that emerged from open coding that had no 
parallel with previous research. Issues unique to gliding emerged, such as the need to 
cater for complex perceptual judgement events involving glide performance, and 
differences in accident type and number initiated during the approach phase. The top-
level categories formed from these codes were broadly in line with previous human 
factors taxonomies, supporting the validity of the top level categories developed.
Using the taxonomy, it was found that inexperienced pilots were particularly vulnerable 
to accidents associated with misjudgements, chiefly in the landing flare and the 
approach undershoot, as shown in Table 6.4. In general however, accidents caused by 
misjudgement were less likely to cause injuries than those involving the mishandling of 
controls, primarily because landing flare accidents were rarely severe. Approach control 
(including misjudgement of approach path, misuse of the airbrakes and mishandling of 
airspeed) was found to be the most common danger for low-hours pilots. Instructors 
therefore need to pay more attention to this area when deciding that a student pilot is 
competent for solo flying.
This research demonstrates the benefits of producing accident rates rather than relying 
on simple frequency counts of accidents. Although statistics such as Chi square can be 
used to compare existing accident totals between pilot groups, the likelihood of those 
accidents occurring can only be demonstrated using exposure data to produce accident 
rates. Odds ratios and cross tabulations can give probabilities and risk of accident types 
occurring only on a relative basis within a given set of accidents.  However, rates based 
on exposure data (all flying done) can show the comparative chances of accidents 
occurring within the population of all flights.
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Implications
The current study, along with previous work (Jarvis & Harris 2008), shows that the high 
accident rate of inexperienced UK glider pilots is not caused simply by more accidents 
in general occurring to these pilots, or even a higher frequency of the sorts of accidents 
occurring to other glider pilots. The vast majority of crashes for low-hours pilots are 
accounted for by specific kinds of accidents in specific phases. Indeed without these 
accidents, the accident rate for early solo pilots would be relatively low! This prompts 
important questions regarding the release of student pilots for solo flight in the first 
place.
The following chapter addresses whether instructors underestimate the risk faced by 
inexperienced pilots, particularly in these flight phases, and begins to address questions 
relating to instructor judgement in allowing solo flight.
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Chapter 7 - Further Technical Background
Instruction and supervision of trainee glider pilots in UK gliding clubs
As stated in the previous chapter, there is a need to focus on the nature of instructor 
judgements with regard to solo flight. Because subsequent studies will begin to explore
these issues there is a need to present a small amount of essential background 
concerning post-solo supervision and the nature of UK gliding instruction. 
Post solo restrictions
All gliding clubs operate some form of restrictions by which minimum pilot 
qualifications or experience are required in order to fly when certain conditions prevail 
as judged by the instructor in charge (notably weather conditions, but may include 
ground conditions, anticipated conditions, low sun, etc). Many of the bigger clubs 
operate a colour system with variously coloured windsocks hoisted dependent upon the 
duty instructor’s assessment of flying conditions. Some clubs issue flying cards to 
members based on experience and qualifications. For example at Lasham airfield (the 
largest gliding centre in the UK) white, red, yellow and blue cards are issued as pilots 
pass a laid down criteria. The colour of the windsock directly relates to this colour 
coding, meaning that only pilots holding that colour card or above may fly solo.
As well as restricting early solo flying to safe flying conditions, clubs restrict solo flying 
based on currency (the amount of recent flying). The BGA states “Each club should 
develop, publish and implement a set of currency requirements for all pilots” (British 
Gliding Association 2006c). No specific rules are laid down by the BGA, but advice is 
given on how to decide. The first piece of advice is that pilot experience, in terms of 
“hours, launches, number of types flown, number of sites etc”, should be taken into 
account (British Gliding Association 2006c). 
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In addition to restrictions based on conditions and currency, inexperienced pilots are 
only allowed to fly certain aircraft types such as training gliders, and are only allowed to 
fly within range of the gliding club. 
Such restrictions allow pilots to build up experience before facing more difficult 
situations caused by poor weather, flights after a small lay-off, or field landings. 
Solo Supervision – Differences between gliding and powered flying
A big difference between glider training and powered aircraft training is the approach 
taken after the initial solo flights.
The level of supervision for powered pilots after their first solo flights remain high until 
they have their PPL. Indeed the pilots are still seen as trainees who still do the majority 
of their flying with their instructor and are only allowed to fly solo under strict 
supervision. 
The approach taken in gliding has notable differences. ‘Solo supervision’ is practiced 
meaning that before flying on a given day or a given runway direction, early solo pilots 
may receive one or more ‘check flights’ with an instructor who decides whether they are 
competent to fly solo in those conditions. Such flights often include some sort of 
simulated emergency situation. However these flights are not usually part of a training 
syllabus, but assessment flights by the instructor to make sure the pilot is competent to 
fly on that day. 
Glider pilots soon begin a process of being signed as ‘off-checks’. Many clubs have a 
formal system. For example The London Gliding Club has a set of formally tested goals 
prior to the bronze badge called ‘Performance Assessment 1’ (PA1) and ‘Performance 
Assessment 2’ (PA2). Until a pilot has passed their PA1, they must receive a check 
flight with an instructor prior to flying on any given day. However this also means that 
having passed the PA1, a pre-bronze pilot is officially allowed to fly solo without 
briefings or check fights. 
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It is normal for this ‘off-checks’ stage to occur well before the Bronze badge is achieved 
because systems such as PA1, PA2 or coloured cards come into play prior to the Bronze 
badge. Hence, unlike pre-PPL pilots pre-Bronze badge glider pilots can arrive at their 
gliding site and fly without the need for briefings and check flights, as long as they are 
within their own set of restrictions for the day. Hence the new solo glider pilot’s focus is 
solo flying, unlike the new solo power pilot.
The BGA instructors’ manual recognises the problem: “When trainees reach the ‘off-
checks’ stage it doesn’t mean that your interest in their progress should cease abruptly. 
Their conduct will still need monitoring” (British Gliding Association 2003). However 
there is no formal system for this monitoring.
The big difference from powered aircraft pilots is that prior to the issue of the PPL, 
powered aircraft pilots remain inside a very structured training program, whereas 
structured training all but stops for UK glider pilots once they fly solo, and particularly 
once they are ‘off-checks’ (which could follow quite soon afterwards).
Instructor categories
Gliding instructors in the UK are appointed by the British Gliding Association (BGA), 
and operate under the Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) at a given club. In order to become 
an instructor, a pilot must have 50 hours in command and a FAI Silver Badge. He or she 
must then train at their home club, usually with senior instructors appointed by the CFI. 
Once ready the pilot attends an instructor course run by the BGA. The first instructor 
rating is known as Basic-Instructor rating and requires a weekend course. This rating 
allows the new instructor to instruct gliding only above 500ft above ground level 
(AGL), which in practice means that ‘basic instructors’ only teach introductory gliding 
lessons. The second rating is the Assistant Instructor rating. This involves a nine-day 
course and further two-day completion course. This rating allows the instructor to 
instruct student pilots all the way to solo and beyond. Lastly is the Full-rating. This 
involves logging experience as an assistant instructor and gaining approval after a 
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course with a senior BGA coach. In practice, and from the point of view of a student, 
there is almost no difference between assistant and full rated instructors. The only 
official difference is that CFIs must have a full rating. 
Instruction of UK glider pilots
Instructional practice is outlined in the BGA instructors’ manual, which is updated and 
revised by the BGA instructor committee. Detail is given on how all flight phases 
should be taught, and some specific exercises are included such as particular stall and 
spin demonstrations, lookout exercises, etc. On the other hand little advice is given on 
the order of exercises or student progress, or how to decide if a student is ready to fly 
solo. Some of this will be looked at in the next study.
Gliding is a recreational activity, with very few paid staff in the UK. Several of the 
larger clubs employ a professional chief flying instructor, and sometimes a staff 
instructor during the season to run courses, but volunteer instructors do the majority of 
club member instruction. The vast majority of clubs in the UK run on an entirely 
voluntary basis, with instructors given a roster of their duty days, typically once a 
month depending on the number of volunteers. For this reason most pilots learn to glide 
over a period of months, flying with numerous different instructors, some of whom they 
may meet for the first time prior to the flights. This is different to most forms of 
aviation and has possible unrecognised implications. General aviation instructors are 
able to build up a picture of how the student is progressing through their training, since 
student pilots do most of their flying with just one or two instructors. In UK gliding this 
rarely happens. Instructors are kept informed of the student progress by conversation 
with the student, looking at the logbook, checking progress cards (if the club uses 
them), and any casual conversation with other instructors who have flown with the 
student previously. In gliding therefore student progress is rarely formally monitored. 
This means that the critical decision to send a student pilot solo is often taken by an 
instructor who has not had the chance to build up a picture of the student’s progress 
through his or her own experience. They may not even have flown previously with the 
student. 
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Chapter 8 - Investigation into instructors’ perceptions of the relative likelihood of 
accidents among early-solo pilots and the relative danger presented by each flight 
phase
Accident rates have been shown to be disproportionately high amongst early-solo glider 
pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2007b), and the vast majority of these accidents are pilot-related 
(Jarvis & Harris 2008). As well as the accident rates being high for this group, it is now 
known that this is not caused simply by these pilots having more accidents in general, or 
even a higher frequency of the sorts of accidents occurring to other glider pilots. Low-
hours pilots have specific kinds of accidents in specific phases (namely, accidents 
caused by misjudgements and mishandling during the final approach or landing flare). 
These accident causes are relatively unparalleled in the rest of the UK glider pilot 
population (see chapters five and six).
The high accident rate to low hours pilots occurs against a background of post-solo 
supervision which includes check flights, restrictions (only flying benign glider types in 
benign conditions) and limitations on flying range. Hence these pilots have the highest 
accident rate despite being most likely to fly only in the most favourable circumstances. 
It was previously noted that the picture that emerged from chapters one and two 
suggested that pilots learn rapidly once solo and soon enter a safer experience bracket. 
If they can achieve over ten hours solo then their chance of having an accident 
diminishes rapidly. All of this must focus attention on the instructors, since all very 
inexperienced pilots must have recently been judged safe to fly alone by a qualified 
instructor. Instructors may be allowing pilots to fly on their own before some of their 
most important learning is completed, particularly in specific areas (approach and 
landing), and unknowingly exposing them to a high level of danger for at least their first 
few hours flying.
Given claims made in popular aviation literature regarding experience and accident 
rates (see Chapter 2), it is possible that there is a general underestimation of the dangers 
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faced by low hours-pilots within the UK gliding movement. Many authors (of research 
literature and popular textbooks across aviation) claim that very inexperienced pilots are 
a relatively safe group (Booze 1977, Piggott 1997, Pratt 2000, Telfer 1993). There are 
also many claims that particular experience levels are associated with high accident 
involvement. These are generally stated to be between 100 and 500 hours (Olsen & 
Rasmussen 1989, Jenson 1995, Wells 1992). The reasons often cited for these 
phenomena are centred on terms such as ‘risk taking behaviour’, ‘overconfidence’ and 
an increased perception of ‘invulnerability’ (Booze 1977, Telfer 1989, O’Hare 1990, 
See Chapter 2). Such terms as applied to aviation accidents have been criticised as “folk 
models” because they are easily applied labels but do not explain accident causes 
(Dekker 2006). Looked at carefully these explanations can be seen to be related to the 
pilot’s attitude (i.e. a predisposition of the pilot) rather than the situational 
circumstances. Theories of psychological attribution describe the tendency of 
individuals to over-estimate the role of dispositional factors (in this case pre-existing 
pilot attitudes), a bias referred to as fundamental attribution bias (Ross & Anderson 
1982). It has since been shown that people judge dispositional characteristics before 
correcting their judgements on the basis of situational characteristics, the latter process 
requiring greater mental effort (Gilbert 2002). With limited information and anecdotal 
evidence on which to make such ‘corrections’ to initial  judgments it is not difficult to 
see why people might conclude that accidents were caused by the predisposition of the 
pilot (attitudes, abilities, etc).
Given the claims made over the last 30 years proclaiming the relative safety of 
inexperienced pilots and high accident rate of more experienced pilots, it is possible that 
the issue of instructor judgement (in allowing solo flight) has been overlooked because 
it was not regarded as a priority. If a common belief exists that accident vulnerability
increases with pilot experience (albeit to a specific level prior to declining again) then 
one can be forgiven for thinking that instructor judgement of students is already 
effective, or is not important, and the focus should be on more experienced pilots. 
Indeed, many clubs run involved annual check flight sessions in which pilots of higher 
experience levels are checked for competence by instructors. It is possible that 
instructors, and the gliding movement as a whole, pay too little attention to very 
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inexperienced pilots as a result of popular misunderstandings about their relative level 
of vulnerability. 
This study asks whether instructors underestimate the relative accident probability of 
pilots that they send solo (for their first ten hours), particularly in the approach and 
landing phases, in order to start answering questions relating to instructor judgement in 
allowing solo flight to take place.
The British Gliding Association is a very small body with few professional staff. 
Gliding instruction is provided at club level mainly by volunteer instructors. This is a 
very varied group, but makes up the majority of the influential membership in the 
British Gliding Association, in terms of training and instruction. Many instructors are 
also examiners, chief flying instructors, instructor trainers, or just highly experienced 
instructors operating across several clubs. Hence as well as being responsible for 
allowing pilots to fly solo, club instructors make up the major body of expert knowledge 
in the UK gliding movement, and are therefore appropriate as the target population for 
this study.
Since it is known that expert evaluations of the probability of uncertain events can play 
important roles in decisions (Tversky & Koehler 1994), it is probable that instructors’ 
perception of the accident likelihood faced by newly-soloed pilots affects decision 
making at various levels and even policy regarding new solo pilots. It is commonly 
recognised that “risks are often produced when dangers are overlooked or 
underestimated” (Sjöberg 1987). Therefore eliciting information regarding instructors’ 
general perception of the accident likelihood faced by glider pilots as well as the parts 
of the flight that cause most problems will start to build a picture of the situation from 
the instructors’ perspective.
The decision to send a pilot solo is done without advanced knowledge of the 
consequences, and any such decision is a ‘risky’ choice (Kahneman & Tversky 2000). 
The concept of ‘risk’ is not easily defined with reference to literature, since so many 
different definitions exist and there is no common understanding of the term (Renn 
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1998). Many definitions rely on mathematical calculations of numerical data and hence 
appear objective in their interpretation. A classic ‘engineering’ definition is “a 
combination of the probability, or frequency, of an occurrence of a defined hazard and 
the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence” (The Royal Society Study Group 
1992). However such apparent objectivity is seriously questioned, particularly within 
the human science domain; some see all risk as subjective; an invention by human 
beings to help understand and cope with dangers and uncertainty, meaning there is no 
such thing as real-risk (Slovic 2000). Clearly, for the purposes of this study, a workable 
concept, or definition was required. 
Classic definitions, such as that of The Royal Society (1992) see ‘risk’ as a dependent 
variable, defined by a combination of two independent variables, ‘consequence’ and 
‘probability’. In terms consequence it has been shown from accident data that there is 
no statistical difference between low-hours glider pilots (10 hours and under) and other 
glider pilots for the five years 2002 - 2006 inclusive (see Chapter 4). Fisher’s exact tests 
showed no significant association between pilot experience groups and the degree of 
injury (p=0.701) or glider damage (p=0.272). However, while accident consequences 
show no statistical difference, the probability of low-hours pilots having an accident
was very much higher than for other glider pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2007b). Hence this 
group are at just as much ‘risk’ in terms of consequences when an accident occurs, but 
far more likely to have an accident in the first place. This means that in terms of ‘risk’, 
the independent variable of most relative impact for this group (relative to other glider 
pilots) is accident likelihood, not consequence severity.
Because of this, this study does not concentrate on ‘risk’, but on accident likelihood 
only. Although some authors have simplified the use of the word ‘risk’ to this degree, 
e.g. “the probability of an unfavourable outcome” (Patankar & Taylor 2004), the term 
‘risk’ was not used as the operational concept in the present study. This was because the 
intention was not to measure risk itself or the perception risk, but simply to discover 
whether instructors’ views regarding the relative likelihood of accidents aligned with 
the research from accident data. However, since this involved elements of ‘risk’, some 
literature pertaining to risk was reviewed.
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Since the study aimed to establish instructor perceptions of accident rates, two 
components were required; a ‘real’ measure, and a perceived measure. Studies of risk-
perception often compare objective measures of probability to the perception of risks 
(Bohm & Harris 2009a). Conventionally in risk studies, objective measures are deduced 
from rates based on data of past accidents (Bohm & Harris 2009a). Previous studies 
(Jarvis & Harris 2007b, 2008) provide such data as well as rate calculations for relative 
accident rates of inexperienced pilots and flight phase causality. This will make it 
possible to determine whether instructors’ perceptions of relative accident probability of 
newly solo pilots are accurate. Many studies have observed that workers’ risk 
perception was significantly different to measures of ‘objective’ risk (Bohm & Harris 
2009a).
The accident data show that the probability of an early solo glider pilot having an 
accident during their first hour of solo flight is approximately one in 713 (see Table 2.3, 
chapter 2). It is unlikely that such a figure would be meaningful to a gliding instructor 
when quantifying likelihood (or making solo decisions) since no equivalent figures have 
ever been produced. 
For reasons of this kind, most studies of subjective risk assessment require individuals 
to assess the risk of one thing against the risk of another, rather than to give absolute 
values (e.g. Bohm & Harris 2009a, Weyman & Clarke 2003, Ostberg 1980). This is 
often in the form of a ranking task, and makes the process more meaningful to the 
participant. Hence, to assess general accident probability for inexperienced pilots, a 
comparison will need to be made to more experienced pilots. To assess the accident 
probability associated with a particular flight phase is straightforward because each 
flight phase can be ranked against each other flight phase. The accuracy of the 
instructors’ perception can then be found by comparing their evaluations with 
comparable information from the previous studies on accident data. Hence this study 
aimed to elicit instructors’ level of appreciation of the situation (regarding pilots with 
ten hours or fewer) as defined by previous work on accident rates and flight phase 
causal factors (Jarvis & Harris 2007b, 2008). 
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When evaluating probabilities in relation to groups or populations with unequal 
frequencies (such as inexperienced pilots within the larger population of all pilots) it has 
been shown that there is a tendency to neglect the underlying difference in the sizes of 
the groups. This has been termed ‘the neglect of base rates’ (Kahneman et al 1982).  
Base rate neglect is a common human bias, as described by Hogarth (1987); 
“Probability theory argues that one should modify base rates by case data 
such that the ensuing judgement reflects both [specific and base-rate data]. 
People’s intuitions, however, do not always correspond to the laws of 
probability in this instance. Indeed considerable evidence has been 
documented of the failure to consider base rate data.”
Neglecting to take into account the relatively small size of the population of 
inexperienced pilots when reflecting on accident figures or anecdotes would have the 
effect of obscuring the high accident rates sustained by the smaller group, and hence 
could lead instructors to underestimate the relative danger (in terms of accident 
likelihood) faced by newly soloed pilots.
It is quite possible that instructors’ perception of accident probability impacts on the 
decision making process when allowing such flights to take place, since decision 
making in situations of risk can be viewed as a choice between prospects and gambles 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979). One of the best known models of decision making under 
uncertainty is ‘expected utility theory’ also known as ‘decision theory’, which 
postulates that people select the alternative with the greatest expected utility 
(simplistically the most favourable outcome) using rational methods (Hogarth 1987). 
One of the best known generalisations of the theory is that people are risk averse 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979). On the other hand, ‘prospect theory’ (Kahneman & 
Tversky 1979) shows that this is only generally true when people face gains, but in the 
face of losses many people become more likely to take risks. The instructor decision to 
send a pilot solo has only one option that involves any level of risk; allowing solo flight, 
and so it is not straightforward to determine where the losses and gains would factor 
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into the decision for the instructor. Both of the stated theories would appear to predict 
that instructors avoid the risk of allowing solo flight (risk aversion), since there is no 
apparent need to allow the flight and there are no obvious losses to be faced. Clearly 
however, at some point, instructors do take the risk and send the pilot to fly alone.  
There may be other factors involved which are viewed as losses or gains such as 
possible strain on relationships (in not sending someone solo), or gain of credibility and 
praise (for doing so).
As well as attempting to assess potential losses and gains, in the face of uncertainty 
individuals tend to rely on heuristics, which are speculative frameworks used to guide 
solutions or understand the world (Botterill & Mazur 2004). Estimation of probability of 
undesirable outcomes has been shown to be biased by several heuristics, of which the 
‘availability heuristic’ is generally agreed to be of most importance in understanding 
risk perception (Botterill & Mazur 2004, Slovic et al 1982). This is a process by which 
people judge an event as likely or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or recall 
(Slovic et al 1982). Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman first recognised the existence 
of this heuristic, and define it as “the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind... a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability” (Kahneman et al 
1982). The availability heuristic manifests itself is as follows: Members of one class 
(e.g. population of people, set of objects, etc) will be judged as more numerous than 
another equally sized class if its members are more ‘retrievable’ in terms of memory. 
An elementary example would be a list of names containing equal numbers of men and 
women, but containing more famous men than famous women. The availability (in 
terms of memory retrieval) of the famous men will make men appear more numerous 
than women (Kahneman et al 1982). In this case the availability would be caused by 
familiarly, but it can also be caused by the salience, for example witnessing real events 
rather than seeing photographs (Kahneman et al 1982). In terms of decisions to allow 
solo flight, availability bias might lead to instructors failing to recognise the high 
accident rate. As previously stated, the vast majority of accidents happen to pilots with 
more than ten hours (simply because there are many more such pilots in the population). 
Availability bias means that people tend to think that events are more probable if they 
can recall an incident of their occurrence (Botterill & Mazur 2004), and with the very 
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few total accidents occurring to newly soloed pilots, most instructors would be unlikely 
to recall as many cases, if any. They would however be likely to recall cases of 
accidents occurring to more experienced pilots. As well as being more numerous, these 
accidents are more likely to be the sort of accidents instructors might have while flying 
on their own (e.g. field landing accidents) and so make more of an impression on 
instructors and hence be more salient in memory.
A similar phenomenon that has been shown to elevate people’s estimation of the 
probabilities of certain events is the feeling of ‘perceived dread’ associated with 
outcomes (Slovic 2000, Bohm & Harris 2009a). This would appear to be related to 
salience as previously mentioned, and has been shown to affect evaluations of 
environmental hazards such as nuclear accidents (Slovic 2000) as well as the perception 
of accidents in the workplace (Bohm & Harris 2009a). It is possible that such ‘perceived 
dread’ does not exist for instructors when deciding to send a pilot solo because there is 
no possibility of ‘dreaded’ consequences for the instructor, and hence this may result in 
an underestimation of accident probability. Indeed this is supported by a finding that 
SMEs in the construction industry were not affected by feelings of perceived dread in 
the way that the equipment operators themselves were (Bohm & Harris 2009a). 
Perceived dread would make it more likely that instructors base their assessment of the 
dangers of early solo flights on the aspects that they themselves fear most, or that they 
fear their students doing while they are with them in the aircraft.
The decision to allow a new pilot to fly solo has huge safety implications. From 
previous studies (Jarvis & Harris 2007b, 2008) there is sufficient evidence to suspect 
that glider pilots are often sent solo before they are ready. Since a large amount of 
aviation literature underestimates the danger faced by early solo pilots (Jarvis & Harris 
2007b) it is very possible that the UK gliding movement (in the form of its instructor 
core) underestimate the likelihood that the people they send solo will have an accident. 
This could bring the question of judgement in decision making for early solo flying into 
question. 
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No research has attempted to explore risk perception, or the relative accident likelihood 
perceived by flying instructors in relation to their students, nor the effect of this on the 
judgement itself.  The first aim of this study was to discover the extent to which gliding 
instructors are aware of the level of vulnerability of pilots recently sent solo (relative to 
other pilots), and the reasons behind their estimates. The weight of popular assertions in 
aviation literature and the influence of cognitive biases such as the availability heuristic 
and base rate neglect, lead to an expectation that instructors will underestimate the 
relative likelihood of early solo pilots being involved in accidents, compared to more 
experienced pilots. It is more likely that instructors will estimate the pilot experience 
level associated with the highest accident involvement as being between 100 and 500 
hours, and base these estimations on pilot predispositions more than the situational 
characteristics in line with claims in the literature.
The second aim was to determine whether instructors were aware of the parts of the 
flight that caused most accidents to this vulnerable group. This may be affected by 
factors such as the ‘dread factor’ and the availability heuristic. This would involve 
probabilities being biased by aspects of the flight that the instructors are most afraid of, 
the most salient situations they recall, or those parts of the flight in which they most 
recall students making errors during instruction. It has been shown that in terms of 
instructional flights, the launch and landing stand out as being the phases that cause a 




A questionnaire was distributed to gliding instructors that requested them to indicate 
what pilot experience levels they believed were most associated with accidents, and 
give a short explanation for their figure. Additionally participants were asked to rank six 
flight phases in the order that they thought led to most accidents.
Sample
For sound practical reasons, all data collection was completed promptly. 
Notwithstanding this it was important to sample instructors from a number of different 
clubs and of different experience levels and ages. Two gliding clubs were chosen as the 
main centres for data collection. One was a large club focussing mainly on training and 
cross country soaring, the other a medium sized club focussing mainly on general 
soaring and glider aerobatics. Just over a quarter of the participants were approached 
individually at other UK clubs. 
Instrument
The questionnaire (Appendix E), contained three sections; participant demographic 
information, estimation and explanation of pilot experience most associated with 
accidents, and flight phase ranking. After the demographic section, instructors were 
asked to mark a horizontal scale from 0 to 5,000 hours to indicate their estimate, and 
then write the exact figure in the box provided. It was explained that they could make 
several estimates if they felt that there were several different pilot experienced levels 
associated with high accident rates. If so, they were asked to circle the one that they felt 
was associated with the highest accident rate. Participants were instructed that if they 
perceived there to be a bracket of pilot experience associated with high accident rates, 
then they should indicate only the lowest point of that bracket (e.g. a bracket between 
200 and 500 hours would simple require them to write ‘200’ hours). After this 
participants were asked to explain as briefly as possible (in one sentence) their 
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perceived reasons for the high accident rates at the experience level(s) that they had 
identified. Participants were fully briefed as well as being given written instructions 
(Appendix E). The instructions were written and agreed upon by the investigator and 
two other gliding-related SMEs. Further validation involved reading the instructions to 
a small sample of gliding instructors. The feedback showed that the meaning was clear 
and as intended. In the final part of the questionnaire, participants were presented with 
six flight phases (pre-flight, launch, top of launch to circuit, circuit, approach, landing) 
in line with the task break down of Jarvis & Harris (2008). They were instructed to rank 
these from six to one (in the boxes provided) to indicate their perception of the relative 
likelihood of each phase to cause accidents to pilots with ten hours or fewer.  They were 
instructed that six indicated the flight phase that they thought was associated with the 
most causal accident events and one for the least. In order to prevent bias caused by the 
ordering on the questionnaire, the flight phases were presented in a circle rather than a 
list, and six batches of the questionnaires were produced with them ordered differently 
in each. These were shuffled together prior to distribution.
Data collection
Two specially arranged instructor evening presentations were arranged (one at each 
participating club, run by the investigator and organised by the clubs), in which 
questionnaires could be completed and returned in large numbers. Over two thirds of 
the questionnaires were filled in at the two special sessions. This prevented the chance 
of communication occurring within each club and distorting the results. At the 
meetings, participants were briefed collectively before the questionnaires were 
distributed. Silence and discretion were requested. After collection of the questionnaires 
participants were de-briefed as part of the presentation, and results of Jarvis and Harris 
(2007a) as well as Jarvis and Harris (2007b) were presented as part of the evening’s 
presentation. The remaining data collection (run on a convenience basis at a variety of 
clubs due to the volunteer nature of UK gliding) was conducted by the investigator in 
person and the same briefing was given.
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For the analysis of the flight phase data, the method and data analysis drew upon the 
work of Bohm and Harris (2009) who determined risk perception of seven hazardous 
scenarios by dumper drivers on construction sites. An objective ranking of the six flight 
phases was prepared from accident data using calculated accident frequencies (from 
rates) for pilots with 10 hours or fewer (from Jarvis & Harris 2008). This objective 
ranking was then compared to the subjective ranking of the participants, which had been 
calculated by obtaining a mean rank for each flight phase and then ranking the resulting 
means.
Qualitative data.
Each narrative was treated as an individual unit of meaning in its entirety, since none 
were very long. The paired-comparison method as described by Partington (2002) and 
previously employed in Chapter six was used to compare each statement with its 
preceding statement to see if the same phenomena were described.  Where this was the 
case they were coded as belonging to the same category. After the initial process was 
complete, the categories were named and all statements re-coded into those categories. 
This process required further refinements to the categorisation and labelling. This 
process was repeated a number of times until a satisfactory set of representative 
categories were established that adequately described the themes within the data.
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Results
Questionnaire - part 1: Demographics
There were 74 participants, consisting of 34 full rated and 40 assistant rated BGA 
qualified instructors, 72 were male and two female. The Mean gliding experience was 
1251 hours (sd = 1103) and 20.6 years (sd = 11.1). Age was requested in ten year 
brackets, with the distribution as follows (n represents the number of participants in that 
bracket); 
[20 - 29] n = 2
[30 - 39] n = 7
[40 - 49] n = 18
[50 - 59] n = 23
[60 - 69] n = 17
[70 - 79] n = 7
Questionnaire - part 2:
A. Estimation of the pilot experience levels with high accident rates
Only seven participants indicated a second or third pilot experience level (or bracket) as 
bring was associated with relatively high accidents rate for glider pilots. For each of 
these only the level associated with highest accident rate (as they indicated) was used in 
the analysis.
The overall estimation of peak accident experience was 288.7 flying hours (sd = 314.2).
Table 8.1 shows that a large number of participants considered that there was an 
increase in accidents between 100 and 250 hours (n = 37, exactly half the participants).  
Fifty-five participants (74%) estimated a figure between 100 and 500 hours inclusive. 
Only 13 participants (18%) estimated a figure below 100 hours, and only one put the 
figure within the vulnerable 10 hour bracket (at 10 hours) which included all the data 
from those giving multiple estimates.
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Table 8.1. The percentage (%) and number (n) of estimates in each 50 hours 
experience bracket. The accompanying bar chart illustrates the frequency (n) 
as represented by the horizontal axis. For example, the top row shows that 
five participants (6.76%) gave an estimate between 0 and 49 hours as the level 
of pilot experience they thought was associated with the highest accident rate. 
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B. Qualitative explanations given by participants for their estimated figures
Seven categories were established, three of which were deemed to describe a single 
overlying concept (pilot attitude), and were hence merged into one large category 
(category 1). The category titles and the numbers of explanations coded into each were:
1. Attitude (n = 38)
1.1. Over confidence / complacency (n = 23)
1.2. Taking risks / Pushing boundaries, under-estimating dangers (n = 12)
1.3. Enthusiasm / Ambition (n = 3)
2. More challenging types of flying, conditions, gliders, situations (n = 15)
3. Post solo supervision related (n = 11)
4. Known Figure (n = 6)
5. Reason given for improvement (n = 4)
Reliability check
Reliability was checked independently by a second rater (a human factors professional 
with research experience) who re-coded all 74 explanations into these seven established 
categories (including all three ‘attitude categories’). The reliability matrix is shown in 
Appendix F. Sixty-five out of 74 statements were coded the same as the original rater, 
giving a percentage agreement of 88% (Cohen’s Kappa .848). The remaining nine 
statements were discussed and agreement reached in all cases about which category to 
code them by and why.
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Descriptions of each category and example statements
1. Attitude: This was a large category formed by the merger of three others, since they 
were all formed of comments relating to pilot attitude. This category contained just over 
half of all comments made.
1.1. Over confidence / complacency: This category was formed as a response to 
the number of comments using the terms ‘confidence’ or ‘complacency’ or 
both. Only responses using these terms or obviously referring to them were 
placed in this category. It reflects the expression by instructors of an 
undesirable attitude demonstrated by pilots.  Nearly a third of all comments 
were to do with confidence or complacency.
Examples: 
 “Confidence outstripping capability and getting over-complacent”
 “Young and over-confident, ‘Nothing will get me’ attitude”
 “Confidence levels are at a max until about 200 or 300 hours”
1.2. Taking risks / Pushing boundaries, under-estimating dangers: This 
reflected statements concerned with the notion that pilots increasingly start 
taking more risks or ‘pushing the boundaries’. Occasionally this was linked to 
competition flying.
Examples: 
 “Risky behaviour reaching its peak”
 “They start to feel immortal and start taking risks, after a few scares 
settle down more, if their (sic!) still alive”
 “a peak risk seeking time, pilots can't assess the risks accurately because 
inexperienced”
1.3. Enthusiasm / Ambition: This category represents just a few comments made 
suggesting that pilots had accidents precipitated by their level of enthusiasm or 
ambition.
Examples: 




2. Doing (or encountering) more challenging types of flying, conditions, gliders, 
situations: This category reflected many comments about high accident rates being 
related to the increased challenges encountered or engineered with experience.  These 
included flying further from the base airfield, cross-country flying and competitions. 
Other increased challenges were mentioned to do with conditions, more challenging 
kinds of flying, and more advanced gliders. 
Examples: 
 “Flying further out of the local area and first few field landings are a big 
danger, then competitions leading to lots of broken fibreglass.”
 “Season three or 4, first serious cross country flights and badge attempts”
 “people buying into advanced and slippery machines and doing longer 
flights”
3. Post solo supervision related: This was the idea that accidents were precipitated due 
to the diminishing supervision that accompanies increasing experience. Since a brief 
statement was asked for, most do not offer more detail as to why this occurs.
Examples: 
 “Pilots are protected in their first few hours (we keep an eye out etc) 
hence they are safest then, but they become freer to do the things that 
eventually leads to the inevitable”
 “They are stepping out of the post-solo environment, post solo 
supervision, no one looking out for them and keeping them in line”
 “Post solo is so poorly looked after and trained in the UK, lots of 
accidents once pilots are left to fend for themselves, off-checks.”
 “By 50 hrs they are getting away from the heavily regulated part of their 
gliding career which kept them safe”
4. Known Figure: This category included all comments where participants stated that 
their indicated figure was previously known.
Examples: 
 “well known figure, between 200 - 400”
 “Statistics ?? 400 to 600 hrs. From the RAF originally”
 “Common knowledge of the statistics (sorry!) 250 to 500 is the best 
known (from the BGA?)”
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5. Reason given for improvement: Some participants described why pilots became 
safer after the peak / zone, as opposed to more vulnerable as they entered it. In these 
cases the comments were entered into this category.
Examples: 
 “The feeling of reality hits and you don't take as many risks, So things 
get better after this (for most people!)”
 “Enough scares to realise this thing's going to kill me sooner or later”
 “Reduction in risks as they know what can happen”
The analysis suggested that three broad causes were given by instructors as to why 
accident rates should increase sometime after going solo. These were
 Caused by an increasingly unsafe attitude (category 1)
 Caused by an increasing level of challenge (category 2)
 Caused by a reduction of post solo supervision (category 3)
The other two categories did not contain suggestions relating to the causes of the 
accident rates.
Effect of instructor qualification, age and experience. 
Pearson’s chi-square was used to show that there were no significant differences 
between full and assistant rated instructors for frequencies of categories. For example 
the number of ‘attitude related’ comments ( category 1) was 20 out of 40 for assistant 
rated instructors and 18 out of 34 for full category instructors. This results in a chi-
square of 0.064 (df  = 1) which is not significant ( p = 0.1).
There were no significant differences between instructors on the basis of their own total 
flying experience or age. Ten out of 19 instructors with 500 hours or fewer gave reasons 
relating to attitude, 18 out of 31 with between 501 and 1000 hours did so, and 10 out of 
24 with over 1000 hours. This relates to a chi-square of 1.473 (df = 2) which is not 
significant (p = 0.1). In terms of age, 13 out of 27 of those under 50 gave reasons to do 
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with pilot attitude, as opposed to 25 out of 47 of older instructors (50 plus). This results 
in a chi-square of 0.175 (df = 1) which is not significant (p > 0.05).
Participants’ estimated figure (for the pilot experience level associated with the 
accident rates in UK gliding) against the reasons given for it.
Table 8.2. Mean participant estimates of experience level for highest accident rate, 
associated with statements given in each of the qualitative categories. I.e. Each 
mean figure represents only the estimates of instructors who gave explanations 
coded as belonging to that specific category.
Category
Participant mean 
estimate (hrs) of 
experience level for 
highest accident rate sd
1 Developing an unsafe attitude 306 238.2
2 Exposure to greater challenge 402 546.0
3 Post solo supervision related 66 41.2
4 Known Figure 330 141.8
5 Reason given for improvement 250 129.1
1.1 Over confidence / complacency 331 283.9
1.2 Taking risks / Pushing boundaries 282 143.1
1.3 Enthusiasm / Ambition 213 162.9
Table 8.2 shows that participant estimates of peak accident rates that were accompanied 
by explanations relating to post-solo supervision (category 3) were, on average, a lot 
lower than the other groups (only 66 hours experience).  Explanations relating to pilots 
being exposed to greater challenges were accompanied by the highest estimates (mean 
of 402 hours).
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3. Flight phase data.
Fifty-eight of the participants filled in the flight phase questionnaire. Table 8.3 shows 
the accident likelihood for pilots with ten hours or fewer experience (the objective 
measure) produced from findings of Jarvis and Harris (2008), against rankings produced 
from the subjective instructor assessments (‘6’ means the highest accident likelihood
and ‘1’ the lowest). Comparing the subjective ranking against the objective ranking 
shows that two out of the six flight phases match (‘Top of launch to circuit’ and 
‘Landing’) and two are within one ranking position (pre-flight and circuit). However 
‘launch’ and ‘approach’ are ranked too high and too low respectively. From the accident 
rates the launch has a low frequency of causal occurrence (second lowest flight phase 
occurrence) whereas the subjective judgements suggest that instructors believe it to be 
the highest causal phase (ranked ‘6’). The approach phase, despite being the highest 
accident causation flight phase for low-hours pilots was ranked as second lowest by 
instructors.
Table 8.3. Objective ranking based on the number of flights per accident 
associated with each flight phase (from Jarvis & Harris 2008) against subjective 
probability (instructor perception) of these rankings (from the mean ranking for 













Pre-flight 9975 3 3.40 4
Launch 14962 2 4.71 6
Top of launch to circuit 29924 1 2.52 1
Circuit 9194 4 3.31 3
Approach 2720 6 2.71 2
Landing 3741 5 4.38 5
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Discussion
Estimation of experience level and accident involvement
As expected the perceptions of UK gliding instructors closely reflects the literature. In 
common with claims of low hours pilots being safe (Booze 1977, Pratt 2000, Telfer 
1993), only 13 instructors (18%) estimated peak accident rates to be associated with 
pilots with fewer than 100 hours, and only five (7%) put a figure less than 50 hours 
(Table 8.1). No instructors indicated that they believed pilots with ten hours or fewer 
had a relatively high accident rate and this held true even when the additional estimates 
of those participants who had multiple estimates were taken into account. Some 
explanations offered went as far as to state that early-solo pilots were safest (e.g. “First 
solo is pretty safe then peaks and troughs”, “First few solos are safest”). Given the trend 
of accident rates discovered by Jarvis and Harris (2007b) this means that in common 
with Piggott (1997), instructors seriously underestimate the relative danger faced by UK 
glider pilots embarking on their first few solo flights.
The implications of this could extend into instructor decision making, particularly given 
that instructors must decide when it is safe to allow a student pilot to fly solo. It was 
noted that decision making under uncertainty involves some assessment of probabilities 
and choices between prospects and gambles (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Major 
theories (expected utility theory, prospect theory) involve some estimation of losses, 
and if an instructor underestimates the chance of a loss (undesirable outcome) this could 
lead to students being sent solo before they are safe to do so. However, very little is 
known about instructor decision processes when sending a pilot solo.
The finding that most participants (74%) estimated a figure of between 100 and 500 
hours generally reflects the claims of similar figures in the literature (Olsen & 
Rasmussen 1989, Jenson 1995, Wells 1992 & Telfer 1989). Participants may have been 
influenced by reading the literature, the literature may have been influenced by 
perceptions held across the aviation community, or both the community and the 
literature may have misread the situation in the same way, possibly for the same 
reasons.
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There is some evidence suggesting that instructors may have been influenced by the 
literature. The qualitative category labelled ‘known figure’ (see ‘Results’ section B), 
contained some comments clearly stating that the participant had read of the figure 
previously, and additionally all of these stated (as text) that it was a bracket (variously 
between 200 and 600 hours) which is very similar to claims in the literature. This does 
suggest that the literature has had an effect on perception, at least for some.
However, an explanation given by Pratt (2000) for a claim regarding the relative safety 
of student pilots indicates a possible common reason why the literature and the 
community alike may be underestimating the relative probability of accidents occurring 
to early solo pilots. Pratt states that “less than 5% of the fatalities were student pilots; 
far more instructors and professional pilots were involved in fatal accidents”. Just as it 
has been pointed out that many studies fail to adequately control for levels of exposure 
(Jarvis & Harris 2007b), cognitive bias relating to base rate neglect (Kahneman et al 
1982) could affect individuals’ subjective assessments in the same way. Pratt’s 
explanation focuses on the specific information without noting the underlying base rates 
(the frequencies of the two groups mentioned). This base rate neglect leads him to draw 
inappropriate inferences regarding the relative safety of a small group (all student pilots 
who are post-solo but pre-qualification) versus a clearly much larger group (all 
instructors and professional pilots). The UK gliding movement has a single national 
magazine publication (Sailplane and Gliding). This bi-monthly publication contains a 
section of summaries for all recent accidents, including the experience level of the pilots 
involved (in hours). The BGA accident database from 2002 to 2006 (British Gliding 
Association 2007) contains 469 accidents to gliders, of which only 33 (7%) occurred to 
pilots with 10 hours or fewer. Hence, the magazine sections from 2002 to 2006 would 
have had to show approximately 13 accidents that happened to pilots with more than ten 
hours for every one occurring to a less experienced pilot. Base rate neglect would tend 
to predict that readers would perceive a low accident rate for low hours pilots simply 
because of the higher frequency of the more experienced group. More subtle types of 
communication of accident information through the gliding community (e.g. word of 
mouth) would be subject to the same mechanism. Hence it is possible that neglect of 
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base rates contributes to the established misconception in both the literature and the 
community, as shown by the present study.
The effects of the availability heuristic would further add to this misperception. People 
tend to think that events are more probable if they can recall an incident of their 
occurrence (Botterill & Mazur 2004). Because most accidents happen to more 
experienced pilots, it is likely that instructors would have a close link to one or more of 
those accidents rather than to an accident to a low-hours pilot (e.g.  they personally 
knew the accident victim, witnessed the accident, or heard a firsthand account). Any 
such things would increase the ‘salience’ of that accident. Salience of particular 
memories causes them to be more available (retrievable) and hence they tend to get 
disproportionately used as a cue to probability (Kahneman et al 1982). This would 
cause people to overestimate accident rates for pilots with experience (i.e. the majority) 
compared to those with little experience.
Base rate neglect and availability bias give strong explanations as to how instructors 
could come to perceive the situation as it is expressed in the literature, without 
necessarily having read or heard about it before. Some authors may have been biased in 
the same way but it has also been previously shown that at least part of the 
misconception in literature has been driven by studies that do not collect or properly 
account for, exposure data (Jarvis & Harris 2007b).
Since all 74 participants gave estimates above 10 hours, it means that all the qualitative 
data (the explanations given) relate to a misconception about relative accident levels, 
and hence can inform about why these misconceptions come about, or how they are 
justified by those that hold them. In line with general theories of attribution, 
explanations tended to relate to either the predisposition of the accident involved pilots 
(category 1: attitudes, n = 38) or the situational challenges faced by more experienced 
pilots (categories two and 3, challenging situation and reducing supervision, n = 26). 
Most explanations tended to focus on the predispositions of accident pilots (i.e. aspects 
of their attitude), possibly due to literature claims of this kind and possibly due to the 
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known tendency of people to attribute personal predispositions to events rather than 
situational characteristics (Gilbert 2002). In the same way that instructor estimates 
reflected the figures in the literature, explanations given for them are also very similar. 
Statements coded in the categories relating to pilot attitude used commonly recurring 
terms such as “over confidence”, “risk taking” (or seeking etc), “pushing limits” (or 
boundaries etc) and “complacency”. These are remarkably similar to those used in the 
literature (see Booze 1977, Telfer 1989, O’Hare 1999). Overall this shows that most 
gliding instructors rely on so-called ‘folk models’ (Dekker 2006) to ‘explain’ problems 
encountered by their relatively experienced colleagues. 
It is clear that the perception of UK gliding instructors regarding the effect of 
experience on safety is not only inaccurate but also misguided. Jarvis and Harris (2008)
showed that most accidents to experienced pilots (over 10 hours) between 2002 and 
2006 occurred away from the base airfield. Chapter six showed that these were mainly 
involved with problems occurring during off-field landings and hence were strongly 
associated with more challenging situations encountered only by pilots with the 
necessary experience and qualifications. Hence there is a fundamental situational factor 
underpinning accidents to experienced glider pilots, despite most participants believing 
that pilot attitudes are the main issue for this group. Only a fifth of participants cited 
reasons related to the situational challenges found to be associated with accidents at this 
level (see ‘Results’ section B, category 2). The main challenges referred to were ‘cross-
country flying’, ‘competitions’ and ‘field landings’. Hence these participants were 
accurate in that the reasons they gave were in line with their estimates, when compared 
to accident data. It is therefore likely that their misconception of accident rates was 
driven by simple frequency bias (e.g. base rate neglect), or by engrained 
misunderstanding, as opposed to poor reasoning.
The other category made up of situational factors consisted of explanations to the effect 
that accident rates went up as post-solo supervision or other restrictions were lifted. 
This implies that the participants believe post-solo supervision has a protective effect. 
The mean numerical estimates given by this group were predictably much lower than 
for other groups (mean = 66 hours, see Table 8.2). This is expected because solo 
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supervision starts reducing after pilots have several solo flights and is comparatively 
negligible after pilots have achieved their Silver C qualification (for most this would be 
achieved sometime between 20 and 100 hours). Most of the participants who estimated 
a figure of 50 hours or less gave explanations belonging to the ‘post-solo supervision’ 
category, see Table 8.2). Since no research has been done specifically on this experience 
bracket, it is not known to what extent the reduction of supervision effects accidents at 
this level. Accident rates for early solo pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2007b) show that post-
solo supervision does not compensate for the increased vulnerability of early solo pilots, 
in terms of accident prevention.
Flight Phase Rankings
Results from the ranking of flight phases show that for four flight phases (pre-flight, top 
of launch to start of circuit, circuit and landing) instructors ranked the likelihood of a 
causal accident event as being the same or close to that derived from the accident data 
on inexperienced solo pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2008). However the mean rank for the 
launch and approach phases suggest that instructors overestimate the relative probability 
of an occurrence during the launch and underestimate the occurrence during the 
approach when pilots first fly solo.
This could be partly explained by the previously outlined ‘dread’ factor as well as the 
availability heuristic. Table 5.11 (Chapter 5) shows that accidents coded as being caused 
during the launch phase were the most likely to have serious consequences (measured 
across all UK glider pilots regardless of experience level, and hence relevant to 
instructors flying solo). Despite being the second lowest accident causing flight phase 
(after pre-flight) it had the highest number and rate of fatalities (1 in 10). Additionally 
38% of these accidents ended in injury (15 out of 39), compared to the next highest 
phase ‘pre-flight’ (33%), then ‘approach’ and ‘general flying’ (both 25%) and ‘circuit’ 
and ‘landing’ (both 9%). Hence for the instructor, launch events represent the causes of 
accidents which are the most likely to end in death or injury to themselves. Specifically 
the rotation into the climb on a launch is associated with most fatal accidents (Jarvis & 
Harris 2008). After a number of serious accidents, in 2007 the BGA launched a 
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publicity campaign about the serious consequences of winch launch accidents and 
issued a leaflet for every UK glider pilot about the dangers of rotating too quickly into 
the climb. Hence accidents caused by winch launching have been recently refreshed in 
the minds of instructors and are therefore more likely to be used to judge frequency, 
based on the availability heuristic. In addition, the severity of consequences make these 
more salient, which increases the effect of the heuristic. Because these accidents are 
spread across all experience levels they could equally happen to instructors. This could 
cause worry to instructors which means that their high rankings for this phase could 
have been contributed to by the ‘perceived dread’.
Conversely, the approach phase was not associated with any fatal accidents in the years 
2002 to 2006. Interestingly however this was also true of the landing phase, which had a 
mean rank of five and yet had the lowest rates of injury and a lower accident rate for 
more experienced pilots than the approach phase (Jarvis & Harris 2008).
On the face of it this appears to be a strange result. However one possible explanation 
for it can be found in Table 5.10 (Chapter 5); landing was the cause of a 
disproportionate number of accidents during training (i.e. occurring to instructors) 
compared to all other flights by experienced pilots. It is also notable that the second 
highest number of instructing accidents was associated with the launch phase. As 
previously explained (chapter 5) these findings are probably because of the proximity to 
the ground and time to recover when students make errors in these two phases. This 
further helps to explain the possible feeling of ‘perceived dread’ experienced by the 
instructor when considering the launch phase, particularly considering the unforgiving 
nature of these accidents. It is quite possible that launching is an area where instructors 
feel particularly vulnerable to errors made by students. 
It is possible that the landing phase also features highly in the instructor’s mind for 
similar reasons, although with far less chance of a severe outcome. The frequency of 
landing accidents has been shown to be far higher than launching accidents for early 
solo pilots as well as instructional flights (Chapter 5). Hence the instructor possibly has 
to react quickly on numerous occasions to prevent landing accidents during instructional 
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flights. This is supported by the findings outlined in Chapter six that showed 
misjudgement of the landing flare to be a common cause of accidents in early solo 
pilots. It is probable therefore this misjudgement also occurs very regularly during 
instructional flights and such errors require quick reactions from an instructor, and may 
very possibly be remembered for their salience!  These effects would be weaker for 
errors made during approach during instructional flights, as well as for the circuit and 
proceeding upper air work. The height and time available would normally allow the 
instructor to deal easily with errors or even let the student correct their own errors. All 
this would predict that instructors are able to easily retrieve from memory many 
instances of landing errors made on instructional flights, which helps to explain why 
they rank landing as the second highest phase but approach as the second lowest.
All of this indicates that instructors may not base their evaluations on an objective 
assessment of what students would do when solo, but on the factors that potentially 
have most negative impact upon themselves, either while instructing, or flying 
generally. This is similar to findings by Bohm and Harris in which the observations of 
machine operators were more concerned with ‘perceived dread’ than risk per se (Bohm 
& Harris 2009a). Whereas the high rankings given by instructors to the launch and 
landing phases are understandable, the low ranking of the approach phase is of concern, 
particularly considering that this phase is associated with a disproportionally high rate 
of accidents for early-solo pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2008).
Overall
These results demonstrate that gliding instructors do not realise that the most likely 
pilots to be involved in accidents are those that they have just sent solo.
This should raise serious concerns about the basis of decisions made by instructors to 
send student pilots solo. Such ‘solo decisions’ could be questioned from the point of 
view of the accident rates alone (Jarvis & Harris 2007b) but the present study provides 
strong evidence that as well as underestimating the probability of accidents occurring 
during such flights (relative to other flights), instructors may not give sufficient 
consideration to the most problematic areas of flight for early solo pilots (specifically 
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the approach phase). Their assessments of the competence of newly soloed pilots may 
be strongly affected by biases such as availability bias and ‘perceived dread’ as applied 
to their own flying. Since it has been shown that instructors cannot easily judge the 
areas of danger faced by early solo pilots (in terms of flight phases) it opens up the 
question of what instructors are basing their decisions to allow solo flight on.
It is particularly curious that the approach phase was not ranked as a relatively more 
important area by instructors, considering its disproportionate accident rate (Jarvis & 
Harris 2008). Chapter six showed that a relatively common accident scenario for newly 
soloed pilots was insufficient reduction of airbrakes (e.g. leaving them deployed while a 
serious undershoot develops to the point where the glider can no longer reach the 
intended landing area). In line with the pyramid theory of accidents and incidents 
(Heinrich et al 1980) if high numbers of gliding accidents are caused by certain events 
then many more such events probably occur that do not lead to accidents. Therefore it is 
likely that the same sorts of errors and events causing accidents for early solo pilots also 
occur in the lead up to solo (i.e. during training). The question therefore is; do 
instructors notice them, and do they take them into account in their assessment of 
student performance? It could be argued that if instructors were noticing a high number 
of such ‘undershoot’ occurrences then they would have ranked the approach as a more 
critical area. Interestingly the approach phase did not feature highly in instructional 
accidents between 2002 and 2006 (see chapter 5) and no instructional accidents were 
caused by insufficient reduction of airbrake (see chapter 6). This could be because 
instructor intervention or prompting means that such errors do not become an issue 
during instructional flights. As previously stated, it could be that some errors made on 
instructional flights are more salient than others, since some are more recoverable. This 
would have implications for the instructor’s assessment of a student’s flying and the 
decision to allow solo flight in the first place.
Research is required into which aspects of student performance instructors are basing 
solo decisions on. This might help to address the very high accident rate of early solo 
pilots. The following chapter will look more deeply into this critical decision process.
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Chapter 9 - Investigation into the factors influencing instructor decisions to allow 
and disallow solo flight
Introduction
It was found that gliding instructors under-estimate the relative likelihood of accidents 
faced by early solo pilots (defined as those with 10 hours experience or fewer) (see 
chapter 8). Out of a sample of 74 instructors, none realised that low-hours pilots were 
the most likely glider pilots to be involved in accidents, as shown by Jarvis and Harris 
(2007b). Instructors incorrectly believe that pilots become more likely to have accidents 
as they gain experience up to a point between about 200 and 500 hours (see chapter 8). 
These consistent beliefs are based on notions of unsafe pilot attitudes, increased 
challenge and reduction of post solo supervision, and they reflect similar claims in 
aviation literature. It was proposed that several cognitive biases could contribute to 
these misunderstandings. Being as the most vulnerable group of glider pilots 
(statistically) are those who have just been sent solo, it is of concern that those sending 
them solo may underestimate the likelihood of an accident.
Additionally, instructors’ perceptions of the areas that are most likely to cause these 
accidents (in terms of flight phases) are not aligned with the accident data. Specifically, 
despite the approach phase being the most likely to cause accidents to newly soloed 
pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2008) instructors perceive it as the least likely to do so relative to 
all other in-flight phases.
The results of the previous study (chapter 8) raised potential concerns with regards to 
instructor judgment in terms of sending student pilots solo. It was suggested that their 
decisions may be strongly affected by biases such as availability bias and ‘perceived 
dread’ in the same way that their perceptions of accident likelihood appeared to be. 
Simply put, since instructors appear to wrongly perceive the main issues faced by early 
solo pilots (in general terms as well as by flight phases) it opens up the question of what 
instructors are basing their decisions on to allow solo flight.
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Chapter six showed that accidents to early-solo glider pilots (under 10 hours) were 
confined to just a few causes. These were misjudgements of the approach path (leading 
to undershoots), misjudging the landing round-out, and control of airspeed and pitch on 
approach. A well known rule of accidents and incidents (the pyramid theory), based on 
extensive accident research, is that for every accident there are roughly 30 occurrences 
of similar unsafe practices or conditions (Heinrich et al 1980). This theory would 
suggest that the aforementioned accident causal events should occur regularly in the 
period leading up to solo flying. If so then one would expect these factors to be present 
in training accidents, but the picture does not fully support this. 
Research literature looking at accidents occurring to general aviation pilots under 
instruction gives support to the general point; events on landing and during ‘touch-and-
goes’ were associated with the highest frequencies of accidents in both instruction and 
early solo flying (Baker et al 1996). This is similar to the findings of Jarvis and Harris 
(2008) that in UK gliding landing was the most frequent flight phase for seminal events 
for both early-solo pilots and student pilots under instruction. However, further study by 
Jarvis and Harris (chapter 6) showed that the landing events on instructional flights 
were only associated with misjudgement of the landing flare, and specifically leaving it 
too late, whereas for early-solo pilots flaring too early was just as likely to cause an 
accident. Accidents initiated during the approach phase were not highly associated with 
instructional accidents, whereas they were associated with the highest rates and totals of 
seminal accident events for early solo pilots.
Possible answers to these apparent anomalies lie in the contribution of the instructor. 
Certain errors made by students during training might be less likely to lead to accidents 
than others (due to the instructor contribution) meaning that these errors never enter the 
accident data and so are invisible to these types of studies. This theory is supported by 
the finding that of the specific factors that caused accidents to early-solo pilots, the only 
one to feature highly in training accidents was ‘initiating a late landing flare’. Clearly 
there is very little time for an instructor to prevent an accident when the seminal event 
occurs close to the ground in these circumstances; “the worse problem for both the 
student and the instructor occurs when the initial round out is left too late” (Piggott 
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1991). This helps to explain the high number of these sorts of accidents occurring 
during instructional flights. The other types of accidents occurring to the early-solo 
pilots (overuse of airbrakes / mishandling on approach, and landing flare too early, 
chapter 6) are not represented at all in the instructional accident data. Notably these 
events all occur at a higher altitude during the flight (than a late landing flare) allowing 
the instructor time to take over control to prevent an accident. These particular kinds of 
errors are therefore less likely to lead to accidents with an instructor on board, than late 
landing flare events. In this way such errors may never appear in the training accident 
data or subsequent analysis. Hence they only appear in the data when pilots are flying 
solo despite possibly occurring right through their training.
Despite some apparent anomalies in accident cause between student pilots and solo 
pilots, there is a strong case (supported by the nature of those same anomalies) to 
explain how only those that leave the instructor less time to respond appear in the 
accident statistics for student pilots. 
If the causes of accidents occurring to low-hours pilots were more evenly distributed 
among flight phases and causal categories, then it would raise questions about the 
general standards of new solo pilots. However, as shown the accidents are not spread in 
this way, but are clustered around a small number of relatively discrete areas which, 
with increased pilot experience become relatively insignificant in terms of accident 
numbers. This raises the question of how much weight is put on these factors by 
instructors when judging student pilots prior to sending them solo or whether these 
areas are considered at all. Research is required into how instructors make ‘solo-
decisions’ and what aspects of student performance they base these decisions on, in 
order to address the very high accident rate of early solo pilots.
There are no standards laid down as to what constitutes a solo-standard, nor what 
instructors should look for. The British Gliding Association solo training syllabus; 
‘BGA Solo Certificate’ (another name commonly used for ‘the A certificate’) provides 
guidance on what exercises should be completed by students before the solo certificate 
is issued. The list of training exercises is given as ‘lookout’, ‘effects of controls’, ‘use of 
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trim’, ‘the straight glide’, turning’, ‘airbrakes’, ‘approach control’, ‘landing’, ‘circuit 
planning’, ‘launching’, ‘stalling’, ‘spinning and spiral dives’, and ‘first solo’ (British 
Gliding Association 2008b). The latter is simply described as “Normal take-off, circuit 
and landing”. Instructors are referred back to the BGA instructors’ manual for detail on 
all these exercises. 
The requirements to fly solo simply state that a candidate must be 16, have signed a 
declaration of medical fitness, and must have completed 20 flights (British Gliding 
Association 2008a). The rules state that tests (leading to certificates) “can only be done 
when the candidate is alone in the glider” (British Gliding Association 2008a). The first 
test is to obtain a certificate of competence termed the ‘A’ badge, which consists of 
“one solo circuit… followed by a satisfactory landing” (British Gliding Association 
2008a). It is difficult to imagine what constitutes a failure to this test other than an 
accident, which should bring its value into question. Hence the solo standard appears to 
be recognized retrospectively, in that a pilot is deemed competent to fly a solo only after 
they have flown solo! The reason for this rather odd requirement appears to be historic, 
and comes from a time when there were no two seat gliders, and so the first flight was 
also the first solo, and hence no ‘solo-standard’ existed. Strangely the assessments have 
remained the same for over seventy years, and the system of testing illustrates the lack 
of attention to pre-solo achievement. The findings from chapter eight along with claims 
by popular textbooks, suggest that the UK gliding movement (from a training 
perspective) does not perceive a safety issue with newly soloed pilots. This would help 
to explain the lack of attention given to the issue of determining whether or not pilots 
are ready for solo.
The BGA instructors’ manual includes only a short section devoted to the first solo, but 
there is no mention of the decision itself apart from the following: “At first sight the 
decision to send a trainee on a first solo looks to be a tricky one. It isn’t, because if you 
aren’t sure you don’t do it” (British Gliding Association 2003). This advice assumes 
that gliding instructors can make reasonable assessments of the risk (i.e. to be ‘sure’) 
but it has been suggested that this is not true (see chapter 8). However the BGA syllabus 
and instructors’ manual (British Gliding Association 2003) do include performance 
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markers to be attained before solo. These include circuit ‘planning’, approach control, 
spot landings, stalling, spinning, speed and directional control, launch failures, 
satisfactory take-off and launch and thermal soaring. Each of these has a very short 
description about what is required. Of particular interest are approach control and ‘spot’ 
landing, which represent the two areas found to cause most problems in early-hours 
pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2008). The former is accompanied by the description “able to 
recognize and correct for an undershoot, and understand the need to turn in early if 
necessary” (British Gliding Association 2003). This description does appear to be in 
line with accident trends showing that judgment is problematic on approach, leading to 
undershoots caused by overuse of airbrakes. Although there is no further advice on how 
instructors should assess the ability of the student to recognize and correct for 
undershoots, it indicates that instructors should look at this aspect of a student’s flying 
when making a decision about their standard prior to solo. In terms of landing, it is 
interesting that ‘spot landing’ is given instead of just ‘landing’, and the only advice is 
that this is “not necessary, but should be done competently if the glider has good 
airbrakes” (British Gliding Association 2003). Landing itself, including judgment of the 
flare is not included in this list, although ‘ballooned landings’ are identified as one 
‘common difficulty’ experienced on first solos, in another section. Considering the rate
of flare misjudgments leading to accidents this could be a serious omission. The 
instructors’ manual deems that the only other areas that trainees regularly have 
difficulty with on first solos are ‘getting the circuit too close’, and ‘making sloppy 
turns’ (British Gliding Association 2003). There is no mention of the approach phase in 
this context, which again appears to be a serious omission given the findings of Jarvis 
and Harris (2008), and those outlined in chapter six.
Approach control is covered in a separate section of the manual and includes a large 
variety of exercises for instructors to do in order to show problems to students that can 
occur (including undershooting and the effect of not closing the brakes to recover from 
it). These are written as instructor demonstrations however (rather than student 
exercises), and the only exercise that is about checking the student for undershoot 
tendencies involves the instructor setting up a low final turn to check that the trainee 
does not open the brakes immediately (termed ‘landing lever syndrome’). The BGA 
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instructor training syllabus includes six approach control exercises but these are also 
instructor demonstrations, including ‘undershoot and recovery’ and ‘progressive 
undershoot’ (British Gliding Association 2008c). The instructor must learn to do these 
competently in order to demonstrate them to student pilots. There are no such exercises 
for the diagnosis of issues in pre-solo pilots, for any specific area of the approach. 
Indeed there are only two exercises out of 55 on the BGA instructor training syllabus 
(Appendix G) that are concerned with diagnosis or observation of a student’s flying as 
opposed to the flying skills of the trainee instructor. These two exercises come under the 
heading of ‘fault finding’, and are termed ‘handling skills’, and ‘judgement exercises’. 
No more information is given on what these might entail. The syllabus contains nothing 
about the decision making process of sending a pilot solo.
Gliding and general aviation text books (written for pilots) include even less 
information useful to instructors, or students wishing to attain the standard. Most simply 
include encouragement to the solo pilot such as “When your instructor steps out of the 
aeroplane and leaves you to your first solo flight, you are being paid a big compliment” 
(Thom 1997), and “Relax as much as possible and let your training take over. Enjoy 
every moment of this flight - there is only ever one first solo” (Pratt 1994). Additionally 
all these books include phrases that reassure a student pilot about the instructors ability 
to judge when a pilot is ready to fly solo, for example “remember that he is trained to 
judge the right moment to send you solo” (Thom 1997) and “Your instructor will not 
send you first solo unless he or she is totally confident of your ability” (Pooley 2003). 
However there is no description or advice on what this standard actually is, or how such 
confidence or judgment is attained by the instructor. The most that Thom (1997) states 
on this point is that “The usual standards apply to your take off, circuit and landing… 
your instructor, when sending you solo, not only considers you competent to fly a 
circuit with a normal take off and landing, but also considers you competent to handle 
an emergency”. Pooley (2003) also mentions emergencies in a statement that the student 
would have perfected their landing technique and practiced various emergency 
procedures, including engine failures after take-off and go-around.  Pratt (1994) offers 
little more by stating that “Your instructor will send you solo based on his judgement of 
the safety and consistency of your flying and judgement”. The findings from the 
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previous study (Chapter 8) strongly suggest that instructors’ ‘judgement of safety’ as 
applied to this pilot group is poor, which must bring into question the confidence of the 
above claims.
Gliding texts tend to elaborate on the personal attributes needed to fly solo more than 
the human factors or technical skills. Piggott (1997) states that a solo pilot should 
possess ‘confidence about his ability and be aware of his limitations’, as well as being 
‘experienced and confident in his ability to cope with emergency situations’ and have 
‘an honest and mature outlook’. He only states a few technical skills; ‘prove that you 
can plan your circuits and deal with any contingencies such as cable breaks, running 
short of height, and stalling and spinning, without advise or help from the instructor” 
(Piggott 1997). Hence, ability to deal with emergencies appears to be the most 
consistent theme running through training literature, as to what solo competence looks 
like. No texts for pilot training go into depth on any of these issues. 
It is clear that there is a serious lack of guidance in training literature and texts on how 
to decide when a student pilot is ready to fly solo in general, as well regarding specific 
areas of the flight.
Unfortunately there is almost no research into this area within the scientific domain 
either. The only study to look at instructors decisions regarding solo flight was in 
general aviation, and required twenty instructors to create decision ‘policies’ of what a 
student should attain to be competent for solo flight, based on their scores on the 16 
elements in the training syllabus (Ikomi & Guion 2000). Consistencies were found in 
terms of instructors ruling out solo flight unless a score of at least three out of five had 
been achieved (average) in virtually every maneuver in the syllabus, which suggested a 
cut-off point being set on each item. Although it was noted that ‘policies’ were very 
different, even within a single flight school, it was concluded that more flying 
instructors showed insight into their decision making than football coaches or 
psychology professors, based on matches between verbal reports and actual judgements 
(Ikomi & Guion 2000). However the numbers were not significant and there was also 
extreme variability in the willingness of instructors to send students solo.
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The limited conclusions of this work could be partly due to research limitations. There 
are questionable aspects to such a study. It begins from the assumption that instructors 
base their decisions of whether to allow a student to fly solo or not, on those elements 
found in the training record (i.e. that the decision ‘attributes’ are all contained on the 
record sheet). The decision process involved in sending a pilot solo could be more 
complex than this, and involve other less obvious decision dimensions and non-
declarative knowledge. The use of non-declarative knowledge in decision making is 
sometimes referred to as ‘intuition’, which Klein (1998) describes as “the use of 
experience to recognise key patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation”. Expert 
knowledge is stored in the ‘knowledge-base’ (long-term memory) which is an 
unconscious resource with a vast array of specialised processors called schemata, used 
to process familiar information rapidly (Reason 1990). Schemata are activated by 
triggers (often unconsciously) and the more that a schema is used, the less is needed to 
trigger it “particularly in very familiar environments” (Reason 1990). Hence instructors, 
familiar with the environment, may rely on such unconscious cues to judge when a 
students’ flying is not ‘typical’ or ‘satisfactory’ in order to help make an assessment as 
to whether or not the student is safe to fly solo. Intuitively judging whether a situation is 
‘typical’ in this way is a process that is often relied upon in expert decision making 
tasks (Klein 1998).
The work of Ikomi and Guion (2000) may therefore have missed some important 
decision attributes by asking instructors to base their ‘solo decisions’ only on the scores 
of the elements on the training record (on paper). All instructors claimed to have used 
non-compensatory combining rules when making decisions based on these elements 
(Ikomi & Guion 2000). Strategies of decision making are often characterized as either 
compensatory or non-compensatory (Rothrock & Yin 2008). Compensatory decision 
making theories postulate that people make numerous and exhaustive ‘trade-offs’ 
between attribute cues (Rothrock & Yin 2008), and as such are based on the classical 
model of rational choice. According to this model, the “rational” actor chooses the best 
options to follow by assessing the probability of each, then discerning the utility of each 
one, and combining these two assessments (Gilovich & Griffin 2002). However this 
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model has regularly been shown to be unrealistic, particularly in terms of complex 
judgements. The theory of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957) led to a large and 
ongoing body of work concerned with how people short-cut the rational decision 
process, of which non-compensatory theories are an important part. 
Simon proposed that instead of valuing and combining decision attributes fully, people 
simply set ‘aspirational levels’ on various dimensions, meaning thresholds with which 
they would be satisfied. This process is known as ‘satisficing’, and reduces the effort 
and time required by the process. In the context of the ‘solo decision’, satisficing 
behaviour would relate to the instructor ‘setting’ a level that they will be satisfied with 
on any particular attribute (e.g. the landing) rather than fully evaluating it. If this were 
the case then there would be little value (simply in terms of the ‘solo decision’ outcome) 
in a student making a very good landing as opposed to a satisfactory landing, since 
either would satisfy the ‘landing attribute’ part of the decision process.
Non-compensatory combining rules mean that one decision attribute cannot be 
compensated for (in terms of the decision outcome) by another. For the research of 
Ikomi and Guion (2000), the non-compensatory nature of the decision meant that 
unsatisfactory performance on one part of the flight training record (less than three out 
of five) could not be compensated for by good performance on another. Therefore the 
score of three represented a ‘cut-off’ threshold of satisfaction for each manoeuvre, in 
line with satisficing behaviour within a non-compensatory model. A score below three 
on any manoeuvre could not be compensated by a score above three on another.
Hence the use of non-compensatory models in ‘solo decisions’ would appear very 
possible because any element of a flight could cause an accident, and one satisfactory 
element (e.g. take off) could not compensate for an unsatisfactory one (e.g. Landing). 
Hence the rule proposed by Ikomi and Guion (2000) is theoretically applicable, and the 
cut-off points (scores of three on each element of the record card) would equate to 
instructor satisfaction and hence suggest the possibility of satisficing behaviour. 
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A second interesting feature of the research by Guion and Ikomi (2000) was that a 
successful first solo was used as a definition of a correct judgement on the part of the 
instructor to allow solo flight. The implications of allowing a pilot to fly solo are 
arguably far reaching, and may lead to accidents several flights down the line (for 
example when the pilot experiences their first emergency, or first challenging weather 
situation). This is supported by the findings that pilots with up to 10 hours have twice as 
many accidents per launch than their more experienced counterparts (Jarvis & Harris 
2007). Therefore an uneventful first solo flight is arguably not in itself an indicator that 
a pilot was in fact ready or competent to fly on their own, and therefore not necessarily 
a good singular indicator of correct judgement on the part of the instructor.
Considering that the approach has been associated with most accident causes in low-
hours pilots (Jarvis & Harris (2008), it of note that the training records used in the 
research of Ikomi and Guion (2000) did not include the final approach as an element to 
be scored and taken into account in the solo decision. It may be that the approach phase 
was included with the landing phase, but that is highly unlikely based on the description 
of that category on the record used. Additionally there was no element for the circuit, 
and so it appears that the final approach was not judged at all by the instructors as part 
of the research, even though it has been associated with a number of accidents in 
general aviation (Baker et al 1996). This would appear to be a serious limitation caused 
by the research design and provides a strong case for a research methodology that does 
not assume the decision attributes used by instructors. Since it is a relatively unknown 
decision process, an exploratory technique is required in order to establish the attributes 
of the decision rather than imposing them on the participants. This will provide a 
foundation of knowledge for later work that could begin to map the dynamics and 
measure the weightings of the decision process. 
The decision to allow solo flight is a highly critical one, with possible fatal 
consequences if made incorrectly. Although many consequences will show up early in a 
pilots career (during the first ten hours of solo flight, as shown by previous findings), it 
is also possible that lack of skills could lay dormant until a situation arises where 
incorrect technique combines with circumstances to produce fatal results much further 
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downstream. Therefore instructors have a huge responsibility to correctly judge whether 
a pilot has mastered all the necessary skills to be safe, and so one would expect a 
reticence in regard to their decisions to send pilots solo. Indeed, the simple need to be 
absolutely sure is one of the few pieces of guidance in the training literature as 
previously outlined (British Gliding Association 2003, Pooley 2003). Interestingly the 
results of Ikomi and Guion (2000) show an unexpected leniency on the part of flight 
instructors in sending pilots solo, although this may be a reflection of the validity of the 
research method. 
Given the lack of research or knowledge about this complex decision, an exploratory 
methodology is required that can establish how instructors decide that a pilot can fly 
alone. This may provide some answers with regard to the very high accident rate of 
early solo glider pilots.
In order to inform any remedial actions to the high accident rate of early solo pilots, 
exploratory research is needed that can build a picture of what aspects of students’ 
performance cause instructors to allow them or prevent them from going solo, and how 
that picture overlays the pattern of accidents occurring to these pilots after the decision 
has been made. No research has been done that answers these questions.
Aims and Objectives
The first objective was to discover what elements gliding instructors identify as being 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance in their students, and establish how these 
factor into the decision to allow or disallow solo flight. The second objective was to 
compare such findings to previous findings from accident data (in terms of areas of 
concern).
The overall aim of the study was to gain an initial understanding of instructor decisions 
with regard to solo flight, and to explore in what ways instructor decisions could be 




Since nothing was known about the process of instructor decision making regarding 
solo flight, an initial exploratory pilot study was undertaken. Twelve open interviews 
(simply asking instructors to talk about the decision) revealed that they felt it was a 
hugely complicated process with many factors. They found it difficult to explain the 
whole process, and in many cases stated that they simply did not know how they came 
to a conclusion. A large number expressed the idea that while they found difficulty in 
explaining reasons behind the decision to send a pilot solo, they would find it easier 
explaining why they decided not to send pilots solo. A number of instructors talked 
clearly about observable aspects of student flying that had led them to send pilots solo, 
or not allow solo flight. Most instructors said that the decision was largely based on 
their observations of the student’s flying, but when asked to elaborate on the detail they 
often ran into difficulty. The interviews also revealed numerous possible decision 
dimensions, some general and some specific (related to aspects of the students’ 
performance). 
Research Questions
From the pilot study findings, two broad research questions were formulated that were 
exploratory in terms of finding out the basis upon which instructors decide to allow 
student pilots to fly solo, and whether these aligned with the issues raised by the 
accident data.
1. What factors do gliding instructors identify as being satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory performance in students, in terms of allowing them to fly solo?
2. How do these findings compare to previous findings from accident data (in 
terms of areas of concern)?
151
Methodological considerations
A research methodology was required that would enable open exploration regarding the 
decision to allow solo flight and generate data capable of meaningful comparison with 
previous results. Based on the pilot interviews, the Critical Incident Technique (CIT, 
Flanagan 1954) was chosen. CIT was ideal for probing the factors impacting upon 
instructor decisions without needing to discuss the decision making process directly, 
which pilot study participants had found difficult. Additionally, CIT allowed collection 
of data comparable to previous accident analysis.
Critical Incident Technique (CIT)
CIT was developed by John Flanagan in the 1940s as part of the Aviation Psychology 
Program of the US Army Air Force (USAAF) and is widely associated with studies of 
human error (Kirwin &Ainsworth 1992). The technique is firmly established and has 
been extensively used over the past 60 years (Butterfield et al 2005). It is recognized as 
an effective technique when researching a topic that is little understood or sparingly 
documented Gremler (2004). Research has demonstrated that material collected using 
the method is highly representative of the essential points required for a task, as 
determined from other sources (Andersson & Nilsson 1964). It is now generally 
accepted that CIT has proved both reliable and valid as a method of generating a 
comprehensive description of a content domain (Ronan & Latham 1974, Woolsey 
1986).
CIT does not consist of a single rigid set of rules, but is a flexible set of principles to be 
modified to the task in hand (Flanagan 1954). The technique generally involves 
collecting first-hand reports of satisfactory and unsatisfactory execution of an assigned 
task (Flanagan 1954). ‘Critical Incidents’ themselves are effectively anecdotes 
describing: “behaviour either outstandingly effective or ineffective with respect to 
attaining the general aims of the activity” (Flanagan 1954). Thus this method was 
ideally suited to the present research question since there was a clear criterion for 
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successful and unsuccessful task execution in the form of the student’s performance 
being judged to be good enough or not good enough to allow solo flight.
Flanagan (1954) described five important stages to performing the CIT which have been 
utilized in many hundreds of studies since. 
 STAGE 1 - The General Aim: This is a functional description of the activity 
and specification of what it is necessary to do and not to do in order to achieve 
successful or effective participation (Flanagan 1954). 
 STAGE 2 - Plans and Specifications: This stage involves “a delimitation of the 
situations to be observed”, including information about place, persons, 
conditions and activities (Flanagan 1954).
 STAGE 3 - Collect the data: Data collected in a critical incident study should 
provide complete coverage of the content of the domain (Woolsey 1986). This 
usually involves eliciting critical incidents from participants in the form of 
interviews or questionnaires.
 STAGE 4 - Analyse the data: Analysing CIT data involves “analysis of 
thematic content, arrived at by inductive reasoning” (Woolsey 1986). Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods have been used in critical incident studies.
 STAGE 5 - Interpret and report findings: This is involves reporting findings 
(results) and determining the meaning of these within the context of the subject 
area under investigation.
All these stages were taken into account in order to complete the procedure. They will 
be discussed further after the fundamental procedure has been outlined.
Sampling considerations: Participants
Recent critical incident studies reveal a wide range of sample sizes in terms of 
participant numbers. Most modern studies use between 25 and 75 participants (see 
Zaidman-Zait 2007, Borgen & Maglio 2007, Coleman 2006, Neupert et al 2005). 
However this is not universal; Butterfield and Borgan (2005) used only 15 participants 
whereas Garn and Cothran (2006) used 191.
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Key CIT literature generally proposes that the number of critical incidents rather than 
the number of participants is the key factor in sampling (Butterfield et al 2005, Woolsey 
1986, Flanagan 1954) and generally little attention is given to participant sampling 
numbers in the research literature.  This is surprising given that participant 
characteristics determine to whom the study can be generalised (Woolsey 1986). Hence, 
in order that the results could be confidently generalised across UK gliding instructors, 
consideration was given to obtaining a representative sample of participants.
Sampling considerations: Critical Incidents
In the same way that participant sample sizes are not uniform across studies, there is no 
set rule for the number of incidents required (Butterfield et al 2005, Flanagan 1954). 
The number of incidents depends on the nature of the task, and could range from fifty 
up to several thousand for particularly complex tasks (Flanagan 1954). A general rule is 
that incidents continue to be collected until redundancy appears (Woolsey 1986). A 
running count of critical behaviours emerging from the data is often advocated to find 
out when the addition of incidents no longer leads to the emergence of more than a few 
critical behaviours (Woolsey 1986, Andersson & Nilsson 1964, Flanagan 1954). An 
often quoted rule is that when 100 incidents only lead to the emergence of two or three 
new categories then the topic has been sufficiently covered (Flangan 1954). Because 
this was conducted concurrently with data analysis, the process is covered in STEP C 
(Data analysis).
Data collection considerations
The retrospective face-to-face interview remains popular for CIT studies across many 
domains (Borgen & Maglio 2007, Dollarhide et al 2007, Zaidman-Zait 2007). Other 
methods such mailed questionnaires (Garn & Cothran 2006, Coleman 2006), telephone 
interviews (Oldenburger et al 2008, Cottrell et al 2002) and on line survey forms
(Papadakis 2008) have also been used, and there is evidence that some of these methods 
give satisfactory responses (Converse et al 2008). Even so the interview aligns well 
with the CIT method’s requirements to understand the implications of the event within 
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its full context (Schluter et al 2007). As well as allowing researchers to follow up on 
interesting responses (Robson 2002), interviewing facilitates the active support of the 
interviewee, and allows a multi-dimensional picture to emerge, including the use of 
body language (Stitt-Gohdes et al 2000). Given the subject matter, visual gestures were 
likely (e.g. to imitate the path of the glider) and face-to-face interviewing would allow 
these to be noted on the transcript if necessary. Although focus groups have been used 
for CIT studies (e.g. Keatinge 2002), this might have inhibited responses in light of the 
subject area under discussion, and would not allow confidentiality. 
A review of CIT studies since 1987 found that virtually all of them used retrospective 
reporting, as opposed to direct observation of incidents (Butterfield et al 2005). The 
criterion for accuracy is based on the quality of specific incidents recounted in terms of 
fullness, clarity and detail (Butterfield et al 2005) and hence the accuracy of 
participants’ memory and recall is important. Where observers report on others (such as 
is proposed) recency is important in order to maintain accuracy (Woolsey 1986). This 
problem can be minimizing by restricting reported incidents to observations within the 
previous six to 12 months (Ronan & Latham 1974). Mitigation to this is to give 
participants pre-warning of the questions (Schluter et al 2007) which have proved 
effective. However, gliding clubs are social places where instructors might have 
discussed incidents between themselves and hence introduce bias (from a cognitive 
recall and social perspective). It was therefore decided as unwise to give much warning. 
Whilst some participants did clearly struggle to recount incidents during the pilot 
interviews, most were able to recall several in detail.
In terms of the interview questions themselves, wording is known to be crucial, and 
even small differences can seriously affect the range and quality of reports (Flanagan 
1954). For this reason the question (and most particularly the CIT part) were carefully 
thought out to be reflective of the general aim, discussed with subject matter experts, 
and piloted on a small number of gliding instructors to assess their focus on in relation 
to the general aim.
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Data analysis considerations
It is normal to extract (code) critical incidents from interview transcripts. However 
deciding what is and what is not a critical incident (in order to extract them) is far from 
straightforward. Flanagan (1954) describes an incident as “any behaviour either 
outstandingly effective or ineffective with respect to attaining the general aims of the 
activity”. Other studies have described incidents simply as ‘units of behaviour’ 
(Andersson & Nilsson 1964).
Once extracted, the analysis of critical incidents involves “analysis of thematic content, 
arrived at by inductive reasoning” (Woolsey 1986). Whereas most studies use some 
form of qualitative analysis in this way, data collected using the critical incident 
technique can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively and both have been 
frequently used (Chell & Pittaway 1998).
The general purpose of analyzing critical incident interviews is to understand the 
commonalties among responses (Stitt-Gohdes 2000). The causal taxonomy formed from 
UK gliding accident data (see chapter 6) could have formed a foundation for such 
analysis, but this would assume that explanations of the ‘solo decision’ factors (CIT 
data) shared a common basis with the accident data. To make such an assumption would 
be premature in view of the lack of previous research in this area. Without an adequate 
template, the data analysis required a more fundamental emergent technique. Critical 
incident data can be (and has been) categorized according to the principles of grounded 
theory (Gremler 2004), and this methodology was suitable for the analysis of meaning 
within the data.  In Flanagan’s original paper on CIT it was stated that “the aim of 
analysis should be to increase the usefulness of the data while sacrificing as little as 
possible of their comprehensiveness, specificity, and validity” (Flanagan 1954). To this 
end it was very important that the categories accurately reflected exactly what had been 
said and meant by the participants, and that categories were not over-generalised. 
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Reliability and validity considerations in CIT research
Critical incident technique has been established as a valid and reliable technique for 
describing content domain (Andersson & Nilsson 1964, Ronan & Latham 1974). 
However, as CIT has evolved it has become increasingly common to include measures 
aimed at convincing readers of the credibility of results (Butterfield et al 2005). Table 
9.1 summarises eight such procedures identified as being used in CIT research, in the 
order described by Butterfield et al (2005). Although it is unusual for studies to use all 
such procedures, it was decided that within reasonably practical restraints all should be 
attempted to insure the most robust data collection and analysis possible. 
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Table 9.1. The eight validity and reliability processes identified by Butterfield et al 
(2005) as being common in CIT research.
Independent incident extraction check: A second person independently extracting 
critical incidents from transcripts (typically 25% of the total incidents gathered)
Participant cross-checking interview: A number of participants are interviewed 
again after the first round of categorisation, to confirm that the categorisation makes 
sense to them, and reflects their experiences. They are also asked to review their 
own incidents, and add, delete, or amend as they wish.
Categorisation by an independent judge: Typically 25% of incidents are placed 
into existing categories, after the initial categorisation is complete.
Tracking the redundancy of incidents during data collection: Batches of critical 
incidents are checked during data collection for newly emerging themes. When no 
new themes (or very few) emerge from a batch the subject area can be said to be 
covered.
General SME review: Submission of tentative categories to two or more SMEs in 
the field, to review, indicate any categories that surprise them, or are missing.
Participation rates: The number of participants citing a particular incident is 
divided by the total number of participants. A participant rate of 25% is suggested as 
valid.
Descriptive validity. This is concerned with the accurate interpretation of incident 
descriptions. Recording and or transcribing helps to maintain this, but also 
participants can be asked to check incidents within the categories to insure that the 
category descriptions represent what they were trying to express.
Interview fidelity: An experienced researcher listens to a number of interviews to 





Face to face interviews were held with a wide sample of qualified gliding instructors 
from a number of UK clubs with the aim of establishing the reasons that they have sent 
pilots solo, or decided not to. The following sequence of questioning was asked many 
times of each participant, and probe questions were used if more information was 
required.
“Think of a student that you have flown with recently under these circumstances 
[assessing for solo] but don’t tell me their name. Did they satisfy you that they should be 
allowed to fly solo that day? What did the student do or not do that made you say [no / 
yes] on that occasion?”
All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The critical incidents were ‘extracted’ 
from the transcripts. In essence, a critical incident was any statement made by the 
instructor that gave a reason for sending a student solo, or deciding not to.
Two independent sets of analyses were then carried out on the entire set of critical 
incidents.
1. Meaning analysis: In common with previous studies, techniques from grounded 
theory (Strauss & Corbin 1967) along with the ‘paired comparison’ technique 
(described by Partington 2002) were used to group the critical incidents into 
categories based on their meaning in relation to the CIT general aim (why a 
student was sent solo, or nor).
2. Flight Phase analysis: The flight phase template from Jarvis and Harris (2008) 
was used to carry out template analysis (as described by King 1998) on the 
critical incidents. This was done in order to find out about the relationship 
between flight phases and ‘solo decisions’, i.e. how often each flight phase was 
related to the events driving the instructors’ decision.
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Throughout the process, procedures were carried out to maintain and check the 
reliability and validity of the process. These are shown in Table 9.1.
Finally, in order to compare the CIT ‘meaning’ analysis directly with the previous 
research, all events found to cause accidents in UK gliding (chapter 6) were coded into 
the ‘CIT’ top-level categories.
The general CIT aim
The purpose of establishing a general aim is to gain an understanding of what a person 
who engages in the activity is expected to accomplish (Butterfield et al 2005). This can 
be obtained by asking participants and should result in a functional description of the 
activity that is at least acceptable to potential users (Flanagan 1954). 
In terms of the ‘general aim’ the task was piloting a glider (for a student pilot). However 
the research question did not ask about successful performance on this task, but what 
the instructor perceived as indicating it. This simplified the general CIT aim because the 
success criteria did not need to be defined due to it being part of the question.
After discussion with subject matter experts as recommended by Flanagan (1954) the 
general aim of the activity was established as:
“For the student to satisfy his/her instructor that they have reached an overall 
standard of flying that would make it acceptable (for the instructor) to allow 
them to fly solo. This should be achieved through demonstrating that they can 
safely operate a glider in the prevailing conditions and under any restrictions 
laid down or accepted as part of early solo flying”.
This was shown to other subject matter experts (SMEs) and read to participants who 
were also SMEs by nature of being experienced glider pilots, and was found to be 
acceptable to all. It is important that collected reports of observed behaviour are relevant 
to the general aim in terms of making a significant’ contribution, either positively or 
negatively, to the general aim of the activity (Flanagan 1954).
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Plans and Specifications
In the present study the situation was any instructional glider flight where the instructor 
was considering allowing the student to fly solo after that flight or session. This could 
be a formal flight or test (often termed a check flight, or check ‘ride’) or any 
instructional flight leading to the consideration. External factors such as weather 
conditions, traffic density, logbook comments and progress cards might impact on the 
instructor’s decision outcome but it could assumed that if the instructor was genuinely 
considering whether to allow solo flight then these must have been satisfactory. Hence 
the observed behaviours of interest would be only those attributable to the student 
during that session, and assuming the instructor was already reasonably satisfied about 
the student’s progress and background. An explanation of this was included in the
interview schedule, along with specific information to guide participants so that 
they knew exactly what was required of them, and within what context. 
Sample
Emails were sent to instructor populations of four UK clubs and several visits were 
made to each. Instructors were then interviewed as was practical on location (almost all 
UK instructors are volunteers, and it was not always possible to know exactly who 
would be available and when). This was successful because the eventual sample showed 
a large spread of instructors representing instructional activity at eight UK gliding clubs, 
including flat sites, coastal sites and ridge sites. 
Interviews
For the reasons given previously; individual face to face interviews were used, 
containing retrospective, open-ended questions. Participants were urged to try to use 
incidents from the previous 12 months. Where possible they were given a small amount 
of notice of the questions (no more than a day) which gave them a small amount of time 
for recalling incidents prior to the interview.
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The full interview schedule as shown in Appendix H was finalised after a small pilot 
study of four participants using an initial schedule. This pilot interview process is 
outlined in Appendix I.
A three stage questioning process was found to work best. The process worked as 
follows.
1. An instruction was given (after the pre-brief); “Think of a student that you have 
flown with recently under these circumstances, but don’t tell me their name.” 
2. Only after acknowledgement from the participant, a further (secondary) question 
was then asked; “Did they satisfy you that they should be allowed to fly solo that 
day?” 
3. The real CIT question was asked; “What did the student do or not do that made 
you say [no / yes] on that occasion?”
In trials, it became evident from the responses to the yes / no question (part two) that a 
number of instructors had not considered a specific case as requested. The subsequent 
(yes/no) question was therefore important because it could be used to help maintain the 
interviewees focus on that specific case.
Interview probes (see Appendix H) were included based on Rous and McCormack 
(2006), as well as probes aimed at discovering what part of the flight the incident 
occurred in (if unclear). 
All interviews were digitally recorded and most parts faithfully transcribed.  Although 
transcription is not essential in CIT (Woolsey 1986) this did assist with maintaining 
descriptive validity (see Table 9.1).
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Data Analysis
In common with most CIT studies, data analysis was conducted concurrently with data 
collection in order to establish the scope of the task and determine the number of 
incidents required. Before data analysis could take place, the critical incidents had to be 
extracted.
Incident extraction - development of the method of extraction
A method of critical incident extraction was developed by two independent raters 
jointly coding several transcripts. The initial brief was deliberately loose, and centred 
around the CIT ‘general aim’:
“Any statement or part of a narrative that was deemed to be meaningful in 
its own right with regard to why a specific student pilot, or pilots, did or 
did not satisfy their instructor that they could fly solo, should be 
highlighted on the transcript”
Four issues led to more detailed extraction guidance. These were;
1. The quantity of information deemed to be a single critical incident. It was 
decided that a critical incident would be any singular phenomenon (behaviour) 
belonging to the student (action, inaction, skill, procedure, decision, 
communication etc) that the instructor was dissatisfied or satisfied with in terms 
of potential for solo flight, or any single reason given for not sending a pilot 
solo. In other words any individual unit of behaviour that was effective or 
ineffective with regards to attaining the general aim (Flanagan 1954).
2. The level of specificity or generality, in terms of defining what could be counted 
as a critical incident. It was decided that ‘general’ reasons were acceptable as 
long as a specific session, flight or student were referred to. General comments
about why students should or should not fly solo were not counted as incidents. 
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3. It was decided that ‘positive’ incidents that were relayed within ‘negative’ 
anecdotes could be included and vice-versa (e.g. an instructor mentioning a 
reason why they prevented a student going solo last week, within an anecdote 
related to why they did fly solo ‘this’ week)
4. On occasions two critical incidents were identified within a single interview 
(e.g. because the instructor was repeating it for emphasis). These were only 
counted once, and con-joined if more could be gained.
The full extraction guidelines are shown in Appendix J The final working definition of a 
critical incident was:
Any observed behaviours of the student pilot that were effective or 
ineffective in attaining the goal. In other words any unit of behaviour 
(action, inaction, decision, communication etc) that was meaningful in its 
own right with regard to the decision to allow or disallow solo flight. In 
addition to this any single reason given by the instructor as to why a 
specific student was or was not sent solo should also be included.
Incident extraction - Process
Critical incidents were ‘extracted’ from the remaining transcripts using the guidance in 
Appendix J), and the definition above. 
Analysis and Categorisation of extracted incidents
As outlined, two independent sets of analyses were performed on the critical incident 
data. 
Firstly, the ‘meaning’ analysis was performed using qualitative techniques based on 
inductive reasoning and principles of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin 1967). This 
was the same process described in chapter six and utilised ‘open-coding’ and the same 
paired-comparison technique as described by Partington (2002). Concepts were kept 
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deliberately narrow rather than attempting to cover large areas of meaning within single 
categories, in order that there was no loss of fidelity, since generalisation would take 
place with the higher levels of categorisation (axial coding). This led to a large number 
of lower level categories. Those that described similar overall phenomena were grouped 
to form larger categories (using the axial coding process), resulting in two further levels 
(termed second level and top level categories). 
Secondly, template analysis as described by King (1998) was performed using the flight 
phase template from previous research by Jarvis and Harris (2008). Each critical 
incident was coded by the flight phase in which they occurred. Template analysis allows 
the researcher to form new categories and change or delete existing categories as the 
analysis progresses. The data therefore changed the flight phase template and only once 
finalised was it used to categorise the data from scratch. 
Matching of CIT categories to causal accident factors.
The 59 bottom level categories from the human factors (HF) causal template (chapter 6, 
Table 6.1) were matched to the top level categories that emerged from the CIT 
‘meaning’ analysis (as if each was a critical incident). Associated accident narrative 
examples were provided with each one in order to add context, as well as both template 
structures.
A second rater independently conducted the same analysis and got the same result, bar 
two of the 59 categories (both classified as airmanship rather than attention, and hence 
within the same top-level category of the accident analysis: ‘Attention’). Hence there 
was no need for a statistical reliability test to demonstrate this high level of agreement. 
This showed that the two sets of analyses were the same in some areas. Results are 
presented in the results section.
Appendix K shows the results of this matching process.
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Reliability and validity processes.
Six out of the eight processes detailed in Table 9.1 were completed fully. Two checks 
(‘General SME review’, and the ‘participation rates’ check) were attempted but found to 
be less applicable than anticipated due to issues relating to the specific context of the 
research. These were used in a limited way only. This section outlines all eight 
processes. The ‘participant cross-checking interview’ and the ‘descriptive validity 
check’ are discussed together because they were practically implemented as one 
process.
Independent incident extraction check
This was used as an integral part of the incident extraction process to code valid 
incidents from the narrative. An independent rater coded every fourth transcript after the 
initial four had been done jointly (meaning that just over 31% were assessed by both 
raters).
There is no general rule as to how to go about measuring such a check. It is not a simple 
matter of categorisation into known groups leading to a quantitative reliability check 
because the test has a qualitative element in the determination of meaningful events. 
Therefore no simple solution exists in terms of measurement.
Where raters disagreed on whether a particular piece of description should be extracted, 
the inter-rater analysis was straightforward (as long as some reasonable flexibility was 
allowed around the exact number of words highlighted as part of that event). However 
the most common issue of disagreement between raters was what number of incidents 
that a description constituted (one, two or three). Additionally, the amount of narrative 
highlighted as being an incident usually differed slightly between raters. These areas 
warranted much discussion.
In total, fourteen interviews were coded by both raters, yielding 102 critical incidents, 
only five of which could definitely be established as not being selected by both  raters 
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(representing 96% agreement on which parts of the narratives warranted ‘critical 
incident status’). A third rater helped to resolve differences in terms of scoping incidents 
(i.e. what constituted a single incident). From the extraction check process it was clear 
that the coding of critical incidents was a reasonably consistent and reliable process as 
long as the guidance (shown in Appendix J) was closely followed.
Participant cross-checking interview and descriptive validity check
‘Participant cross-checking’ and ‘descriptive validity’ were employed in order to ensure 
that the interpretation of incidents by the investigator was in line with the intended 
meaning of the participants who supplied them. Eight instructors were re-interviewed 
about their incidents several months after taking part originally. Each was presented 
with their own critical incidents one by one (along with the original interview 
transcripts where necessary in order to give context and aid recall). The categorisation 
system was presented and explained to the instructors and the purpose of the study 
reiterated. 
For each critical incident, the instructor was shown the initial low-level category label 
and asked whether they felt it was adequate to explain the phenomena that they had 
been trying to express. They were asked to look across all the low level categories and 
determine whether they felt that that critical incident fitted any other categories better. 
Over the course of the eight interviews, 74 out of 82 incidents were agreed upon by the 
instructors as being adequately classified, in terms of low level categorisation. This 
demonstrated that the categorisation process was satisfactory in terms of the analysis of 
meaning and initial categorisation of incidents. Participants were also asked to add, 
delete or amend incidents as they saw fit (in line with the ‘participant cross-check’). In 
practice only a few decided to make any changes, and some wished to add a little detail. 
After some of the interviews, category titles were modified to better reflect the 
incidents. 
During each of these interviews discussion was encouraged about the whole 
categorisation process. After each of these sessions the investigator reviewed the overall 
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categorisation and made some changes where appropriate in line with the feedback. 
Additionally during this process, participants were also asked to say which flight phase 
the incident took place in or whether it was a general comment that did not refer to any 
given part of the flight. This information was used to help validate the categorisation 
during the template analysis of flight phases.
One of these interview sessions was overseen by a second subject matter expert who 
was closely involved with the project, in order to discuss the process afterwards and 
ensure that it was objective. 
Categorisation by an independent judge (Reliability check)
Butterfield et al (2005) describe the process of categorisation by an independent judge 
as a sample of incidents being placed into existing categories. This check has previously 
been referred to as inter-rater reliability testing. It was done once the initial 
categorisation was complete at all levels.
An independent rater categorised extracted incidents into top level categories. This 
tested the entire chain of categorisation (from extracted incidents to top-level 
categories). The sample of critical incidents was drawn at random from all extracted 
incidents, by selecting every sixth incident (meaning a sample of 110). Each incident 
was presented within surrounding interview context where needed. At the time of this 
check there were 28 top level categories in total (13 negative and 15 positive).
A gliding SME with professional flying experience and human factors / CRM 
background was employed for this test. He was made familiar with the categorisations 
(all levels) and the objective of the process. Because the second rater had access to the 
mid level category titles, incidents could first be placed into one of these if it helped to 
decide on the higher level category.
The percentage of agreement was calculated on the basis of this test. There was 
agreement upon 96 of the 110 incidents (percentage of agreement 87.3%); no negative 
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incidents were put into any positive categories and vice-versa. This gave a Cohen’s 
Kappa value of 0.86 which was deemed highly satisfactory. The test data are shown in 
Appendix L, along with a table of 28 top level categories at the time of the test.
During this process notes were made by the investigator about any issues that appeared 
to arise, and following the process the categories were scrutinised in discussion with the 
independent rater. Following these discussions, several small adjustments were made to 
some categories as outlined in Appendix M.
Tracking the redundancy of incidents during data collection
This check was used in order to establish the point during data collection when it could 
be confidently claimed that the subject area had been exhausted and hence data 
collection could cease. The number of new categories emerging (from open coding) 
from each batch of about 50 incidents was tracked, in line with previous research (e.g.
Bradley 1992).The point was reached where no new categories were appearing at all 
(either positive or negative). The processes used are described in detail in Appendix N, 
along with the graphs of results.
Because the numbers of incidents was not known until after the extraction was 
complete, the exact numbers of incidents (i.e. batches of 50) could not be planned for 
accurately and so the concurrent check was only a practical approximation. Once all 
data had been collected and categorised the positive and negative incidents were 
checked in batches of exactly 25, in order to uncover the pattern of redundancy more 
accurately. Figure 9.1 shows the progress of redundancy of negative incidents against 
positive incidents. It is of interest to note that the negative incidents took many more 
batches to reach the point of saturation due to higher numbers of new categories 
continuing to emerge throughout the process. This was partly because each interview 
provided fewer positive than negative comments.
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Figure 9.1. Number of new categories that emerged per batch of 25 critical 
incidents.
Figure 9.1 shows that after collecting about 225 positive comments and 400 negative 
ones, the point was reached where no new ‘meaning’ emerged from the collection of 
further critical incidents. Hence the subject area had been properly covered and data 
collection could be stopped. 
General SME review
Because the participants were also the SMEs it was found that this process risked 
upsetting the objective nature of the data. For example, whereas most participants 
agreed with categories around the area of judgement and positioning, several advised 
that categories such as airspeed control and co-ordination should be removed on the 
basis that such basic skills ought to be attained long before a student was being assessed 
for solo. However this does not make them scientifically non-valid as data, nor does it 
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mean anything about the validity of the categories. Indeed, since during the initial CIT 
interviews many instructors claimed that deficiencies in basic skills (poor control co-
ordination and speed control) made them decide not to allow solo flight, it would be 
wrong to drop these categories on the basis of the opinions of other instructors. It 
became clear that asking instructors to comment upon the overall categorisation was not 
a valid activity in itself, and so this process was restricted to a few SMEs who were 
closely involved with the project and who had a good understanding of the aims, the 
process, and the data.
Participation rate check
Butterfield et al (2005) suggest checking the validity of incidents by establishing the 
proportion of participants who cited such incidents (at the first level of coding). A 
participant rate of 25% is suggested as valid. This assumes that unless a critical incident 
is put forward by a reasonable number of participants, it is not of value. However it is 
clear that this would depend on the specificity of coding. Incidents coded ‘generally’ 
would have less chance of possessing low participant rates. Since the present study used 
very narrow coding at the first level, this check risked losing important data. The check 
was therefore only used on the top-level categories. Despite this there remained a large 
number of positive categories that had very low participation rates (see Table 9.2). This 
could have been partly due to the lower number of positive incidents than negative 
incidents in each interview. Every category with a participation rate of less than 25% 
was scrutinised by the investigator and two subject matter experts. It was determined 
that the only category that could be justifiably dropped was ‘unusual glider type’. This 
had the lowest of all participation rates, with only one critical incident. All other 
categories were deemed to valid by the SME group, albeit with low participation rates.
Interview fidelity
In order to ensure the proper rigour was being upheld in the interview process, an 
interview fidelity check was employed. A random sample of interviews (recordings) 
was listened to by an experienced researcher. The individual was a chartered 
psychologist with a PhD in applied psychology, extensive interviewing and qualitative 
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research experience in aviation psychology, but was not linked to the project in any 
way. The researcher particularly checked that the interview technique was being upheld 
to the schedule and that participants were not being led in any way. No problems were 
highlighted in any interview.
172
Results
Firstly, the results from the ‘meaning analysis’ of critical incidents will be reported, 
secondly those from the flight phase analysis of critical incidents, and thirdly there is a 
short numerical comparison of these two sets of analyses.
Data
Forty-four instructors were interviewed. The mean total experience was 2,431 hours 
(SD = 2333 hours) although most instructors gave approximate estimates of experience. 
All participants held a British Gliding Association assistant or full rating, two were 
regional examiners and three were current professional instructors. Overall, the sample 
represented eight UK gliding clubs, including three ridge sites, two coastal sites, one 
mountain site, three clubs based on former military airports, two very large UK clubs 
and two very small clubs. Within this there were a variety of glider types, operations, 
airspace restrictions and traffic densities. Interview duration ranged from 14 minutes to 
95 minutes. 
Final Taxonomy of incident themes
There were 659 critical incidents after coding was complete. The final three-level 
taxonomy consisted of 23 top level categories (12 positive and 11 negative), 52 mid-
level categories (24 positive and 28 negative) and 169 low level categories (61 positive 
and 108 negative). 
Top level categories are listed with incident counts and percentages in Table 9.2. The 
mid level structure feeding into these is shown in Figure 9.2 (for negative incidents), 
and Figure 9.3 for positive ones. A full list of bottom level categories, numbered for 
identification across all levels is shown in Appendices O and P.
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Table 9.2. Top level categories. The ‘Ref’ column contains the category reference. 
Column ‘n’ gives the total number of critical incidents under each category, and 
column ‘%-n’ gives this figure as a percentage of either all negative incidents (432) 
or all positive incidents (277). Column ‘pr’ gives the number of participants who 
gave at least one critical incident in that category and ‘%-pr’ gives this figure as a 
percentage of all 44 interviewees. These latter figures represent the participation 
rate of each category.

















e) N 1 In-flight attention 28 6.5 18 41
N 2 Behind the glider 10 2.3 7 16
N 3 Handling and control 85 19.7 35 80
N 4 Situation – Instructor disharmony 10 2.3 9 20
N 5 Decision / Strategy 30 6.9 18 41
N 6 Airspeed control 51 11.8 25 57
N 7 Indirect issues 44 10.2 24 55
N 8 Consistency 13 3 9 20
N 9 Airmanship 15 3.5 14 32
N10 Not Coping 33 7.6 19 43
















P 1 In-flight Attention 6 2.6 3 7
P 2 Instant Reactions 3 1.3 3 7
P 3 Handling and Control 25 11 17 39
P 4 Situation-Instructor' harmony 31 13.7 15 34
P 5 Decisions 3 1.3 3 7
P 6 Airspeed control 8 3.5 6 14
P 7 Indirect issues 29 12.8 18 41
P 8 Consistency 9 4 6 14
P 9 Airmanship 4 1.8 4 9
P10 Dealing Well With a Simulated Situation / Emergency 27 11.9 12 27
P11 Judgement and Positioning 29 12.8 15 34
P12 Overall non-specific 53 23.3 21 48
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Figure 9.2. Top and mid-level categorisation of negative critical incidents
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Figure 9.3. Top and mid-level categorisation of positive critical incidents
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Top level categories
The most fundamental finding was the extent to which polarised pairs of top-level 
categories emerged. All top level negative categories had matching parallel positive top-
level categories. Any standardisation of labelling between the category pairs was 
undertaken with advice from subject matter experts. The top-level category ‘overall 
non-specific’ was not able to be paired in this way.
Category Explanations
N1 and P1: ‘In flight attention’: These included all incidents where some form of 
attention was apparent as the primary factor during flight (as opposed to on the ground). 
This could be in the form of a control slip or attending to the wrong task (as perceived 
by the instructor), distributing attention improperly between tasks, or not being aware of 
all the aspects of the situation. For this reason, comments using the term “situational 
awareness” were grouped here. ‘Situation awareness’ can be simply defined as 
“knowing what is going on around you” (Endsley & Garland 2000) and hence expresses 
the same general concept as the other comments grouped into this category (positive or 
negative).
Examples:
 “oblivious to the fact that we were in crashing sink all the way down the 
downwind leg” (N1.1.7)
 “I asked him several questions like ‘where’s the airfield now?’ and without 
turning his head he said ‘it’s directly behind me’,  ‘it’s under the wing’, so he 
was spatially aware without actually physically saying ‘well it’s over there 
somewhere’ (P1.1.1)
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N2 ‘behind the aircraft’: This was a commonly expressed idea that related to 
instructors’ perceptions that the student was not reacting promptly, or waited too long 
before taking action. Terms such as “behind the aircraft” were common.
Examples:
 “They’re sort of reactive. They reacted to things, rather than actually be in 
charge... reacted when things started to go wrong. You would say he was behind 
the aeroplane.... As an instructor, you know that because you want the stick to 
move well before it does, and you feel that everything happens after you want it 
to.” (N2.1.1
 “They did not react at the rate that I would have wanted them to react” (N2.1.2)
P2: Instant reactions:  This was related to specific, discrete incidents where the 
student was said to react quickly and properly (commonly to sinking air).
Examples:
 “Instant reaction to the sink that you get over the Tring road... flying along and 
there’s this sshhhoo the nose goes down, turns in.. Just the reaction and the erm, 
the response to the unusual, that’s very good.” (P2.1.1)
 “I’d asked the tug pilot to wave me off at 1800ft and he didn’t hesitate, you 
know, tug come up to 1800ft, waggled it’s wings and he [gesture of pulling the 
release], ‘...what was all that all about?’, so he reacted accordingly” (P2.1.3)
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N3 and P3: Handling and control: These categories contained all incidents that 
described aspects of glider control and handling, except those explicitly related to 
airspeed. These include the handling of specific tasks (e.g. launch rotation, ground run), 
general handling of the glider (e.g. control co-ordination), handling of specific flight 
phases (e.g. the final turn), and the use of controls such as airbrakes and wheel brakes. 
N3 was the largest of all categories, containing numerous sub categories and low level 
categories.
Examples:
 “pulled back on the stick to the back stop... not in a sharp stabbing motion... in a 
deceptively smooth consistent one.. rapidly accelerated into a very high G 
situation which I couldn’t, I could barely recover from...An over steep launch” 
(N3.3.6)
 “Not allowing the aircraft to fly itself... moving the controls, and all the aircraft 
is doing is creating drag. Now that is poor technique” (N 3.1.8)
 “not snatching at the controls, not kind of jerking, don’t know how else you can 
define ‘smooth’”, (P3.1.1)
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N4: Situation – Instructor disharmony:
This included critical incidents where the participant described feelings of negativity 
(e.g. discomfort, unhappiness, uneasiness) towards the situation or the pilot’s actions, or 
having to intervene as a result (prompting, taking control etc). Specific descriptions of 
what the student did (such as misjudging or mishandling) were not included here, since 
these were prioritised into specific categories. 
Examples:
 “your gut feeling is saying you’re uncomfortable about them, so you may 
modify your overall evaluation on that”(N4.1.1)
 “You know that feeling where you just want to take over all the way round, but 
you don’t. It was like that, it never really felt right” (N 4.2.3)
P4 Situation - Instructor Harmony
The opposite to N4, this includes incidents where instructors had expressed the feeling 
that the situation (including the flying of the student) was close to (or at) what they felt 
comfortable with. This category was much larger than its negative pairing (N4), in both 
real and relative terms (n = 30, representing 14% of positive incidents). 
Examples:
 “He did everything when I would have done it.. it’s when the stick moves as if 
you were flying, and you know he flies like you would do. That’s what this guy 
was like” (P4.2.1)
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 “the experience of sitting in the back and feeling sort of useless, redundant, is 
the best way I can put it... You sort of get the feeling that you are superfluous to 
requirement” (P4.2.2)
N5 Decisions / Strategy:
This category was used where it could be determined that the decision-making or 
strategy in use was being referred to. Poor decisions and decision uncertainty were 
included. A very large group of these incidents formed mid-level category called ‘Poor 
strategy after simulated launch failure’. This is recognised as a critical decision making 
situation, because in a matter of seconds the pilot must decide between landing ahead 
and turning the glider, both of which demand other quick choices to be made 
subsequently.
Examples:
 “then the decision making, and you know, dealing with that was just not good...  
I think also the decisions being made that weren’t necessarily the best or the 
right ones... the decision making wasn’t as good as it should have been” 
(N5.1.1)




This category was very small, containing only three comments, each where good 
decision making was mentioned in a general sense, rather than as a specific instance.
Example:
 “He did the cable breaks, and yeah they were ok, yeah good, decisions...  That’s 
actually quite challenging here as you know” (P5.1.1)
N6 and P6 Airspeed Control:
Comments relating to airspeed control were coded here. These incidents were kept 
separate (i.e. from those of ‘handling and control’) because a large number of 
participants referred to airspeed control quite specifically and separately. Although 
inaccurate airspeed can be the result of poor handling, it can also be caused by other 
factors such as prioritisation of pilots’ attention on a tracking task (Padfield et al 1998). 
Maintaining a separate category therefore avoided inappropriate inferences on the part 
of the raters. It is noteworthy that category N6 had a high participation rate.
Examples:
 “I mentioned low speed on the winch launch (SJ: What speed?) 50ish... well 
certainly going up the, the steep bit of it. I think the entry wasn’t too bad and 
then as we went up into the steep part of the climb the speed was dropping off...” 
(N6.1.6)
 “until the final turn... suddenly the speed is up round the clock and we’re 
coming in like a bat out of hell, sort of 70 or 80 knots” (N6.3.1)
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N7 and P7 Indirect issues:
Critical incidents relating to issues not directly relating to flying the glider were coded 
here. These included issues such as the quality of pre-flight checks, trainee self 
assessment and personal state, and pressures encountered to send a student solo (such as 
the fact that he or she was ‘overdue’ to go). 
Examples:
 “Worst thing, he was indignant about the whole thing. He said he’d done what I 
told him to [after the first flight] and it hadn’t worked... bad attitude” (N7.3.1)
 “He was incredibly tense both physically and mentally, With Peter you push the 
stick and it was held in his iron grip. You’d also see the shoulders, you know, so 
there’s physical tension which was a kind of reflection of his mental tension” 
(N7.3.4)
N8 and P8 Consistency:
These comments referred to repeated performance (or the inability to repeat 
performance). Although forming only small categories (in both the positive and 
negative sense), the concept of ‘consistency’ was specifically emphasised as being very 
important by a number of participants when making their decisions. 
Examples:
 “from time to time he’d fly several perfect circuits, and then he’d get one 
completely wrong...so there wasn’t the consistency” (N8.1.1)
 “She was consistently good on the day.. it’s all about consistency” (P8.1.1)
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N9 and P9 Airmanship:
A number of instructors specifically used the term ‘airmanship’, usually in the context 
of lookout or actions concerning other gliders. Although many authors use the term 
airmanship, few attempt to explain what it is (see Thom 1997, Campbell & Bagshaw 
2002, Green et al 1991). Pooley (2003) explains airmanship as encompassing “all 
aspects of safety such as awareness, rules and regulations and matters which 
differentiate the ‘good pilot’ from the ‘bad pilot’”. This is similar to a definition by Pratt 
(1994) which deems it to be “the quality that differentiates a pilot from an aeroplane 
driver”. These definitions appear to suggest that airmanship is not concerned with 
technical flying skills, but other necessary elements of knowledge and awareness. 
Several popular UK general aviation text books (Thom 1997, Pooley 2003) are 
composed of sections for flying exercises, most of which include sub-sections entitled 
‘Airmanship’. A common feature in all such sub-sections is the emphasis on ‘lookout’, 
and “good visual awareness of other aircraft”. Hence airmanship appears to be a 
popularly used term in aviation, often used in relation to keeping good lookout and 
avoiding others. This is how it was interpreted for the present study.
Comments relating to lookout or specifically using the term ‘airmanship’ were 
categorised as ‘airmanship’.
Examples:
 “his lookout... lookout on a ridge is particularly important, airmanship I should 
say airmanship rather than lookout, his airmanship was particularly good” 
(P9.1.2)
 “because their lookout was so aw’, non-existent actually! I started counting and 
got to over thirty before he moved  his head” (N9.1.3)
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N10 Not coping:
Comments that a student ‘did not cope’ or ‘could not deal with’ the situation were often 
related to simulated emergencies or unusual situations. This category did not include 
those comments regarding the technical symptoms (e.g. poor handling co ordination or 
inaccurate speed control), but only comments regarding the instructors perception or 
whether the student failed to managed the situation. Specific descriptions of symptoms 
were categorised here such as “he froze on the controls”, as well as general comments 
such as “..about coping with pressure, he hadn’t got it”. Instructors’ perception about 
students’ ability to manage emergency situations in the future was also included. 
Another set of comments related to students’ inability to manage workload or multiple 
tasks.
Examples:
 “He just didn’t demonstrate his ability to cope with more than one or two things 
happening at once” (N10.1.1)
 “he’s not going to cope with something going wrong, or something changing, 
you know a situation, like other traffic, or a patch of sink in the wrong place” 
(N10.1.3)
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P10 Dealing Well With a Simulated Situation / Emergency:
Many critical incidents cited examples of students dealing well with unusual or 
‘emergency’ situations, such as simulated or real launch failures, or the instructor 
engineering a challenging circuit. This category was not concerned with technicalities 
such as accurate speed control (as these were categorised elsewhere) but more with 
general comments about the way the students dealt with the pressure or the limited time 
available. Hence this category was similar (in an opposite sense) to N10, although it 
only related to emergency situations, simply because that was what the data provided.
Examples:
 “I threw the book at this bloke... he coped, difficult cable breaks, actually a very 
gradual power failure...  he just ripped through it all” (P 10.1.1)
 “simulated cable break, and they’ve done that, it’s not what they’ve been used 
to but it hasn’t phased them, they’ve sorted it.” (P 10.1.7)
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N11 and P11 Judgement and Positioning
It was sometimes not possible to reliably separate comments about judgement in the 
circuit from those concerning circuit positioning (often called ‘circuit planning’ by 
glider pilots), since positioning may be based on more than simply judgement (e.g. 
extrapolation of height loss, knowledge of the wind conditions etc). The method of 
flying circuits is a critical skill in gliding, and not simply about judgement. Because of 
this, the category was called ‘Judgement and Positioning’ as opposed to simply 
‘judgement’, in order to reflect comments about glider positioning where it was not 
possible to isolate judgement elements from other complex cognitive skills. 
Notwithstanding this, the categories N11 and P11 contained all judgement related 
comments, not just those applicable to circuit flying. Because there were no positive 
comments about round-out judgement (landing), only N11 consisted of two 
intermediate categories to divide circuit and landing comments. All comments relating 
to glider positioning were found to relate to the circuit.
Note: N11.2 contained comments about misjudgement of the round-out. These were 
concerned with rounding out too early, too late, too far or close to the ground. Handling 
issues in the round-out and issues of technique (such as ballooning after closing the 
brakes or snatching at the control column) were coded into category N3 (Handling and 
control).
Examples:
 “a problem with circuit judgement I think really... just couldn’t seem to judge 
the circuit properly...a mixture of too tight, too far out” (N11.1.7)
 “able to plan a good circuit and keep it just right” (P11.1.2)
 Didn’t have the judgement to hold off.. flying it into the ground .. generally the 
actual visual judgement wasn’t good enough
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P12 Overall non-specific
A large numbers of critical incidents (on the positive side only) concerned students 
doing ‘everything’ right, or doing ‘nothing wrong’. This was different to ‘consistency’, 
which was about students doing one thing right every time (or not). Similarly, 
comments were also made that summed up whole sessions (or flights), which did not 
occur in the same way on the negative side.  Therefore category P12 was formed in 
order to cater for comments that were made about the overall flights or sessions in a 
general sense, without referring to any specific phase, element, issue etc. All such 
comments were positive.
Examples:
 “the whole performance is usually, they’re on top of” (P 12.1.4)
 “He did everything right. That’s all I can say really. There was nothing wrong 
with his flying” (P 12.2.1)
 “I couldn’t find a reason not to send him solo, on the day... “
 “It’s no mistakes really. It’s more like what I don’t see, and if I don’t see 
anything wrong then that’s what indicates to me that they are ready. [SJ: And in 
this case, the guy you were thinking of?]. Yeah yeah, that’s like it, I didn’t see 
any mistakes” (P12.4.2)
 “they’ve got a little bit of spare capacity, to look around, you know. Asked him 
‘where’s the airfield ?’, ‘it’s behind us on the left’, you know so enough spare 
thoughts over and above and that’s what I’m looking at, and this guy, in 
particular, was actually very very good...    [they were in control of the 
aeroplane]” (P12.5.1)
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Comparison of relative critical incident frequencies by category
(Figure 9.4) shows the percentage of negative critical incidents in each top level 
category, and the percentage of positive critical incidents in each. Using a percentage 
breakdown over categories enables direct comparison of positive and negative pairs in 
terms of their representation relative to other positive or negative categories. The 
percentage and total figures are shown in Table 9.2.
Figure 9.4. Percentage of positive critical incidents in each top-level category 
alongside the percentage of negative critical incidents in each. 
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When the 59 human-factor causal accident categories from chapter six (Table 6.1) were 
matched to the 23 CIT categories, six negative categories accounted for all of them. 
These categories were N1, N3, N5, N6, N9 and N11. These (along with their positive 
pairing) are placed on the left-hand side of Figure 9.4). The reason that only negative 
categories were used was because the causal categories were descriptions of accident 
causes. The issues themselves were equally relevant to the positive pairings of these six 
negative categories (since they describe the same issues, just with a different instructor 
decision outcome). These six negative categories and their positive counterparts were 
termed ‘causal-factor’ critical incident categories, because they described the same 
phenomena as causal accident events. 
Table 9.3 shows how the four top-level categories established from accident analysis 
(chapter 6) map onto the six applicable pairs from the CIT analysis, along with the 
equivalent percentages of accidents and critical incidents. Airspeed issues were coded 
under the overall heading ‘handling’ in the accident analysis, whereas this was not the 
case for the CIT data. Hence, N6 (airspeed control) as well as N3 (handling and control) 
were required to account for all the low level accident codes within the overall 
‘handling’ category from the accident analysis. The same was true of the attention 
category from accident data and the CIT categories of N1 (In-flight attention) and N9 
(Airmanship). This is shown in Table 9.3.
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Table 9.3. The ‘causal factor’ critical incident categories against the four top-level 
accident causal factor categories from chapter six.
Four main categories 

















H. Handling 25 32.1





S. Strategy 26 0.0 N/P5 Decisions 33 8.3
A. Attention 25 14.3
N/P1 and N/P9. 'In-
Flight Attention' and 
'Airmanship'
53 13.4
The six ‘causal factor’ pairs (12 categories) accounted for 397 critical incidents (60% of 
the total), see Table 9.4. This implies that 60% of critical incidents reported by 
instructors as being influential in the ‘solo-decision’ process were descriptions of the 
same events found to cause accidents to UK glider pilots. 
Figure 9.4 shows that the six causal-factor category pairs are all characterised by high 
percentages of negative incidents, rather than positive ones. The remaining categories 
(on the right of the graph) are all characterised by higher percentages of positive 
comments (reasons why pilots were sent solo), with only one minor exception. In total 
322 (81%) of these causal factor critical incidents were negative (led to solo flight being 
disallowed) and only 75 (19%) positive (led to solo flights). In terms of raw incident 
numbers, this dichotomy is statistically significant to a very high level of confidence 
(see Table 9.4).
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Chi-square analysis showed that there was a highly significant difference in terms of 
critical incident numbers in ‘causal-factor’ categories between positive and negative 
groups (χ2 = 107, df=1, p < 0.001, see Table 9.4).This showed that a significant 
difference existed between positive and negative incidents, and that negative incidents 
were significantly more likely to be associated with the causal factor categories.
Table 9.4. Total number of positive critical incidents belonging to the six ‘causal-
factor’ categories, against the number of negative critical incidents in those 
categories. Data used for chi-square analysis.
Total number of incidents in all 
six 
‘Causal-factor categories’
(P/N 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 & 11)
Total number of incidents in 
all 
other  categories
(N/P 2, 4, 7, 8, 10 & 12)





Each of the 659 critical incidents was coded by the flight phase they related to, requiring 
some adjustments to the original template (Jarvis and Harris 2008) including the 
removal of several fine-grained phases which were unused. No such phases were 
associated with accident causes for low-hours pilots from 2002 - 2006 inclusive (Table 
5.9, Chapter 5). Table 9.5 shows the totals.
192









1 pre-flight         10          2           8
2. Launch
2 Launch (non-specific) 9 4 5
2c Launch (Rotation) 6 0 6
2d Launch (established climb) 9 46 0 7 9 39
2e Launch (Aero-tow cruise) 6 0 6
2f Launch (release) 3 1 2




3a General (general flying) 26 3 23
3d General (ridge) 4 37 2 12 2 25





4a Circuit (join) 6 0 6
4b Circuit 156 208 31 32 125 176
4c Circuit (abbreviated c/b) 28 1 27
4d Circuit (final turn) 18 0 18
5. A
pproach
5a approach 13 2 11
5b approach (post launch failure) 7 20 0 2 7 18
6. Landing
6a Landing 54 12 42




7a Non-Specific 267 149 118
7b Un-specified launch failure 16 283 11 160 5   123
TOTALS 659 227 432
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Table 9.5 shows that 283 incidents were not sufficiently ‘specific’ to be coded by flight 
phase (section ‘7’ - ‘non-specific’). Unless the reasons given by instructors for their 
decisions were sufficiently specific to establish which flight phase they related to, they 
could not be coded into the six flight main phases. Prompts from the interviewer helped 
to ensure that the phase was elicited, but numerous critical incidents were still of this 
more ‘general’ nature. For example, many referred to overall aspects of pilot 
performance, or non-flying cues picked up from the student, for example;
“I just felt like he was reacting to the aircraft…. Everything he did 
just seemed late” (coded as N2)
“General mannerisms about the guy. When you can talk to a guy... 
and you know just by talking to him ‘this guy is switched on’ and 
he’s not going to be a problem... he’s going to do the business.” 
(coded as P7)
Reliability tests showed that such incidents could be consistently recognised (see 
method section and Appendix Q). 
This had wider relevance to the overall analysis. All incidents could be broken into two 
types; specific (able to be recognised as relating to a specific element of the flight, and 
hence able to be coded by flight phase) and non-specific (too general to attribute to a 
particular flight element). ‘Specific’ incidents could be coded into flight phases because 
they usually described events, or symptoms of events. However, instructors’ 
observations of overall behaviour, performance, attitudes and even their own feelings 
had to deemed ‘non-specific’. Hence the flight phase analysis indicated a more far 
reaching dichotomy within the data set, which proved to be useful in explaining other 
results. 
The only other subsequent issue relating to this was a subset of incidents termed ‘launch 
failures in general’. These occurred when instructors commented about ‘launch failures’ 
without referring to a specific phase within that failure, for example:
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“I did, awkward straight ahead [simulated cable break]... Coped perfectly, 
flying perfect. Also it had been a complete surprise, I’d talked about 
doing circuits with him etc”
Hence these were unable to be categorised by a flight phase and were deemed ‘non-
specific’. For readability, all the non-specific critical incidents are henceforth referred to 
as belonging to a ‘non-specific’ category; flight phase category 7, even though they do 
not really form part of the flight phase analysis.
Only 376 out of 659 critical incidents (57%) were of a sufficiently specific nature to 
allow categorising by flight phase. Notably however, whereas 309 out of 432 (72%) 
negative critical incidents were specific in nature, only 67 out of 227 positive comments 
were (just under 30%).
Table 9.6. Total number of positive and negative critical incidents coded as specific 
flight phases and non-specific flight phase. Data used for chi-square analysis.
Total number of incidents coded 
into 
Specific flight phase categories
(Flight Phase 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)








The data in Table 9.6 was subject to a Pearson’s chi-square test of association, resulting 
in a chi-square of 107.2 (df = 1, p<0.001). This showed that negative incidents were 
significantly more likely to be ‘specific’, and positive incidents were likely to be 
associated with general comment.
Because similar results had also been obtained for the six pairs of causal-factor critical 
incident categories, a Cohen’s Kappa test of agreement was conducted between 
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incidents that could and could not be coded into flight phases (specific and non-specific) 
and those that were and were not coded as causal factors (i.e. categories N/P 1, 3, 5, 6, 
9, 11). The data are presented in Table 9.7. The result was a Kappa of 0.59 (a ‘fair’ level 
of agreement [Robson 2002], although very close to the ‘good’ bracket). This showed 
that the critical incidents that were able to be coded by flight phase also tended to be 
coded as ‘causal-factors’ (categories N/P 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11), and ‘non-specific’ critical 
incidents tended to be those that were not ‘causal factors’. This meant a high level of 
association between critical incidents coded as ‘specific’ (flight phase) and those coded 
as a causal accident factors (from the CIT ‘meaning’ analysis).
Table 9.7. Total number of causal-factor and non-causal factor critical incidents 






ALL ‘Causal Factor’ Incidents (N/P 
1,3,5,6,9,11)
321 76




Comparisons of flight phase analysis with findings from accident data.
For comparison of figures with previous flight phase analysis, critical incidents in the 
non-specific category were dropped. This left 376 critical incidents which were specific 
to particular flight phases (67 positive and 309 negative).
Comparison was conducted using relative frequencies (percentages). The percentage of 
accident causal events occurring to pilots with 10 hours or fewer in each main flight 
phase was used for comparison, from Jarvis and Harris (2008). Figure 9.5 shows these 
compared against the percentage of critical incidents coded into each main flight phase. 
196
Figure 9.5. Percentage of critical incidents across the six main top-level flight 
phases compared to the percentage of accidents to pilots with 10 hours experience 
or fewer, split by the same six top level phases (as percentages).
Figure 9.5 shows that apart from ‘pre-flight’ the approach phase was the least 
commonly mentioned as influencing the solo decision process. The circuit was a feature 
of well over half of all ‘specific’ critical incidents, and over a third of all critical 
incidents. However the circuit was associated with the causes of very few accidents 
according to the data from Jarvis and Harris (2008).
In order to compare the present flight phase data with the data from chapter eight 
pertaining to instructor perception of accident likelihood, the flight phases were ranked 
by the total number of critical incidents that involved them. Figure 9.6 shows the ranked 
data against the instructor perceptions of the flight phases most likely to be associated 
with the causes of accidents for inexperienced pilots. ‘Objective’ rankings are also 
shown (from accident analysis, see chapter 5) using broken lines.
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Figure 9.6. Ranked flight phase data (from critical incident numbers) against 
instructor perceptions of accident cause by flight phase for early-solo pilots (from 
chapter 8). Broken-lined bars represent the flight phase ranking from accident 
data (‘objective ranking’).
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Numerical comparison of causal factors by flight phase results.
Table 9.8. Numbers of flight phase critical incidents split by causal factors
Flight phases












s Judgement & 
Positioning 114 23
Handling and Control 




"airmanship") 1 15 16
In order to compare the results of the two analyses, flight phases were split by critical 
incidents fitting into one of the four causal factor categories from chapter 6. This was 
done to identify whether any particular causal elements dominate instructors’ 
observations in specific flight phases, and enable further comparison with previous 
findings.  Comments relating to the launch almost exclusively relate to handling and 
control. Circuit flying was dominated by judgement and positioning issues, and landing 
issues split evenly between judgement and handling. When referring to approach 
incidents, instructors predominantly mention issues of decision making and strategy.




This section has two parts, one relating to each of the general research questions:
1. What factors do gliding instructors identify as being satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory performance in students, in terms of allowing them to fly solo? 
This discussion draws mainly on the CIT ‘meaning’ analysis.
2. How do these findings compare to previous findings from accident data (in 
terms of areas of concern)? This is a discussion draws mainly of the flight phase 
analysis.
Some factors apply more generally and are therefore discussed across both sections. 
Section one explores the decisions made by instructors regarding solo flight, and 
attempts to model the decision process within the limitations of the data. This relies 
heavily on the findings from the ‘emergent’ CIT analysis.  The second section explores 
how the findings relate to the sorts of accidents that glider pilots have been shown to 
sustain after they have recently been sent solo. This relies predominantly on the analysis 
of ‘specific’ incidents; i.e. those coded by a flight phase.
Section 1 - Instructor decision ‘modelling’
This section will assess the findings of the critical incident ‘meaning’ analysis, and 
build an initial model of the decision attributes (Figure 9.8). The negative outcome 
(disallowing solo) will be treated first. The positive outcome will be explored 
subsequently (allowing solo) and the model presented lastly.
The model was based on evidence from the analysis and supported by ongoing SME 
discussion throughout the process to help with validation. It does not attempt to model 
the dynamics of the decision, only those attributes where some evidence was available. 
It is stressed that the model is hypothetical, and brings together the findings from the 
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data as opposed to being put forward as a decision algorithm for which more research 
would be required. Further study would also be required to validate the model in a 
naturalistic setting. The manner in which many of the components of the model were 
put together is described concurrently throughout the discussion. The ‘top half’ of the 
model is presented first (negative outcome - disallowing solo flight) and a full diagram 
of the model, overview and explanation is at the end of this section.
Three key overall findings are fundamental to the discussion. Firstly, the finding that 22 
of the 23 top-level categories could be matched into pairs of one positive and one 
negative category. Secondly, that when placed against the causal features of gliding 
accidents (from chapter 6) six of those pairs could be easily accounted for. Lastly, that 
the incidents comprising those six pairs accounted for 75% of negative incidents but 
only 30% of positive ones. This gives the rationale for splitting this section into two 
parts; ‘disallow solo flight’ and ‘allow solo flight’.
The pairing of categories is less surprising when one considers that the nature of the 
decision is a dichotomy, either the pilot goes solo, or not. Against this background it 
would perhaps be more remarkable if such dichotomies did not emerge. Each of the 11 
pairs is clearly of this nature, i.e. one member of the pair is the compliment of the other 
in terms of the decision process. About half the pairs are dominated by negative 
incidents and half by positive incidents.
Most causal accident factors from the findings of Chapter six were accounted for within 
those pairs that were dominated by negative outcomes. Again, this does not appear to be 
surprising. Most critical incidents within these six pairs were also independently coded 
as being ‘specific’ in nature, meaning sufficiently specific to code into one of six flight 
phases. These critical incidents took the form of clear and often discrete events 
occurring during ‘assessment’ flights. Positive incidents were predominantly unable to 
be coded in this way. Therefore, in contrast to the reasons given against solo flight 
(negative), the reasons given for sending a pilot solo were mainly of a non-specific 
nature. Overall this suggests that the decision outcome to prevent a pilot from going 
solo is not simply the compliment of the process used to allow solo flight.
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Disallowing solo flight
As previously discussed, many aviation textbooks make reference to the standards 
needed in specific performance areas, e.g. “The usual standards apply to your take off, 
circuit and landing” (Thom 1997), and “the student would have perfected their landing 
technique” (Pooley 2003). This suggests that an important aspect in an instructor’s 
decision is whether the student is technically proficient in certain important areas of 
flight. In the present research the ‘important’ areas would include those with the most 
potential to cause an accident (i.e. the judgement and handling of the approach and 
landing). This section will describe the first part of the decision model (Figure 9.7).
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Figure 9.7. The decision model (intermediate stage) representing the non-
compensatory decision process. As well as representing causal accident factors, the 
six areas (N/P 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, & 11) are all specific and observable as being within 
certain flight phases (as demonstrated). If no causal factors are observed (left side 
of model, in green) then the student may still go solo (the decision is still open).  
However sufficiently poor performance in one of these areas (sufficient to report as 
a critical incident) normally leads to the decision not to allow solo flight, in a non-
compensatory way (right-hand side of the model, red lines). The only ‘mitigation’ 
that can compensate for such an event is demonstrated by category P7.2, which 
can keep the decision ‘open’ despite a causal incident having occurred.
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The statistically significant result that most ‘causal factor’ critical incidents were 
negative (no solo) and most other incidents were positive (see Table 9.4) has possible 
implications for the process by which instructors weigh these types of evidence. 
Whereas instructors commonly pointed to the presence of one or two specific and 
observable events (termed ‘causal accident factors’) as reasons for disallowing solo 
flight, few mentioned any specific causal events (or absence of them) as reasons to 
allow solo flight. This indicates the possible existence of a simple ‘discounting’ type of 
decision model whereby the student cannot prove s/he is ready for solo, only disprove it 
by doing things wrongly. This would be a non-compensatory process since good 
performance could not compensate for bad. Category P12 (‘overall non-specific’) 
contains two subcategories that indicate this process from the positive incidents. These 
are called “everything right” (P12.2) and “nothing wrong” (P12.4). These are comments 
in which instructors explain that they did not see any errors, unsafe events or 
performance problems, and this contributed to them sending the student solo. P12.2 and 
P12.4 are clearly important categories because they contain 33 critical incidents in total 
(having two of the largest of all 62 low level positive categories). They are also further 
supported by similar ideas expressed through incidents in category P4 (situation-
instructor harmony) such as ‘Instructor not having to do or say anything’ (P4.2.4) and 
‘Instructor was not worried / uncomfortable / uneasy etc’ (P4.2.5). 
This suggests a process by which instructors’ base their decisions on whether or not 
they have seen something which could potentially cause an accident. An example of a 
common type of comment to support this would be:
“there is nothing that’s actually dangerous, you know, so off you go” (P12.4)
From the CIT data, it is clear that such ‘causal factor incidents’ occur during many 
instructional flights, any of which could prevent solo flight being allowed by the 
instructor. There is strong evidence (from category P12) that pilots are sent solo only if 
no such incidents occur (and hence not sent solo if any occur). This suggests that for 
many instructors the occurrence of one such ‘causal incident’ is sufficient to prevent 
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solo flight, and cannot be compensated for by the student doing well in other areas. No 
positive comments put across the idea that problem events could be ‘forgiven’ in the 
light of high performance in other areas. There is therefore no evidence that poor 
performance in some areas can be compensated for by good performance in others, and 
there is strong evidence (from the ‘causal factor’ incidents and from category P12 
supported by P4) that no such compensation takes place, at least with regards to specific 
incident occurrences (potential accident causes, see table 9.7).
Such a process indicates a ‘non-compensatory’ method of combining attributes in the 
‘solo decision’ process, in line with Ikomi and Guion (2000). The decision attributes 
that feed into the eventual judgement are represented by the six negative ‘causal factor’ 
incident categories (N1, N3, N5, N6, N9, N11). The findings of Ikomi and Guion 
(2000) showed consistent evidence that instructors ruled out solo flight if a student 
attained a score of less than three out of five on any manoeuvre in the syllabus. This 
implies that the non-compensatory rules were combined with a cut-off level on each 
attribute which might indicate the possibility of satisficing (because these ‘cut-offs’ 
could indicate aspiration levels). This may be what Thom refers to as “the usual 
standards... in take-off, circuit and landing” (Thom 1997). This would suggest a 
conjunctive form of non-compensatory decision model. This is where the decision 
maker sets certain cut-off points on various decision attributes and no attribute falling 
below the cut-off is viable (Hogarth 1987). However because critical incidents were 
collected rather than numerical scores, such process detail cannot be verified by the 
present study. A conjunctive non-compensatory model would imply that students do not 
have to be perfect, simply good enough (satisfactory) in all areas. Some critical 
incidents were coded under the heading ‘despite problems’ (P 12.3.1), meaning that the 
instructor sent the person solo whilst recognising that some aspects were not perfect, 
e.g. “there are some problems there but they’re not major...”. This would indicate that 
a ‘cut-off’ point could exist, as opposed to the decision being compensatory, since no 
attempt is made to justify poor performance in one area with good performance in 
another. There were no comments indicating that compensatory methods existed within 
the six causal factor areas. Since all ‘causal factor’ critical incidents indicated a 
contribution to the decision process, it is assumed that the mention of the incident by the 
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participant meant that a satisfactory level had been achieved (for positive incidents) or 
not (for negative ones).
Although the analysis appears to show that causal accident factors cannot be 
compensated for, one possible compensatory element was found. It was in line with 
guidance that to fly a glider solo, a pilot should “be aware of his limitations” (Piggott 
1997). Some critical incidents showed that when the instructor perceived that the
student knew what they had done wrong, this compensated for the mistake itself (e.g. by 
correctly assessing poor performance in a de-briefing). Category P7.2 contained a 
suitably large number of examples demonstrating this effect, including:
“we had a discussion about erm final turn heights and approach... the minute I 
started talking about it ... they pretty much said to me what I was going to say 
to... they said: “yeah I know” and then they pretty much said.. So it was this 
thing about: if you know what you’re doing wrong then you’re safe. So they’d 
known almost immediately what had gone wrong”
“...It wasn’t something they’d done on their first flights, so it wasn’t a 
trend...ok, you know what you did wrong there, I don’t think you’ll” [do that 
again]
This demonstrates the advantage of using an exploratory technique, since such a 
decision attribute could not have been uncovered using pre-determined dimensions such 
as used by Ikomi and Guion (2000). 
Figure 9.7 summarises the findings of the decision process so far. Enough evidence is 
available to establish that six specific (and observable) areas relating to known accident 
causes are used as decision attributes by instructors (particularly with regard to 
preventing solo flight). Further evidence from positive categories (P12 and P4) in 
combination with previous research findings (Ikomi & Guion 2000), strongly suggests 
that non-compensatory combining rules are used by instructors. It is also possible that 
cut-off levels (or aspirational levels) operate as part of this process. Additionally, there 
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is evidence of a separate process by which problematic events can occasionally be 
compensated for.  This is a process in which instructors allow student knowledge and 
acceptance of the problem event to compensate for the event itself, and hence allow solo 
flight. There is no suggestion that this happens regularly. More research would be 
required to establish the extent to which this occurs.
Allowing solo flight
The process so far described, accounts for the vast majority of negative critical incidents 
(75%) and all major ‘negative’ type categories. 
The process does not account for the categories that were most representative of the 
positive critical incidents (i.e. why solo flight was allowed). It has already been 
established (from the flight phase template analysis as well as the causal factor 
breakdown) that positive critical incidents were heavily characterised by their non-
specific nature (see Tables 9.6 and 9.4). These categories were in line with advice in
textbooks regarding the importance of non-technical and personal attributes in student 
pilots, such as “an honest and mature outlook” and the “ability to cope with 
emergencies” (Piggott 1997). This suggests the strong possibility that the types of 
evidence that instructors base positive decisions on (to send a pilot solo) are different to 
the evidence that they base negative decisions on (disallowing solo flight). 
It has been established that most ‘specific’ critical incidents were related to non-solo 
decision outcomes, but that instructors tend to refer to general reasons when describing 
why they did send a pilot solo. It is therefore possible that to send a pilot solo, 
instructors need certain further evidence in addition to a lack of the negative evidence 
that they base non-solo decision outcomes upon. In other words, whereas an unsafe 
flight is sufficient to disallow solo flying, a safe flight is not sufficient to allow it. This 
would imply that the decision not to send a pilot solo is often easier than deciding to 
send them. If by noticing a single observable event a decision can be made (i.e. do not 
allow solo flight), then the instructor need go no further with the decision process. In 
this way Figure 9.7 may represent enough of the decision process to account for most 
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non-solo decision outcomes, but only the first stage of the process required to send a 
student solo.
The nature of the ‘non-specific’ categories supports this. Each will be discussed in the 
following section, along with information relating to the further construction of the 
decision model.
Overall non-specific (P12).
This was the largest positive category, and exclusive to positive incidents. Much of the 
content has been discussed as giving support to the non-compensatory decision process. 
In this way, such instructor comments are not independent decision attributes in 
themselves, but comments about the decision process (and combining rules). For 
example, claims that “the whole performance... they’re on top of” (P12.1), “he did 
everything right” (P12.2), “He didn’t do anything wrong” (P12.3) are all comments 
about other decision factors, and not therefore independent decision attributes. It seems 
that many of the ‘incidents’ in P12 are in fact attempts to express the results of the 
decision process. Hence, with a notable exception (sub category P12.5), the P12 
category represents a dependent variable in the decision, rather than an independent one. 
This is not to say that it is unimportant. It may well represent the way in which 
instructors justify the decision to themselves, or conclude the process. But since it is 
clearly dependent upon other decision factors being resolved, it will be placed last in the 
positive process of the solo decision model (Figure 9.8), represented as the instructors’ 
reflection on the reasons for allowing the flight (the final conclusion prior to the solo 
outcome).
There is one exception to this. Sub-category P12.5 (‘extra capacity’) does appear to 
provide an independent decision attribute. A number of instructors pointed out that they 
were inclined to send students solo because as well as flying safely, the student ‘talked 
through’ what they were doing ‘out loud’. According to several instructors, this 
demonstrated that the student had “spare capacity”. For example:
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“When it’s fairly busy on the airfield... and they’re talking to you. They’re saying, ‘um, 
a bit tight on the aerotow, not sure what this cable’s going to do, I’m going to land 
long’”
No instructors mentioned ‘not talking’ as a reason to disallow solo flight, and hence this 
appears to be a factor that loads onto the positive decision outcome only, and hence 
appears to used by instructors to confirm that a student can safely fly solo. This was 
represented as a separate category for the purposes of the decision model, and was 
therefore grouped with all other independent ‘positive’ categories.
All positive independent decision attributes in the model are grouped, since combining 
rules are not known (see Figure 9.8). These were categories ‘P/N’ 2, 4, 7, 10 and 12.5).
Consistency (N8 and P8)
In its positive form, ‘consistency’ appeared to be a way in which a lack of negative 
occurrences was articulated by participants as loading onto the positive decision 
outcome. Hence, like P12, it was often used more as an expression of combining rules 
than as an individual factor affecting the decision. This would further support the non-
compensatory notion that no problematic events (i.e. causal factors) must occur if the 
student is to fly solo. An example was:
“consistently landing well, is a big thing, consistency in landing”
From this comment, it can be seen that consistency was not an attribute independent of 
other attributes but a vehicle used to express longitudinal assessment by the instructor, 
and as such a ‘combining rule’. 
From a decision making perspective however this application of the term ‘consistency’ 
appears redundant in the present context. In the above quote (as well as many others), 
consistency refers to a lack of causal events (bad landings), and in the same way 
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‘inconsistency’ relates to one or more causal events (bad landings) amongst satisfactory 
ones. For example
“..they couldn’t consistently get the aircraft down safely.. inconsistency in her ability to 
flair and land the aircraft”
It can be seen that “inconsistency” as used in the above quote (and many others) is a 
factor of the combined ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ landings that the pilot had made, but not a 
feature of any of those landings. Since the ‘safe’ landings were clearly not the cause of 
the instructor preventing solo, these could be dropped from the decision analysis, which 
would leave only unsafe landings (at least one). But unsafe landings are already catered 
for in the decision process. Hence to use of the term ‘consistency’ seems unnecessary, 
and appears to be redundant in that all the assessment of necessary decision attributes 
must have been satisfied without the need for it, whether positive or negative. Hence it 
appears to be a way of instructors articulating the decision process or their overall 
analysis, rather than a real consideration. Some comments in the ‘negative’ category 
were slightly different and demonstrated the use of consistency to illuminate a 
combining rule. A typical example was:
“making the same bad decision twice, on two flights, having previously talked about 
it..”
In this comment (and others) the instructor’s decision was affected by the same thing 
happening twice. It is possible that the decision error may have been below the 
threshold ‘cut-off’ point of a non-compensatory negative factor (and hence not 
prevented solo flying had it occurred once only), but the reoccurrence of it meant that it 
did prevent solo flight. This hints at the possibility that specific causal factors, not in 
themselves sufficient to prevent solo flight, can combine to reach that threshold (albeit 
still in a non-compensatory manner, since one factor cannot reduce another, only add to 
it). This may be because of what the instructor infers from these happenings, such as 
lack of learning on the part of the student, or overall inability in one area. Other 
comments in this category hinted at a further possibility, and suggested that numbers of 
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otherwise small errors in different areas could add up to prevent solo flight, possibly 
without any one ‘cut-off’ point being reached. For example:
“I think, all the way round the circuit there were things to criticise there”
Hence it is possible that some of the specific ‘non-compensatory’ factors do operate 
together when numbers of less serious events are combined. Because this is the only use 
of ‘consistency’ that was not already accounted for by other factors, it was included in 
the decision model as a method of combining attributes to cause a negative decision 
outcome (no solo). The present research, while recognising this possibility, has no data 
suitable for further investigating it. Importantly there is still no suggestion, or evidence, 
that combinations of ‘causal-factors’ use any form of compensatory combining rules. 
The suggestion is simply that some additive rules may apply, but no deductive rules. 
Importantly there is no evidence that one factor can compensate for the occurrence of 
another.
Lack of consistency (N8) was represented in the decision model (Figure 9.8) as a 
component that offers an alternative method of combining the six non-compensatory 
attributes to prevent solo flight. As opposed to a single attribute simply reaching its cut-
off point, this highlighted the longitudinal assessment that allowed ‘low-level’ causal 
events to combine to a threshold sufficient to prevent the solo. The exact dynamics 
cannot be known, and would require further research.
The reason it did not load onto the positive outcome is because the way it was used by 
participants was redundant to P12. For instance, if a pilot consistently made good 
landings then they made no bad ones, and hence this was accounted for by the 
combining rules applied to the six ‘specific’ non-compensatory attributes.
In the model, no arrow leads into the ‘performance assessment’ category, simply 
because unlike individual causal factors, there was no evidence that multiple low-level 
factors could be compensated for by performance assessment. In reality this may well 
occur however, and so more research is required on this point.
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Indirect Issues (N7 and P7)
Many critical incidents in this category related to instructors’ impressions of their 
students such as “confident”, “relaxed”, “methodological” and “enthusiastic”, as well as 
the important aspect of ‘self awareness’ (in terms of performance assessment). These 
appear to be important independent parts of the decision process, and are reflected by 
smaller parallel negative categories. As well as being used to confirm instructor 
judgement regarding solo flight, ‘indirect’ issues were also used by instructors to 
prevent students being allowed to fly solo. So despite no causal-factor incidents 
occurring, some students were prevented from soloing on the basis of some indirect 
issues, as exemplified by reasonably large numbers of comments such as:
“so bloody good, but so cocky with it.. I’m in command of this thing, this is a doddle, 
it’s like playing on the computer”. But it isn’t”
“It wasn’t so much that he hadn’t been doing things right , but he hadn’t known that he 
hadn’t been doing things right... the self diagnosis type thing..so I think that to me ...that 
says ‘I’m not ready, or you’re not ready’..”
This supports the notion that although solo is often disallowed on the basis of specific 
performance issues, more than the absence of such issues is required to allow solo 
flight. The pilots in above quotes made no errors or mistakes and hence were not 
discounted from solo flight in the initial ‘non-compensatory’ part of the process (shown 
by Figure 9.7).The decision model reflects this with arrows towards both ‘solo’ and ‘no 
solo’ outcomes from the ‘positive’ group. ‘Performance assessment’ (as seen in the 
second quote) has been discussed as the only obvious factor that positively compensates 
for specific causal events. However it also appears to function as a further decision 
factor that can add to an instructors’ positive decision in general.
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A further interesting (although small) category concerned pressures felt by the 
instructor. This was exclusive to positive decision outcomes, and suggests that some 
instructors are influenced in their decision making by factors not related to their 
consideration of the safety of the student to fly alone. However, being a small category, 
there is no evidence on which to further hypothesise this point.
From the incidents and themes emerging from the ‘indirect categories’, there was 
sufficient evidence to hypothesis that indirect issues were considered as well as the non-
compensatory (technical) parts of the decision.
Instant reactions / behind the glider (P2 and N2)
These were small categories, containing just 13 incidents between them. Because of 
this, little can be deduced. However the theme of the comments was consistent and 
appeared to be an independent decision attribute. Examples are: 
“Instant reaction to the sink that you get over the Tring road... flying along and there’s 
this sshhhoo the nose goes down, turns in.. Just the reaction and the erm, the response 
to the unusual, that’s very good.”(P2)
“He just wasn’t on top of it, you know, he was behind the aircraft... a toboggan run, you 
know, a runaway train” (N2)
“They did not react at the rate that I would have wanted them to react”
It can be seen that the instructors did not mention anything specifically going wrong (no 
causal accident factor) despite an overall assessment. However in the positive comments 
instructors were more specific. This could represent a heuristic device that instructors 
use for helping to determine the overall skill level of students, but further research and 
more data would be required to establish this.
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Sufficient evidence is available to determine that these categories are relatively 
independent decision dimensions, and so they were included in the group with other 
such categories in the decision model.
Situation - Instructor harmony / disharmony (P4 and N4)
P4 is perhaps the positive category of most importance, in terms of both concept and 
critical incident numbers, with three times as many incidents as N4. It refers to ‘non-
tangible’ concepts that instructors often talked about when making positive decisions. 
Common expressions were ‘gut feeling’ (P4.1.2), ‘confidence in the student’ (P4.1.1) 
and ‘feeling comfortable’ (4.2.3) to name a few. These concepts were hardly mentioned 
with regards to disallowing solo flight. Many similar sub-categories arose from negative 
comments, but not to the same degree as with positive comments. Indeed most of the 
negative categories of this sort nearly disappeared in the participation rate check.
This category therefore lends considerable support to the notion that when sending 
pilots solo instructors need evidence over and above an observably safe flight, evidence 
that they do not commonly need to rely on when disallowing solo flying. The non-
tangible nature of comments in this category demonstrates that instructors often find it 
difficult to declare knowledge relevant to sending pilots solo. This was stated by a 
number of instructors in the initial pilot interviews prior to the CIT research. 
Many instructors mentioned that the situation had been different from what seemed 
right to them, without being able to describe what was different about it. Also there 
were numerous similar ‘positive’ comments where the instructor had difficulty in 
expressing what they ‘felt’ was right about the student performance. This indicates the 
use of non-declarative knowledge in decision making and the possibility of an intuitive 
element to the decision process (as described by Klein 1998). This could occur when a 
well-known situation either looked ‘typical’ or had a slightly different pattern to what 
looked familiar (e.g. the pilot not looking in the direction that pilots normally look 
during a particular part of the flight). In these situations an instructor may not be aware 
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of the exact nature of the cues that drive their judgement, since they are the result of the 
activation (or not) of contextual schemata (see Reason 1990). Due to the subtlety of 
these sorts of patterns it is common for people to be unable to describe what they have 
observed (Klein 1998).
Because instructors may have been quite certain that something was right (or wrong) 
without knowing what it was, they tended to use terms such as ‘gut feeling’, and 
‘feeling uncomfortable’. A number of comments made it clear that, even from a 
negative decision perspective, this process is not the same as the non-compensatory 
process described early, for example; 
“You know that feeling where you just want to take over all the way round, but you 
don’t. It was like that, it never really felt right.” 
The further context around this comment (and others of this sort) shows that the non-
compensatory process returned no definite ‘specific’ problems but that the overall 
‘intuitive’ decision over-rode this to disallow solo flight. Other comments made it clear 
that the intuitive process had favoured solo flight, but only when there were no 
observable causal factors. Importantly, no comments suggested that a specific ‘causal’ 
factor could be positively compensated for by overall intuition. Comments relating to 
intuitive processes of this sort were not used in conjunction with specific observable 
causal events. This further supports the non-compensatory nature of the ‘causal factor’ 
critical incident categories. It appears that instructors do not need to rely on intuitive 
processes if a student makes an overt error, since the decision outcome is then clear.
More than any other category, P4 and N4 represent non-declarative knowledge leading 
to ‘expert judgement’ or ‘intuition’. The critical incident numbers suggest that either 
instructors rely on this more when making positive decisions, or require it less when 
making negative ones, perhaps because the non-compensatory process often eliminates 
the need (Figure 9.7). 
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Due to the nature of expert intuition, it is problematic to determine the extent to which 
the outcome is dependent upon other attributes in the decision. For these reasons, in 
terms of the decision model, P4 and N4 were grouped along with all other ‘independent’ 
positively dominant categories.
Dealing with Emergencies / not coping (P10 and N10)
Literature advises that pilots must be able to deal with emergencies prior to solo, for 
example “your instructor, when sending you solo… considers you competent to handle 
an emergency” (Thom 1997) and “prove that you can.. deal with any contingencies such 
as cable breaks, running short of height, and stalling and spinning” Piggott 1997), to 
quote just a few examples.
Some comments in N10 (not coping) shared many similarities with N4 (Situation -
Instructor disharmony) as being related to intuitive processes, but expressed this as 
concern that the student will not cope in the future, particularly with an emergency. For 
example:
“Some sort of third instinct that would say if he had a cable break he may not do the 
right thing. He might decide to land ahead when he couldn’t, or he might decide to turn 
when he should have landed ahead”
Other comments were related to symptoms that students showed during the session, and 
as such these could be quite specific, for example
“he just froze on the controls. He was flying at great speed towards the hill and would 
not do anything, wouldn’t even let go of the controls... very tense”.
Hence, whether or not these were intuitively based or directly observable, they represent 
a further possible independent decision attribute for the instructor to consider. A greater 
proportion of positive incidents were categorised in P10 than negative incidents in N10. 
In a positive sense this category was concerned only with potential emergencies 
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(simulated and real). In common with the negative comments, some positive comments 
were based on intuition, others on specific observable issues. For example:
“I threw the book at this bloke... he coped, difficult cable breaks, actually a very 
gradual power failure...  he just ripped through it all”
Clearly this could be used by an instructor to support trouble free flying and allow the 
pilot to fly solo. 
P10 and N10 were therefore represented in the group along with the other independent 
attributes in the decision model. Since most of these attributes were both positive and 
negative (despite being ‘positively dominant’), arrows led from this group towards 
‘solo’ and ‘no solo’ directly.
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Figure 9.8 Model of instructor decision making, from CIT data analysis
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The decision model
The final model is shown as Figure 9.8, and flows from top to bottom. Each of the 23 
top-level categories are represented (and labelled) with the exception of P8 
(consistency) because there was no evidence to show that it was anything other than a 
redundant expression used by instructors, as explained). Additionally P7.2 
(‘performance assessment’) is shown as an independent attribute as previously 
explained. Each category (or in many cases ‘category pair’) represents a decision 
attribute. Tentative links between them have been added where evidence from incidents 
warranted it, to show the most logical way in which they fit together.
Fundamentally, the model follows two processes to arrive at a positive solo decision.
1. Were there any observable ‘specific’ events with the potential to cause an 
accident? (this is represented by the ‘negative’ group of categories)
2. If not, is there sufficient further justification (further confirmation) from 
other sources that can confirm that the student should go solo? (This is 
the positive group in the model, e.g. ‘pilot attitude’, ‘extra capacity’, 
‘reaction times’, ‘instructor intuition’).
The model basically consists of a negative group and a positive group, reflecting the 
two parts of the process. Although combining rules are hypothesised for the ‘negative’ 
group, there was no evidence with which to do so for the ‘positive’ group. 
The model builds on the previous model of the non-compensatory process (Figure 9.7). 
The majority of these links simply relate the category to the appropriate decision 
outcome; ‘so solo’ or ‘solo’ (via P12). These could be confidently ‘mapped’ because 
each negative critical incident (making up most of each ‘negative’ category) led to solo 
flight being disallowed, and each positive one led to solo flight being allowed (by 
definition). This is the basis upon which the direction of the majority of linking arrows 
has been added, and is therefore easily justifiable. The ‘causal factor’ type categories 
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are coloured red to denote that they are predominantly negative categories, and green 
for the ‘positive ones. Parts of the decision process such as those indicating combining 
rules (N8, ‘consistency - negative’ and P12 ‘general, overall’) are ‘outlined’ rather than 
‘filled’ to indicate that they are not considered decision attributes in themselves.
Red and green arrowed lines only seek to show logical interpretations of the way in 
which categories combine, and not to attempt to map the process itself, since this would 
require more research. However all arrows are supported by evidence from the critical 
incident data. For example no arrows exist between ‘longitudinal assessment’ (N8) and 
the positive decision side of the model, since no critical incidents indicted such a link. 
This includes the mitigating effect of accurate self assessment. No instructors claimed to 
have sent a student solo on this basis, but this may need further exploration in future. 
Arrows are red if they go towards a ‘negative’ attribute and green if they point towards
a positive one. In this way the positive and negative elements of the decision are made 
clearer.
There is direct evidence from the data for the existence of all the elements in the model, 
most of which are categories containing data from the instructors. The critical incidents 
show that all of the factors have been involved in the decisions to send pilots solo or 
prevent them flying solo. Hence the categories represent the attributes of the decision.
However the model is not intended to represent a decision algorithm, although where 
evidence was available this has been tentatively hypothesised (i.e. non-compensatory 
combining rules). Although evidence exists for each element, and for some of the 
dependencies within the decision, the exact nature of the decision process cannot be 
known from the data available. This includes the exact nature of combining rules and 
the weighting of elements within the model. 
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Conclusion (Section 1)
It has been shown that the two dichotomous decision options (allowing and not allowing 
solo flight) are not simply complimentary processes, i.e. if there is insufficient evidence 
to prevent solo flight it does not mean that there is sufficient evidence to allow it.
The evidence suggests that problem-free flight is insufficient for many instructors to 
allow solo flight. After observing any number of safe flights, the instructor looks for 
further confirmatory (positive) evidence to ‘sure up’ a decision to allow solo flight 
(‘pilot attitude’, ‘good self critique’ etc). It is well known that “people show a strong 
tendency to accumulate several instances of confirming evidence” (Hogarth 1987).
This overall view is supported by instructor comments showing clear decision conflict. 
This happened when the instructor observed no causal accident factors (good) but then 
found no further ‘positive’ evidence to build a positive decision outcome upon (such as 
‘a good de-brief’, ‘a feeling of confidence’ or evidence of ‘extra capacity’).
This research demonstrates the advantage of an exploratory approach when the structure 
of the decision is not fully understood. The findings were very similar to those of Ikomi 
and Guion (2000) in terms of the main reasons why students were not sent solo (non-
compensatory combining rules applied to specific elements of flight), but showed a 
further aspect to the decision making process particularly related to choosing when a 
student can go solo. Ikomi and Guion (2000) found unexpected leniency on the part of 
the instructors to send pilots solo (on paper). It is possible that this was caused by the 
experiment only accounting for one part of the decision process (i.e. the non-
compensatory part). The present study shows that the processes of sending a pilot solo 
and not sending them solo are not complimentary (as would be logical). This shows the 
benefit of using an exploratory technique before modelling a decision process based on 
assumptions.
The method employed by the present study makes it likely that all decision elements 
have now been identified. The data were shown to be exhaustive of the subject area by 
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robust processes (see Figure 9.1), as well numerous validity checks and SME reviews. 
Therefore, because the decision model is based exclusively on the data, it can be 
confidently claimed to be exhaustive in terms of decision elements (within the 
limitations of the interview method). 
Importantly however, whereas the model is probably representative of all the attributes 
driving the decision process, there is no evidence that any instructors use all of those 
elements in coming to a decision, and hence no evidence that any instructor goes 
through the process in its entirety. This is a critical point. No instructors mentioned all 
elements (no element had a 100% participation rate, the highest was 82%, for N11 
[Judgement and Positioning]). Whereas this does not provide strong evidence against 
the holistic nature of the model, it nevertheless leaves the possibility that certain 
instructors apply certain parts of this process only. This is an important area for future 
research, along with further field validation of the model and investigation into the 
dynamics of the decision mechanism.
The parts of the model containing the ‘positive’ (and general) attributes require a great 
deal more research. It is not known how these attributes link to the intuitive decision 
processes (N4 and P4), or indeed whether they are elements of the same process. 
Although all the elements of this group are accounted for within the critical incident 
data, no attempt was made to infer combining rules, dynamics or weightings. The 
decision model can only be used to say that these attributes are (and have been) used by 
instructors when considering solo decisions, and that it is likely that instructors use 
them to provide additional evidence (above the student technical ability) to help make 
‘right’ decision.
The main value of this analysis is in exposing the elements of what is possibly the most 
safety critical decision made about a pilot in his or her lifetime, and opening many 
doors to future research of a more practical nature. The dynamics of the decision require 
more mapping. More needs to be done to look at how specific flight elements trigger a 
no-solo decision, but more importantly which elements are most likely not to trigger the 
mechanism. The manner in which evidence is weighed between the components also 
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demands attention, because the method of evaluating positive attributes could lend itself 
to biases such as confirmation bias (Wason 1960). The use of intuitive processes may or 
may not lead to premature solos and more needs to be done in order to understand these 
processes. 
The most pressing piece of research is a field validation of the model, and evaluation of 
the extent to which instructors use it in a holistic sense.
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Section 2: Comparison of critical incidents with previous accident analysis
The critical incident findings were directly compared to findings relating to flight phase 
and accident cause for newly-soloed pilots, from previous studies (chapters 5 and 6).
Only critical incidents of a sufficiently specific nature (e.g. in-flight events) were 
categorised by flight phase, using the six main flight phases from Jarvis and Harris 
(2008). Notably, 82% of these led to ‘negative’ decision outcomes. Almost all the same 
incidents were found to belong to the ‘causal factor’ categories which aligned with the 
accident causations from chapter six (attention, judgement, handling and strategy). 
Hence, when comparing all the critical incidents to findings from accident data, many 
did not apply. Only those in the ‘causal factor’ categories (N/P1, 3, 5, 6, 9 and 11) or 
coded as flight phases one to six, were looked at. This made up about 60% of critical 
incidents. It was hypothesised that these represented instructor observations that were 
sufficient to disallow solo flight, and could not usually be compensated for in other 
ways (see Figure 9.8).
Comparison of proportions of causal accident events (from the CIT data) with the four 
top-level accident categories (from chapter 6) showed broad alignment. There were 
similar proportions of the ‘attentional’ and ‘decision-making’ issues within the two data 
sets (Table 9.3). Together, these made up only a small total proportion of both critical 
incidents and accident events to low hours pilots (less than a quarter). This is because 
training flights and early solo flights are generally confined to local area flying, and 
have fewer opportunities for strategic decision mistakes (Jarvis & Harris 2008). 
Additionally, many accident causes categorised as ‘attentional’ occurred with more 
advanced glider types, being concerned with control slips and lapses relating to 
undercarriage and flaps (see chapter 6). Hence these were not applicable to low hours 
pilots. Training gliders are more basic, with fewer controls to forget or confuse. Highly 
inexperienced glider pilots are restricted to flying training gliders or basic single-seat 
glider types.
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Handling and judgement categories accounted for the vast majority of accidents and 
causal critical incidents. Proportionally more accident events (for early-solo pilots) 
related to judgement (53.6%) than handling (32%). This trend was reversed for the 
critical incidents (42.6% and 35.8% respectively). This is probably because almost all 
judgement related causal accident events (for low-hours pilots) occurred in the approach 
and landing phases (Table 9.3), but these phases were far less represented in the CIT 
data than the accident data. It is also possible that handling issues are easier for 
instructors to identify and comment upon than judgement issues. An instructor can 
directly observe handling issues by shadowing a student’s control movements and 
noticing a number of clear and instant indications (yaw string, airspeed indicator and 
horizon). However instructors cannot directly observe student judgement. 
In terms of flight phase data, the two most striking results were those for the circuit and 
approach phases, but the launch and landing phases were also of some interest. The 
following section discusses the results for the circuit first, because this is possibly the 
area that instructors perform best in terms of assessing student problems. The launch 
and landing are discussed next and the approach phase last because it demands most 
attention. 
The Circuit
Figure 9.5 shows that over half of the ‘specific’ critical incidents were related to the 
circuit phase. No other phase accounted for more than 15% of ‘specific’ critical 
incidents, and so the circuit phase represented a considerable departure from the norm. 
This indicates that instructors base non-solo decisions on the students’ performance in 
the circuit much more than on other flight phases. This phase was not unusual in terms 
of proportions of positive and negative comments (85% negative).
Instructors reported causal events of all kinds taking place in the circuit, and Table 9.8 
shows that the majority were involved with the positioning of the glider relative to the 
landing area (circuit judgement). This is in line with gliding literature which highlights 
the importance of judgement to achieve the right circuit position due to the non-
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predictability of this phase compared to powered forms of aviation (Piggott 1991, 
Stewart 1994).
It is possible that the high number of critical incidents reflects a higher number of such 
events taking place in the circuit, but accident data do not necessarily support such a 
hypothesis. Only 11% of accidents to early solo pilots were caused in the circuit (Jarvis 
& Harris 2008) which would suggest that causal-factors in the circuit are not as 
common as in other phases. However it is also possible that the disproportionate 
number of critical incidents relating to the circuit helps to explain this lower accident 
total for early solo pilots. Such accidents may be fewer due to more effective ‘filtering’ 
of these problems prior to solo, explaining the high numbers of negative critical 
incidents relating to this phase. Therefore high numbers of critical incidents and a low 
accident total for inexperienced pilots could be a sign of instructor effectiveness in 
terms of training and assessing circuit flying.
In terms of causal factors, critical incidents relating to the circuit spawned 28 low-level 
subcategories, meaning that instructors observed numerous circuit problems that 
affected their decision outcomes, mainly to do with judgement and handling. None of 
the 28 categories were particularly large, indicating that there was a wide spread of 
issues. Other flight phases had fewer and ‘stronger’ emerging themes, which provides a 
further explanation to the proliferation of critical incidents related to circuit flying. The 
circuit takes up far more of the flight than the phases that cause most accidents 
(approach and landing). Arguably it also has more components and complexities. This 
means that instructors have more opportunity to notice and consider minor errors, and 
students have more opportunity to make them. Additionally it is possible that the 
instructors’ workload is much lower in the circuit than the launch, approach and
landing, due to the extra time available and a much bigger margin for student error. 
These factors could explain the breadth of circuit related issues raised by instructors, 
and the possibility that errors in the circuit are more likely (than other phases) to be 
noticed.
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Because there was no way of establishing the weighting of decision factors, it cannot be 
not known how critical the various circuit issues were to instructor decision-making 
compared to those of other flight phases. 
The number of critical incidents related to the circuit is disproportional to the other 
phases, as well as being out of step with the relative number of circuit related accidents 
to low hours pilots. More research is required to uncover whether the amount of 
attention instructors give to this phase of flight is effective in maintaining safety. It is 
possible that it has a protective effect, helping to maintain a low accident rate in early 
solo pilots.  Hence the current situation requires further research before any attempt is
made to redress the balance of the decision attributes in terms of flight phases.
The Landing
Early solo pilots have a high rate of landing accidents (Jarvis & Harris 2008). Figure 9.6 
shows that present results for the landing phase align with previous studies (Jarvis & 
Harris 2008, and Chapter 8). As well as being the second most common accident cause 
to early hours pilots, it had the second highest number of related critical incidents and 
was rated by instructors as the second most likely phase to cause accidents to early-solo 
pilots (see chapter 8). The causes given by instructors for not sending pilots solo 
(critical incidents) were also in harmony with the findings from accident data from 
chapter six (‘judgement’ and ‘handling’, almost exclusively in the round out).
The launch
Launch accidents were those perceived as most likely by the instructor to occur to low 
hours pilots (see Figure 9.6), and possibly those most feared (see chapter 8). This was 
reflected by a larger proportion of critical incidents than accidents to early solo pilots 
(12% and 7% respectively), showing possible caution on the part of instructors with 
respect to this phase. It was notable that of 42 critical incidents, 41 refer to ‘handling’ 
issues. This is in line with the fact that the rotation into the launch climb was associated with 
most fatalities from 2002 - 2006 (Jarvis & Harris 2008), and supported by discussion 
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from chapter eight concerning BGA publicity around serious winch launch accidents of 
this type in 2007. These serious accidents were almost certainly issues of glider 
handling (applying too much backward pressure to the control column, or allowing the 
glider to pitch up too rapidly, depending on the glider type). Hence it appears that 
instructors show some caution with respect to the way pilots handle the launch phase of 
flight. No such serious accidents occurred to early-solo pilots from 2002 - 2006. 
Although this was not statistically likely due to the small numbers involved (see chapter 
4 Table 4.3, and Chapter 6), it could be that instructor sensitivity to this area has helped 
prevent such accidents.
The Approach
Whereas the circuit is associated with a high number of critical incidents and a low 
number of early solo accidents, the approach phase shows the opposite trend.
The approach is associated with the highest accident rate of all phases for low-hours 
pilots (causing 39% of accidents) and is 10 times higher than for more experienced 
pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2008). Against this background, there was an expectation of 
finding numerous critical incidents to provide further explanation of this problem. 
However, only 20 critical incidents out of 659 related to the approach, 17 of which 
could be categorised into a causal factor category.
It was previously found that all accidents initiated during approach (to low-hours pilots) 
were caused by judgement and handling issues (see chapter 6). Additionally all fell into 
just three relatively small categories; undershooting the landing area (caused by 
misjudgement of the approach path leading to too much airbrake being sustained), 
mishandling the glider in pitch, and having too little airspeed). It is therefore of 
considerable note that of the 17 critical incidents none were categorised as relating to 
judgement. Furthermore only five were related to handling, the remaining 12 being 
associated with strategy / decision-making (Table 9.8). The findings from chapter six 
showed that no such accidents happened to early solo pilots during the approach.
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The majority of the ‘decision making’ descriptions were due to two sources. A number 
were concerned with the decision to land straight ahead after a launch failure (which is a 
unique type of manoeuvre). This was treated as a separate sub-phase by Jarvis and 
Harris (2008) and contained no accidents to low-hours pilots. A further seven were 
descriptions of problems relating to the direction of the approach (laterally), such as 
approaching towards another glider or vehicle. There were no such accidents to low-
hours pilots from 2002 - 2006 (see chapter 6). 
Of the remaining five critical incidents, two were associated with ‘positive’ outcomes 
(hence reasons why pilots went solo). This left just three critical incidents that related in 
any way to the reasons for accidents identified in chapter 6. Hence the critical incidents 
were out of step with the accident findings, in terms of total numbers as well as the 
reasons given for the ‘solo decision’.
As was suggested with the circuit phase, the contrast in the number of critical incidents 
to accidents could help explain the accident figures. If specific problems are not being 
picked up during training (which seems likely given the analysis of critical incidents) 
then it helps to explain why those factors cause such a high accident rate for newly 
soloed pilots.
It was previously argued that the same issues that caused accidents to low hours pilots 
should be numerous and apparent during instructional flights prior to solo (Heinrich’s 
accident and incident ratio, Heinrich 1980). The critical incident data suggest that either 
this is not the case, or that if it is, the problems are not noticed, not remembered, or not 
deemed serious enough by instructors to disallow solo flight.
Accidents caused in the approach phase rank third in frequency during instructional 
flights (2002 - 2006) behind launch and landing Table 5.10 Chapter five. This strongly 
suggests that causal accident factors do occur on the approach, while students are still 
under instruction.
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The finding that the approach phase was ranked fifth by instructors in terms of 
likelihood of causing accidents (Chapter 8) supports the present finding in general and 
shows that instructors do not believe that the approach phase presents the greatest risk 
of an accident to early solo pilots. If instructors very rarely prevent solo flights due to 
issues occurring during the approach, then such incidents would have lower 
‘availability’ in terms of recall than other events (simply based on frequency of 
episodes).
Unfortunately little explanation can be gained from the analysis of critical incidents 
relating to the approach due to the small number of appropriate cases. The BGA 
instructors’ manual (British Gliding Association 2003) includes a comprehensive 
section on approach control including a large variety of exercises to show problems that 
can occur and how to deal with them (including undershooting, and the effect of not 
closing the brakes to recover from it). Most of these are written as instructor 
demonstrations however (rather than student exercises), and the only exercise related to 
checking the student for ‘undershoot tendencies’ involves the instructor setting up a low 
final turn to check that the trainee does not open the airbrakes immediately (termed 
‘landing lever syndrome’). There are no exercises that involve the student 
demonstrating that they can recognize or recover properly from an undershoot situation, 
which was the essence of about half of the accidents to early solo pilots (see chapter 6). 
Given the accident profile of early-solo pilots (See results of chapter 5 and chapter 6) 
this appears to be a serious omission, particularly as advice to instructors in the same 
document (in the section about first solos) is to check that students are able to recognize 
and correct for an undershoot prior to solo (British Gliding Association 2003). 
Clearly, without setting up such a situation, the only way that instructors can check 
students’ recognition of an undershoot is if one happens for real. It is possible that the 
findings of minimal critical incidents and low instructor concern are explained by a lack 
of real undershoots occurring on instructional flights (combined with no simulated ones) 
and hence no opportunity for the student to misjudge them. If the first opportunity a 
student gets is when they are solo, then the accident rate is not difficult to explain. 
There are numerous hypothetical reasons why students are less likely to get into such 
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situations whilst under instruction. These include briefings (e.g. reminders of wind 
strength), prompting and instructors taking over prior to a situation conducive to a 
problem presenting itself (e.g. a low final turn).
However, even if students did get the opportunity to “recognize and correct for an 
undershoot” during training, it is questionable whether an instructor would be able to 
recognize the problem. Considering the length and size of most gliding airfields 
(required for launching gliders) it is possibility that many pre-solo undershoots go 
undetected by instructors because they have no way of telling exactly where the student 
was trying to land on the field (most gliding sites are large featureless grass airfields). 
Since gliders cannot taxi and have no power, there are no designated landing points as 
there are in other forms of aviation, because other gliders may be occupying those areas 
at the time. Hence gliders tend to land wherever is most safe or convenient. This is why 
chapter 12 of the BGA instructors’ manual (approach control) refers to the need for the 
instructor and student to agree a reference point (RP) before doing approach control 
exercises (“agree an RP, perhaps in relation to a parked car or glider”). This is because 
approach technique in gliders relies on judging the approach angle of the glider relative 
to a reference point directly ahead (just prior to the touchdown point). Without agreeing 
such a point, the instructor cannot know where the student is trying to land. The 
instructors’ manual contains much advice on interpreting the relative movement of the 
RP during approach, but since the advice is to pick an RP “relative to another object” it 
is not clear how this can be achieved. Furthermore this advice is only given for specific 
approach control demonstrations, not for all flights. The very fact that the BGA deem 
this necessary for demonstrating approach control to students supports the proclamation 
that a problem exists during normal flights (i.e. where an unexpected undershoot may 
develop). This helps to explain why approach judgment was not mentioned in any 
critical incidents at all. Without specifically setting up the situation there is no way for 
an instructor to tell if the student has misjudged the approach path or not, unless specific 
circumstances combine with a very serious undershoot. As has been discussed, such 
circumstances are probably less likely to occur while pilots are under instruction.
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Added to this problem, the BGA instructors’ manual advises instructors that students 
need not achieve spot landings in order to go solo (British Gliding Association 2003). 
Indeed this sentiment was mentioned in some ‘positive’ critical incidents, for example:
“Not a spot landing, but a good landing. I don’t care if it’s a spot landing as long as it’s 
safely on the airfield”
Given the high accident rate due to misjudgments of the approach path, this could be 
seriously ill-conceived advice. If a student does not plan to land at a particular point, 
then they deprive themselves of feedback in terms of their technique (‘knowledge of 
performance’) and the outcome (‘knowledge of results’). Both these forms of feedback 
are crucial for development of perceptual motor skills (Magill 1989). Additionally, the 
instructor cannot tell if the student has achieved what they intended and hence cannot 
gauge the approach performance or give further feedback. In many situations this means 
that it is quite possible for student pilot to simply accept whatever approach path the 
airbrake setting provides, particularly on large airfields, and hence not practice the skills 
and judgment required.
Once alone in a glider, this would be a latent training failure that would perhaps be 
exposed the first time the pilot tries to land a little nearer the airfield boundary, but 
perhaps linger on much later into the pilots career when they must approach accurately 
into the upwind end of a small out-field. Accident statistics show that outfield landings 
are by far the largest source of accidents in gliding, and although many start as decision 
making accidents, they often end with undershoots and overshoots. Hence the issue of 
how students are sent solo could have much wider implications for the lifetime of the 
pilot. 
The finding that so few critical incidents related to the approach, and fewer still to the 
most critical aspects, is itself extremely instructive considering it is the major area of 
accident causation for early hours glider pilots (Jarvis & Harris 2008). This makes the 
approach phase an even more notable omission in the work of Ikomi and Guion (2000) 
since it would have made a very interesting comparison to the present results.
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Further research is required into the method of teaching and assessing approach control 
and judgement in gliders. The system may require serious overhaul. It is possible that if 
some form of reference point is marked on airfields (e.g. a painted line perpendicular to 
the landing area) then this would enable feedback for the instructor and the trainee 
during training. However further research is needed into this area.
Conclusion - Section 2
The results suggest the possibility that instructors properly assess those aspects of the 
launch, circuit and landing that are most likely to be hazardous to student pilots once 
solo. A low level of accidents to low-hours pilots, particularly in the circuit and launch 
phase, may be partly due to appropriate attention paid by instructors while making ‘solo 
decisions’. Although there is a high rate of accidents in the landing phase, the research 
suggests that instructors are aware of this, and also that they regularly prevent solo 
flights due to the occurrences on landing that are similar to those causing the high rate 
of accidents to low hours pilots. Hence the instructors are not out of step with landing 
issues, and may indeed be responsible for preventing more accidents in this phase.
However the approach phase shows a very different pattern. Approach path judgement, 
speed and pitch handling caused all approach accidents to early hours pilots from 2002 -
2006. However instructors appear to be unaware of the level of accidents caused to 
early solo pilots on the approach (see Chapter 8). Furthermore the data suggests that 
instructors rarely (if ever) prevent solo flying on the basis of judgement or handling 
issues in this phase, despite these causing the highest accident rate to this already 
vulnerable group of pilots. Based on the results and the gliding literature, the reason 
behind this is that during training flights there is less chance of circumstances arising in 
which these events occur. Furthermore when such events do occur, instructors fail to 
notice due to a lack of cues available. This could mean that pilots do not properly learn 
safe approach control until after they are solo, which could account for the results of 
previous studies (Jarvis and Harris 2007b, 2008).
233
Piggott could be more accurate than perhaps intended when he claimed that “Approach 
is a busy time for the beginner and it is only some time after soloing that he learns to 
organize the thinking and flying so that there is enough time for refinements” (Piggott 
1997). Unfortunately it appears that this learning time may account for more than just 
refinements, and while it is occurring the pilot is particularly vulnerable to an accident.
Overall Conclusion (Chapter 9)
The overall aims of this study were to gain an initial understanding of the decision 
making process of instructors with regard to allowing solo flight and to explore in what 
ways instructor decisions could be contributing to the high accident rate of newly soloed 
glider pilots. A decision model was created, based on findings from critical incident 
data that highlighted the complexity of the decision process, as well as the numerous 
elements involved.
A fundamental part of this process is the way in which potential causal accident events 
(observed by instructors) discount from solo flight in a non-compensatory manner.
Hypothetically, if the components of this part of the process were aligned accurately 
with accident causes, then it would act as a filter to potential accidents. However this is 
reliant on the instructor noticing these potential accident events and assessing them with 
appropriate weighting. It was found that this process may work for most parts of the 
flight, but is certainly ineffective in terms of the approach phase and hence may be 
partly accountable for the high rate of accidents to new solo pilots caused in this phase.
Further research is needed to validate the decision model in the naturalistic 
environment. This would help to assess the dynamics of the model which are tentative, 
and the weightings given to the various components, which are unknown.
It is recommended that the training and assessment of approach control be reviewed in 
light of the present findings, and instructors made aware of the high accident rates 
caused by this phase, and the reasons behind them.
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Chapter 10 - Conclusions and Recommendations
Much has been discovered over the course of these studies, and the implications are far 
reaching in the gliding community, as well as having application to other areas of 
aviation and research. Conclusions and recommendations were given with each piece of 
research. Rather than repeat these at length, this section summarises the main 
conclusions and recommendations.
Prior to the commencement of the work, no knowledge existed concerning the accident 
profile of glider pilots. It was identified that early-solo pilots had a different accident 
profile to more experienced pilots. Popular notions that early solo pilots were safest 
were shown to be mistaken. The issue of pilot judgement in approach and landing was 
uncovered as a major factor in most accidents to low-hours pilots. Instructors were 
found to have the same misconceptions as the popular literature in the terms of the 
relative safety of these pilots.
It was found that instructor decision making in terms of solo flight decisions was out of 
line with the types of accidents that students were most likely to have when sent solo. 
The project shows this decision to be a highly complex problem for instructors, 
involving numerous decision factors.
As well as investigating these specific issues, this work challenged a number of 
methodologies. These centre around the use of accidents as populations rather than 
samples of all flights. Accident counts are often mistakenly used in this way (as shown 
in chapters one to three). By assuming that accidents are a population, false conclusions 
can be drawn regarding the risk to certain groups and certain types of operations. This 
can happen with simple accident counts or statistical tests, for example the use of odds-
ratios on accident data can give false impressions for this reason, as shown in Jarvis and 
Harris (2008). By treating accidents in this way, observers are in danger of drawing 
conclusions not conducive to safety.  This was shown in chapter two (e.g. Piggott 1997, 
Pratt 2000). The unsupportable statements made by authors in such positions 
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demonstrate that there are important safety reasons why observers should avoid 
considering accidents as populations, without factoring in all other flights.
It is recommended that the knowledge of the high accident rate to low-hours pilots is 
used to dispel inaccurate popular notions of the relative safety of this group, particularly 
among instructors. Additionally instructors require more awareness of the types of 
causal factors that are likely to impact upon students when they are sent solo.
As well as greater awareness, more emphasis needs to be put on the approach phase of 
flight in training and assessment. In particular, instructors should actively ensure that 
students can recognise and recover from undershoot situations. This may involve setting 
up such situations, but it may also be possible that the task of approach control and 
judgement for gliders could be taught or practiced in simulators. Research is required to 
establish whether good transfer of training could be achieved in this respect.
The method by which instructors and students judge the approach path requires more 
thought, particularly in terms of the visual references required for student learning and 
instructor assessment. It is recommended that reference points are used during all 
training flights, not just instructor demonstrations of approach control. This would help 
instructors to identify approach judgement issues and help students to receive feedback 
in order to learn the task more proficiently. However, there is also a need to establish 
whether the ‘reference point’ technique is indeed the best method of teaching this phase.
Further research
There are a number of areas that could benefit from further research on the basis of the 
accident findings alone. Training is one such area and the skill of approach judgement 
another.
The method of training approach judgement requires research to establish what is and 
what is not effective in terms of training. The BGA instructors’ manual gives a number 
of ‘demonstration exercises’ but does not give any assistance to instructors on how to 
237
aid students in achieving effective approaches, nor on how instructors can judge when a 
students’ judgement is adequate. This is probably because little is known about the 
mechanisms by which pilots perform these tasks. Although the ‘reference point 
technique’ is common in gliding literature and is the core method of teaching the 
approach phase (British Gliding Association 2003), it is not known whether pilots 
actually use such a technique in reality. It may be that as pilots gain experience they 
begin to acquire other ways of performing this task, particularly as reference points are 
not normally available. This could account for some of the accidents to early solo pilots, 
since they may not yet have acquired a more reliable technique. Hence research is 
needed to establish how pilots really perform approaches in gliders, and hence whether 
teaching the reference point technique is appropriate. Some of the aspects that require 
attention include the use of visual references, the elements that pilots pay attention to, 
how the information is processed, and what indicates that the glider is undershooting.
Further research is also required into instructor decision-making generally, with regard 
to solo flight. The decision model suggested that many such decisions failed to align 
with accident causes to early solo pilots, i.e. the most prominent accident cause 
(approach misjudgement) was unlikely to feature in the decision process. However the 
nature of the research meant that it was not possible to be more descriptive on this point, 
and so further research is required in this respect. The decision model, although only a 
first step, showed the possible complexity and conflict involved in the process. As 
stated previously, there is now a need to validate this model in the field. The model 
uncovered that the two mutually exclusive decision outcomes (‘solo’ and ‘no solo’) may 
not be completely complimentary in terms of the decision attributes that drive them. 
This makes it likely that heuristics and biases could play a large role in the decision 
process, which would mean decisions not always being based on the most critical safety 
factors. Since there was no way of knowing whether all aspects of the model were 
considered in each such decision, this point cannot be further expanded upon using the 
current findings. Further study is therefore required in order to uncover more about 
these issues. Because of the critical safety issues as well as the responsibility involved 
with making decisions to allow pilots to fly alone, this area requires much more 
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Guidelines for coding accidents as ‘pilot-related’ or ‘other’
Accidents must be categorised as pilot induced or non-pilot induced (other). ‘Pilot 
induced’ does not necessarily mean pilot culpability, responsibility or blame, but 
simply that the accident can be reasonably attributed to the actions taken by the pilot 
without an overwhelming and unavoidable influence of external or technical factors 
(unavoidable after boarding). 
1. Pilot Related 
 The causal event must have occurred AFTER the glider was boarded for 
flight.
 There must have been an identifiable performance shortfall in terms of the 
actions (or inactions) on the part of the pilot in command together with a 
reasonable opportunity for the pilot to act in such a way that could have 
avoided the accident.
2. A technical factor
 Meaning that the aircraft would have been deemed unserviceable had the 
failure been apparent before flight. The failure must either exist prior to the 
glider being boarded for flight, occur while the aircraft is within the flight 
envelope and operating limitations, or be induced by normal actions of the 
pilot in flight, while operating within the specified operating limits for the 
glider.
 A technical factor induced by abnormal operation of the glider (outside its 
operating limitations) will be deemed as pilot induced, and therefore not be 
counted within the technical failure category.
 A technical factor induced by the pilot on the ground (ie. rigging the glider) 
will still be counted as a technical factor, since for the purpose of this study 




3. An External Factor
 Any reasonably unforeseeable and reasonably unavoidable factor outside the 
glider, that made the flight difficult, or began the accident chain. External 
factors brought about by pilot actions or decisions (that were reasonably 
foreseeable) will be deemed to be pilot induced. For example striking a 
winch cable due to over-flying the winch while in operation.
 Normal weather conditions will not be counted as external factors, for 
example crosswind landings or cloud. Difficult flying conditions will only be 
counted as external factors where there were no reasonable signs or 
expectation of such conditions occurring.
 Lack of rising air (thermal, wave or ridge lift) will not be regarded as an 
external factor since such ‘lift’ is not reliable, is not required for safe glider 
operation and is not a hazardous condition for flight, unless the aircraft is put 
into a position such that a safe landing cannot be made.
4. General
 Accidents will only be categorised as being caused by technical and external 
factors where as well as the above, it is deemed that the occurrence directly 
led to a situation where the flight was made difficult for an average pilot. 
Launch failures (power failures and rope/cable breaks) will not be counted as 
external/mechanical factors because they are standard procedures which are 
trained for prior to solo and practiced during refresher and currency training. 
Additionally many cable/weak link breaks are induced by pilot actions.
5. Unknown
 Any accident where no causal events could be determined by the rater.
253
Appendix B
Guidelines for identifying and coding accident events within the 
accident narratives
1. Only text in the accident report descriptions and database fields should be used 
for the ratings.
2. The causal event must have occurred AFTER the glider was boarded for flight.
3. There must have been an identifiable performance shortfall in terms of the 
actions (or inactions) on the part of the pilot in command together with a 
reasonable opportunity for the pilot to act in such a way that could have avoided 
the event. This remains true even if the cause of the preceding event was deemed 
to be the fault of the pilot. 
4. Any event identified must include a contribution, by a pilot, to the accident 
chain, as opposed to being a passive part in it, or a technical contribution. In 
other words the situation must have been worsened by the event, not just 
continued. For example, a low final turn as a result of a low circuit would not be 
included in an undershoot accident, even though it occurred between the 
initiating event and the crash.
5. The events must be in chronological order.
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Appendices C and D
Table of all 59 causal factors with their working codes (chapter 6)
This can be used as a key for the subsequent reliability tables.
Low-level Causal factor categories Intermediate 














J1aii Allowed wing tip to touch the ground in a turn
J1aiii Landing Flare too high/ too early
J1aiv Landing Flare too low/ too late 
J1b Misjudged lateral separation from obstruction / object
J2a Flew too close in / (too high / too much energy) Misjudged 
positioning in 
circuit
J2b Flew too far out/ (too low / little energy)
J2c Misjudged alignment of final turn exit




J3aii Left airbrakes out too long 
J3aiii Insufficient reduction of airbrakes below glide path
J3aiv Applied landing flap too early
J3av Not known
J3bi Used too little airbrake Approach 
Misjudgement: 
Overshoot
J3bii Put airbrake away (any number of times)
J3c Continued until too late to safely execute alternative
J4 Cue misinterpreted








H1aii Overuse of up-elevator causing accelerated stall
H1aiii Overuse of up-elevator causing overly steep climb
H1aiv Overuse of up elevator causing tail strike in flare
H1av Overuse of down elevator




H1f Mishandled during an established aerotow
H2a Allowed/ failed to prevent wing going down Ground run 
after landingH2b Steering error (NOT misjudged lateral proximity)
H2ci Causing a re-light after landing by mishandling controls Mishandled 
Pitch during 
ground run
H2cii Causing a premature/exaggerated take-off on launch
H2ciii Causing an extended ground run on take off 
H2d Overuse of wheel brake
H3a Failed to maintain (or increase to) speed required Mishandled 
speedH3b Allowed unintentional increase of speed
H4 Changed hands on controls 
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Appendices C and D (continued) 
Table of all 59 flight causal factors from chapter 6
This can be used as a key for the subsequent reliability tables
S1a Continued into poor conditions
Continuing 






S1b Accepted launch into unfavourable conditions
S1c Continued with a marginal attempt to reach airfield
S1d Continued operating (e.g. thermal soaring) while too low
S1e Flew over an area with no safe landable options
S1f Continued with compromised launch
S2a Flew out of reach of airfield during intended local flight Flew out of 
reachS2b Flew out of reach of chosen field while x-country/ soaring 
S3 Compromised sighting of intended flight path
S4 Landed in an unsuitable field
S5 Chose unsuitable initial field leading to late rejection
S6 Chose to land on unusual/unfamiliar area of airfield
S7 Rejected straight ahead landing from launch failure
S8 Deliberately left wheel up 
S9 Direction of landing (into land-out field) unsuitable









A1b Did not notice another aircraft, or launch in progress
A1c Did not notice change in conditions
A2 Aircraft issue/setting overlooked
A3 Secondary control action omitted (unintentionally) Secondary 
control 
actions
A4 Action initiated but not completed. Eg. u/c, canopy lock
A5 Secondary control action slip
A6 Failed to correctly set/lock control/straps/seat 
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Appendix C part 1
Inter-rater reliability grid for reliability test (causal categories, chpr 6)
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Appendix C part 2
Alignment of 150 events in the reliability test
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Appendix D part 1
Intra-rater reliability grid for reliability test
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Appendix D part 2
Alignment of 150 events in the reliability test































































































































































Instructor rating (BI, Ass Cat/ Full Cat / Examiner etc)?
Age bracket 
(please circle)
Approx years of gliding





Reliability matrix for coding of all participant instructors comments 
regarding reasons behind their estimation of the experience level 
associated with the highest accident rates (chapter 8).
 Agreement = 87.8%
 Cohen’s Kappa = 0.85
Original rating







1 22 3 0 0 1 0 0 26
2 0 10 0 4 0 0 0 14
3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3
4 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 12
5 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 9
6 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 6
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
22 13 3 15 11 6 4 74
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Appendix G
The British Gliding Association Assistant Instructor Course Record 












ASI and speed monitoring
Trimming


























Effect of rudder near stall
Spin off thermal turn




Low circuit (turn in early)
Aerotow
Ground roll and take off
Normal tow
Recovery from vertical displacement






Low launch failure (land ahead)
Awkward' height launch failure












Pre solo training flights






The final CIT interview Schedule
“Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. I would like to record the interview for my 
notes. Within the next month I will transcribe it and then delete the recording. No one else will 
hear the recording, it will remain anonymous, and nothing you say will be identified. You are 
free to withdraw from the interview at any time and I will delete the recording on request. Once 
the data has been analysed, it will become completely anonymous, and so cannot be deleted 
after that point.”
“Instructors such as yourself are constantly observing and evaluating student pilots, and we 
wish to tap those expertise by asking you to recall some of your own experiences related to the 
evaluation of student pilots for the purpose of flying solo”
“We are trying to learn in detail what standard of flying is required from instructors in order to 
allow a pilot to be sent solo”
“We would like you to think back to a flight or session of flights that you have had with a 
student pilot within the last year or so, where at some point you were engaged in a process of 
assessment (formal or informal) with a view to sending the student solo after the dual flight or 
session was complete. Importantly, if they failed, at some point before or during the session 
there must have been at least a chance that you would have allowed them to fly solo after the 
session / flight. This could be a first solo, or an early-solo check flight (ie. day checks). We 
would like to avoid situations of currency checks or annual checks or checks for specific 
purposes such as cross-country flying, aerobatics, launch or type-conversions, because we are 
only interested in early-solo pilots”
Eliciting the CIT responses...
1. “Think of a student that you have flown with recently, preferably within the last year, 
under these circumstances, but don’t tell me their name.” 
2. “Did you allow them to fly solo that session?”
3. “What was it about that student’s flying that made you say [‘no’ / yes] on that 
occasion?”
Probes
 What preceded and contributed to the ‘incident’?
 What did the student do or not do that had an effect?
 What was the outcome or result?
 What made ‘this action’ effective or ineffective?
 What could have made the action more effective?
Activity specific probes:
 What part of the flight did it occur in?
 What was it about that student, or their flying that contributed to your decision?
 What specifically was it that they did or did not do?
“Thank you for your time, you have been very helpful. I’d like to remind you that all the 
information will remain anonymous and the recording will be deleted after being transcribed. 
Do you have any questions?”
Finally the participants were given contact details for further information.
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Appendix I
Initial CIT interview schedule for piloting 
Flanagan (1954) suggested forestalling any doubt in participant as to their selection by 
pointing out their position and the perspective that gives them on the activity. 
Additionally it was important to include the main CIT aim. These points accounted for 
the top section of the interview schedule. 
The following CIT questions were arrived for the purpose of piloting.
“We would like you to think back to a flight or session of flights that you have
had with a student pilot within the last year or so, where at some point you 
were engaged in a process of assessment (formal or informal) with a view to 
sending the student solo after the dual flight or session was complete. 
Importantly, prior to the flight or session there must have been at least a 
chance that you would have allowed them to fly solo that day. This could be a 
first solo or an early-solo check flight (ie. day checks). We would like to avoid 
situations of currency checks or annual checks or checks for specific purposes 
such as cross-country flying, aerobatics, launch or type-conversions, because 
we are only interested in early-solo pilots”. 
POSITIVE CIT QUESTION (pilot): “Staying tightly within this context, we 
want you to talk about a time when a student pilot satisfied you that they were 
of solo standard. Please describe what happened”
NEGATIVE CIT QUESTION (pilot): “Staying tightly within this context, we 
want you to talk about a time when a student pilot satisfied you that they were 
NOT of solo standard. Please describe what happened”
While piloting the questions, a problem emerged that was found to be consistent 
amoung all four participants. When asked the CIT questions, all began to in talk 
general way about the ‘solo decision’ process, rather than relating actual events.
De-briefings established the reasons behind this. Participants claimed that they 
wanted to preferred to explore the overall topic, some said they could not 
remember specific cases easily, and some had difficulty expressing exactly what 
the student did right or wrong (particularly what they did right). This further 
supported findings from the previous set of open interviews.
This piloting process led to the three stage interview schedule, as used.
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Appendix J
Guidelines for critical incident extraction from interview transcripts
Extraction should identify any observed behaviours of the student pilot that were 
effective or ineffective in attaining allowance to fly solo. In other words any unit of 
behaviour (action, inaction, decision, communication etc) that was meaningful in its 
own right with regard to the decision to allow or disallow solo flight. In addition to this, 
any single reason given by the instructor as to why a specific student was or was not 
sent solo should also be included. 
Issues around extracting critical incidents
1. Generality: There must be good reason to believe that the interviewee is 
referring to a specifically remembered case (or number of cases). Use of singular 
third party pronouns (he and she) is direct evidence of this, but care should be 
taken over the use of plural references such as ‘they’, ‘students’, people..’ etc.  
Such anecdotes may be deemed to come from specific events, but should be 
scrutinised, and referred to a second judge. Where interviewees are talking in 
general terms about the sort of problems that occur, or reasons that people are 
sent solo, these should be discounted.
2. ‘Reverse’ comments (when the interviewee mentions negative points while 
relating a positive anecdote, or vice-versa): Only where it is clear that events 
being referred to are specific and relate specifically to a pilot being allowed or 
not allowed to go solo, then such incidents can be included.
3. Bounding the incident: Each critical incident should contain descriptions of 
single behaviours or reasons that related to single skills or actions described by 
the instructor. For example “they got the nose down, and selected the right area 
to go and land in” would be two incidents because the two actions were separate 
phenomenon (not related in either time or skill).
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4. Repeated incidents: Some interviewees repeat the same incidents a number of 
times.  Care should be taken to recognise what is and what is not a repeat, and if 
doubt exists then a third judge used. If the same sort of incident occurs twice 
(eg. on one flight and then another, then this is not a repeat, because it would 
constitute two separate occurrences). Only discount a repeat if it is exactly the 
same event being talked about a second time. If the same specific incident is 
repeated then the repeats should be ignored if they contain less information than 
the first incident, or merged if there is more information to be gained. This 
prevents repeated comments being counted as two or more separate incidents.
Important: Highlighting of critical incidents: Critical incidents should be highlighted 
within transcripts with minimal context included around them. A different colour should 
be used for each incident within the same ‘story’ so that ‘repeated’ incidents can be 
highlighted in the same colours in order to indicate that these represent a single incident. 
Also any embellishments to an incident, or where an incident description is scattered 
within a narrative, all the parts relating to the single incident can be recognized as a 
single incident.
Where a part of the narrative is shared by two incidents it will be coloured grey to 
indicate that it is shared (or necessary context). For example where;  
“The circuit was his main problem, positioning on the one hand but also his speed 
control was terrible”




Inter-rater check on the matching of categories from chapter 6 (working codes included) to the 




B Low-level Causal factor categories Intermediate 














n11 n11 J1aii Allowed wing tip to touch the ground in a turn
n11 n11 J1aiii Landing Flare too high/ too early
n11 n11 J1aiv Landing Flare too low/ too late 
n11 n11 J1b Misjudged lateral separation from obstruction / object
n11 n11 J2a Flew too close in / (too high / too much energy) Misjudged 
positioning in 
circuit
n11 n11 J2b Flew too far out/ (too low / little energy)
n11 n11 J2c Misjudged alignment of final turn exit




n11 n11 J3aii Left airbrakes out too long 
n11 n11 J3aiii Insufficient reduction of airbrakes below glide path
n11 n11 J3aiv Applied landing flap too early
n11 n11 J3av Not known
n11 n11 J3bi Used too little airbrake Approach 
Misjudgement: 
Overshoot
n11 n11 J3bii Put airbrake away (any number of times)
n11 n11 J3c Continued until too late to safely execute alternative
n11 n11 J4 Cue misinterpreted








n3 n3 H1aii Overuse of up-elevator causing accelerated stall
n3 n3 H1aiii Overuse of up-elevator causing overly steep climb
n3 n3 H1aiv Overuse of up elevator causing tail strike in flare
n3 n3 H1av Overuse of down elevator
n3 n3 H1ci Not correcting/allowing for drift Mishandled in 
rolln3 n3 H1cii Mishandled sideslip
n3 n3 H1d Mishandled airbrakes
n3 n3 H1e Mishandled flaps
n3 n3 H1f Mishandled during an established aerotow
n3 n3 H2a Allowed/ failed to prevent wing going down Ground run 
after landingn3 n3 H2b Steering error (NOT misjudged lateral proximity)
n3 n3 H2ci Causing a re-light after landing by mishandling controls Mishandled 
Pitch during 
ground run
n3 n3 H2cii Causing a premature/exaggerated take-off on launch
n3 n3 H2ciii Causing an extended ground run on take off 
n3 n3 H2d Overuse of wheel brake
n6 n6 H3a Failed to maintain (or increase to) speed required Mishandled 
speedn6 n6 H3b Allowed unintentional increase of speed
n3 n3 H4 Changed hands on controls 
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Appendix K - continued
Inter-rater check on the matching of categories from chapter 6 (working codes 
included) to the top level categories from the CIT ‘meaning’ analysis
n5 n5 S1a Continued into poor conditions
Continuing 






n5 n5 S1b Accepted launch into unfavourable conditions
n5 n5 S1c Continued with a marginal attempt to reach airfield
n5 n5 S1d Continued operating (eg. thermal soaring) while too low
n5 n5 S1e Flew over an area with no safe landable options
n5 n5 S1f Continued with compromised launch
n5 n5 S2a Flew out of reach of airfield during intended local flight Flew out of 
reachn5 n5 S2b
Flew out of reach of chosen field while x-country/ 
soaring 
n5 n5 S3 Compromised sighting of intended flight path
n5 n5 S4 Landed in an unsuitable field
n5 n5 S5 Chose unsuitable initial field leading to late rejection
n5 n5 S6 Chose to land on unusual/unfamiliar area of airfield
n5 n5 S7 Rejected straight ahead landing from launch failure
n5 n5 S8 Deliberately left wheel up 
n5 n5 S9 Direction of landing (into land-out field) unsuitable
n1 n1 A1a Did not notice obstruction/ditch/undulation/slope 







n9 n9 A1b Did not notice another aircraft, or launch in progress
n1 n9 A1c Did not notice change in conditions
n1 n1 A2 Aircraft issue/setting overlooked
n1 n1 A3 Secondary control action omitted (unintentionally)
Secondary 
control actionsn1 n1 A4 Action initiated but not completed. Eg. u/c, canopy lock
n1 n1 A5 Secondary control action slip
n9 n1 A6 Failed to correctly set/lock control/straps/seat 
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Appendix L
Inter-rater reliability grid for testing the top level categories from the 
CIT ‘meaning’ analysis (key to category names overleaf)
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Appendix L (continued)
Key to category names in the inter-rater reliability test on the top level 
categories from the CIT ‘meaning’ analysis









n3 Behind the glider
n4 Circuit Planning and Judgement
n5 Consistency
n6 Gut Feeling




n11 Situation – Instructor conflict
n12 Soaring







p2 Circuit planning / Judgement
p3 Consistency
p4 Dealing Well With a Simulated Situation / Emergency
p5 ‘overall non-specific’
p6 Good non-technical skills





p12 Sent despite not quite right
p13 Situation-Instructor'
p14 Soaring
p15 Unusual Glider type
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Appendix M
Minor changes in categorisation of CIT data made following the inter-
rater testing
After the inter-rater reliability check, notes were made about any issues that appeared to 
arise, and the categories were scrutinised in discussion with the 2nd rater. Following 
these discussions, several small adjustments were made to some categories as follows:
 The ‘soaring’ category was collapsed into the ‘handling and control’ category for 
both positive and negative incidents.
 The category called “Sent solo despite not quite right” was collapsed into the 
general category. It was decided that this category did not represent a motive for 
sending someone solo, but more represented general comments on a person’s ability 
being of an acceptable standard (regardless of other issues).
 The positive category called “Good Non-Technical Skills” was dropped, and the 
sub-categories which belonged to it were redistributed. This category had been made 
up of three positive sub categories; ‘situational awareness’, ‘decisions’ and 
‘judgement’. ‘Situational awareness’ was given its own category of ‘in flight 
attention’ (in line with the negative categorisation, since it was decided that the 
incidents categorised as such were expressing issues of awareness, attention issues 
and general comments about situational awareness). ‘Decisions’ was also given its 
own category (‘Decisions’). Judgement was collapsed into the ‘Circuit Planning / 
Judgement’ category, after looking through the incidents and discovering that all 
positive incidents of this type were referring to circuit planning judgement.
 Two smaller categories called ‘gut feeling’ were discussed at length. These 
categories represented comments from instructors expressing an intangible feeling 
(or discomfort) that they had about the situation. It was decided that these should be 
merged into the categories “Situation - instructor conflict’ and ‘situation - instructor 
harmony’. This resulted in a single positive and a single negative category catering 
for comments directly related to the flights or sessions but where general 
phenomenon had been expressed by reference to the instructor rather than the 
student. Both top level categories of ‘gut feeling’ were simply replications of the 2nd
levels categories of the same name and so both remained unchanged as 2nd level 
categories.
 Some minor name changes were made to standardise the wording of similar positive 
and negative categories (e.g. “Good Speed Control” was changed to “Airspeed 
Control (pos)” to align with the name of the parallel negative category. All such 
parallel categories were given a suffix of ‘(pos)’ or ‘(neg’) in order to denote the 




Tracking of redundancy (of critical incidents) during data collection in 
order to establish coverage of the subject area and cease data collection 
at the appropriate time
Concurrently with the collection and categorisation of incidents, redundancy of 
categories was checked in order to find out when enough data had been collected to be 
sure that the subject area had been fully covered. After each batch (of between 50 and 
63 incidents) was analysed, the number of new categories to have emerged from that 
batch was noted (a ‘new’ category was formed where an incident was found that could 
not be categorised with any previous incident). Twelve batches were required (each 
represented by a row in the table below) giving a total of 660 incidents. Each batch 
contained positive and negative incidents in varying amounts (for practical reasons). 
The total number of new categories that emerged from each batch is shown in the right-
hand column of table, and can be seen to have reduced consistently until no new 


























1 58 16 42 15 29 43
2 57 29 28 16 18 34
3 53 17 36 5 17 22
4 52 16 36 8 8 16
5 59 37 22 9 5 15
6 53 17 36 5 8 13
7 58 9 49 0 9 9
8 51 5 46 1 8 9
9 55 27 28 2 4 6
10 50 11 39 0 2 2
11 51 27 24 1 1 2
12 63 17 46 0 0 0
660 228 432 62 109 171
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Appendix N (continued)
The above graph shows the number of new categories that emerged per batch of 
(approx) 50 - 60 critical incidents, and hence illustrates the trend of the redundancy. It 
was determined that since no new incidents emerged from the last batch, and the 
numbers emerging from the two preceding batches were so low, a point had been 
reached where no further data collection was required in order to cover the subject area. 
The final batch is larger than the others because even though full redundancy was found 
with the batch of 50 incidents, there were still some incidents remaining to be 





















The 108 negative categories (from CIT analysis)
Top level categories are numbered as in Table 9.2, using N or P to represent negative or 
positive, then a number from 1 to 12 to represent the category. Mid level categories are 
numbered using a reference to the top level category to which they belong followed by 
their second level number (e.g. N7.1 means the first mid-level category of N7 [‘Indirect 
Issues’] which is ‘N7.1 - non-flying issues’). In the same way N7.1.4 is the fourth low 
level category of N7.1, which is N.7.1.4 - ‘Missed out a pre-flight item’. In this way, the 
follow tables (Appendix O and P) can be used to trace the category structure for all 170 
low level categories.
Ref Category title n % 
N 1.1.1 drifting downwind 1 0.2
N 1.1.2 fixation on a single task 4 0.9
N 1.1.3 IP - poor situational awareness (general) 6 1.4
N 1.1.4 IP - poor situational awareness (height) 2 0.5
N 1.1.5 IP - poor situational awareness (location) 7 1.6
N 1.1.6 IP - poor situational awareness (traffic) 2 0.5
N 1.1.7 not noticing / reacting to sink 5 1.2
N 1.1.8 control slip 1 0.2
N 2.1.1 IP - behind the aircraft 8 1.9
N 2.1.2 IP - slow reactions 2 0.5
N 3.1.1 general handling poor 8 1.9
N 3.1.2 Inaccurate flying 2 0.5
N 3.1.3 IP - not flying positively 4 0.9
N 3.1.4 manner of controlling 2 0.5
N 3.1.5 Not flying smoothly 3 0.7
N 3.1.6 not keeping wings level 2 0.5
N 3.1.7 turn co-ordination poor 11 2.5
N 3.1.8 co-ordination general poor 5 1.2
N 3.2.1 Soaring (lack of ability) 1 0.2
N 3.3.1 allowing a back release 1 0.2
N 3.3.2 not allowing for drift on launch 3 0.7
N 3.3.3 Not pulling hard enough on winch 4 0.9
N 3.3.4 pulling too hard on winch 5 1.2
N 3.3.5 releasing too early 1 0.2
N 3.3.6 too steep on winch 3 0.7
N 3.3.7 aerotow handling 5 1.2
N 3.4.1 Over-controlling - nose down too far after recovery. 1 0.2
N 3.5.1 over-ruddered final turn 1 0.2
N 3.5.2 Under-banked final turn 1 0.2
N 3.5.3 Not transitioning to the approach cleanly 1 0.2
N 3.6.1 lowered nose to counter overshoot (Insufficient airbrake) 2 0.5
N 3.7.1 closing brakes on roundout 3 0.7
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N 3.7.2 inappropriate use of airbrakes in circuit 2 0.5
N 3.7.3 Airbrake setting 1 0.2
N 3.7.4 airbrakes in the turn 2 0.5
N 3.8.1 over pitching in roundout 2 0.5
N 3.8.4 roundout general 5 1.2
N 3.8.5 Flying it onto the ground 3 0.7
N 3.9.1 not controlling the ground run 1 0.2
N 4.1.1 IP - gut-feel 2 0.5
N 4.2.1 IP - feel uncomfortable 2 0.5
N 4.2.2 IP - Instructor Intervention 3 0.7
N 4.2.3 IP - Nearly took over 1 0.2
N 4.2.4 IP - not doing what I would do 2 0.5
N 5.1.1 Decision making 2 0.5
N 5.1.2 IP - Perceived uncertainty 1 0.2
N 5.2.1 bad positioning after cable break 4 0.9
N 5.2.2 Land-out field choice unsuitable 1 0.2
N 5.2.3 Tried to go straight ahead after cable break 5 1.2
N 5.2.4 Turned too late after cable break 1 0.2
N 5.2.5 Turned wrong way after cable break 6 1.4
N 5.2.6 Turned, instead of going straight ahead 1 0.2
N 5.3.1 Alignment of final turn exit 2 0.5
N 5.3.2 approaching towards an obstruction / aircraft 7 1.6
N 6.1.1 Accidental stall 1 0.2
N 6.1.2 no recovery actioned 3 0.7
N 6.1.3 slow to recover speed 5 1.2
N 6.1.4 too slow final turn 1 0.2
N 6.1.5 too slow in circuit 4 0.9
N 6.1.6 too slow on the winch 1 0.2
N 6.1.7 turning with insufficient speed 2 0.5
N 6.2.1 speed not under control 22 5.1
N 6.3.1 too fast 5 1.2
N 6.3.2 too fast in circuit 7 1.6
N 7.1.1 circumstances 1 0.2
N 7.1.2 ineffective or incorrect pre-flight checks 4 0.9
N 7.1.3 knowledge poor 2 0.5
N 7.1.4 missed out a pre-flight item 3 0.7
N 7.1.5 no logbook 1 0.2
N 7.1.6 straps not done up properly 1 0.2
N 7.1.7 Based on other information 2 0.5
N 7.2.1 performance assessment 7 1.6
N 7.2.2 IP - over self critical / analytic 1 0.2
N 7.3.1 attitude issue 5 1.2
N 7.3.2 IP - over-confidence 4 0.9
N 7.3.3 IP - Panic / stress 1 0.2
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N 7.3.4 IP - Physical tension 4 0.9
N 7.3.5 IP - too tired 2 0.5
N 7.3.6 IP - under-confident 5 1.2
N 7.3.7 IP - wrong frame of mind 1 0.2
N 8.1.1 General Inconsistency 9 2.1
N 8.2.1 accumulation of things 2 0.5
N 8.2.2 repeating a mistake on the next flight 2 0.5
N 9.1.1 airmanship 1 0.2
N 9.1.2 Flew too close to another glider for the instructors liking 1 0.2
N 9.1.3 lookout 13 3.0
N 10.1.1 IP - overloaded 7 1.6
N 10.1.2 IP - perceived reliance on the instructor 5 1.2
N 10.1.3 IP - wouldn't cope in emergencies 4 0.9
N 10.1.4 not coping with pressure / unusual / emergency situations 17 3.9
N 11.1.1 Base leg too close 3 0.7
N 11.1.2 circuit continuation - not aborting circuit 8 1.9
N 11.1.3 circuit planning general error(s) 8 1.9
N 11.1.4 Circuit wrong side 4 0.9
N 11.1.5 Extended base leg too far 1 0.2
N 11.1.6 extended circuit too far downwind 8 1.9
N 11.1.7 general circuit judgement poor 9 2.1
N 11.1.8 IP - Using a rigid circuit method, rather than judgement 6 1.4
N 11.1.9 judging where to joining the circuit 2 0.5
N 11.1.10 Not selecting an appropriate landing area while in circuit 3 0.7
N 11.1.11 Too close in during circuit 8 1.9
N 11.1.12 too far out in circuit 5 1.2
N 11.1.13 too high in circuit 6 1.4
N 11.1.14 too low in circuit 15 3.5
N 11.1.15 turning away from the airfield in circuit 3 0.7
N 11.1.16 unable to plan a circuit 1 0.2
N 11.2.1 Rounded out too high / early 5 1.2
N 11.2.2 Rounded out too low / late 18 4.2
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Appendix O
The 62 positive categories (from CIT analysis)
Ref Category title n % 
P 1.1.1 situational awareness 6 2.6
P 2.1.1 instant reaction - other aircraft 1 0.4
P 2.1.2 instant reaction - sink 1 0.4
P 2.1.3 instant reaction - tug wave off 1 0.4
P 3.1.1 Accuracy / Finesse 5 2.2
P 3.1.2 co ordination good 2 0.9
P 3.1.3 general handling of the glider 4 1.8
P 3.1.4 Positive flying 1 0.4
P 3.2.1 Soaring good 1 0.4
P 3.3.1 Launch good 3 1.3
P 3.3.2 Launch safe 1 0.4
P 3.4.1 good approach control maintained despite overshoot 1 0.4
P 3.5.1 Landing good 6 2.6
P 3.5.2 Landing safe 1 0.4
P 4.1.1 instructor felt confident 5 2.2
P 4.1.2 Intangible / gut feeling 5 2.2
P 4.2.1 did what I would have done 4 1.8
P 4.2.2 Instructor feeling unnecessary 1 0.4
P 4.2.3 Instructor felt comfortable 3 1.3
P 4.2.4 Instructor not having to do or say anything 7 3.1
P 4.2.5 Instructor was not worried / uncomfortable / uneasy etc 6 2.6
P 5.1.1 Decisions good 3 1.3
P 6.1.1 Speed Control Good 8 3.5
P 7.1.1 Knowledge good 1 0.4
P 7.1.2 Pre-flight check very good 2 0.9
P 7.2.1 performance assessment 3 1.3
P 7.3.1 General impression of student 4 1.8
P 7.3.2 methodical approach 2 0.9
P 7.3.3 relaxed 2 0.9
P 7.3.4 student was confident 6 2.6
P 7.3.5 student was enthusiastic 1 0.4
P 7.4.1 solo overdue 4 1.8
P 7.4.2 Student flown a lot recently 1 0.4
P 7.4.3 Felt I had to, despite not wanting to 3 1.3
P 8.1.1 demonstrated consistency 9 4.0
P 9.1.1 Good Airmanship 1 0.4
P 9.1.2 lookout good 3 1.3
P 10.1.1 Dealt well with various simulated 'emergencies' 6 2.6
P 10.1.2 IP - will cope with emergencies 5 2.2
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P 10.1.3 Sim situation - recognised the spin 1 0.4
P 10.1.4 Sim situation - recognised the stall 1 0.4
P 10.1.5 Sim situation - recovered from spin 3 1.3
P 10.1.6 Sim situation - recovered from stall 2 0.9
P 10.1.7 Sim situation - well handled launch failure 9 4.0
P 11.1.1 Circuit good 5 2.2
P 11.1.2 Circuit planning good 3 1.3
P 11.1.3 Judgement good 6 2.6
P 11.1.4 modified plan - altered circuit 3 1.3
P 11.1.5 modified plan - modified landing area 5 2.2
P 11.1.6 Recognised a problem in circuit 4 1.8
P 11.1.7 Sim situation - dealt well with simulated OOP in circuit 3 1.3
P 12.1.1 IP - competent 6 2.6
P 12.1.2 IP - safe 2 0.9
P 12.1.3 IP - student was in control 2 0.9
P 12.1.4 On top of things 2 0.9
P 12.2.1 everything was right 16 7.0
P 12.3.1 Despite problems 2 0.9
P 12.4.1 no reason not to send 5 2.2
P 12.4.2 nothing notably wrong 12 5.3
P 12.5.1 spare capacity 2 0.9
P 12.5.2 talking - pointing out what's happening 4 1.8
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Appendix Q
Inter-rater reliability grid for flight phase reliability check on the CIT 
data.
